Title
Kristine Calubaquib-Diaz vs. Dino Lopez Diaz and Republic
Case
G.R. No. 235033
Decision Date
Oct 12, 2022
Kristine filed for nullity of marriage due to Dino's psychological incapacity, but the Supreme Court ruled the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Dino due to improper service of summons, voiding the judgment.
nullity of
marriage
service of
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 235033)

Core Facts of the Relationship and Petition

Kristine and Dino began a relationship in 2009, cohabited at Dino’s residence in Angono, Rizal, and married on June 28, 2010. Kristine bore their son on November 21, 2010. Throughout their relationship and after marriage, Kristine alleges that Dino engaged in repeated extramarital affairs, neglected marital and parental duties, relied on Kristine and her parents financially, and admitted that he married her for money. Kristine filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on May 2, 2013, alleging Dino’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Procedural History Through Trial Court Decision

Summons issued to respondent were returned unserved. The process server reported two attempts (May 24 and June 10, 2013) at the address reflected in the summons; the security guard said respondent visited only occasionally and was residing in Antipolo City. Petitioner moved for alias summons and leave to serve by publication; the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted service by publication on August 8, 2013. After a brief archival and reinstatement, trial proceeded without appearance or defense by respondent or the Office of the Solicitor General. The RTC rendered an August 12, 2015 Decision declaring the marriage null and void for respondent’s psychological incapacity and ordered the publication of the dispositive portion per the applicable rule.

Court of Appeals Ruling and Grounds

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC decision, holding the RTC lacked jurisdiction over respondent because the process server’s return failed to show adequate efforts at personal service or pursuit of substituted service. The CA found the process server neither inquired about respondent’s current residence beyond the guarded address nor attempted substituted service (leaving copies with a person of suitable age and discretion) despite information that respondent frequented the address and lived elsewhere. The CA concluded that the immediate resort to summons by publication was defective.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed two issues: (1) whether summons was validly served upon respondent by publication, and (2) whether the Office of the Solicitor General was estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction over respondent’s person given its earlier conduct in the proceedings.

Legal Standards on Jurisdiction and Service of Summons

The Court reiterated that jurisdiction to render binding decisions requires acquisition of: (a) the subject matter; (b) the res (thing); (c) the parties; and (d) the remedy. Jurisdiction over respondents is acquired by valid service of summons or voluntary submission; absence or defect in service is a jurisdictional and due process defect rendering judgments void. Personal service is the preferred mode; substituted service and service by publication are exceptional and allowed only when personal service is impossible after diligent efforts. The Court emphasized established requirements: the process server must make several attempts (defined as at least three tries, preferably on at least two different dates), narrate in the return why personal service was unsuccessful, specify efforts to locate the defendant, and, when invoking substituted service, state service upon a person of suitable age and discretion or explain why substituted service is infeasible. Service by publication requires an even stricter showing that the respondent’s identity or whereabouts is unknown despite diligent inquiry and prior resort to personal and substituted service.

Application of the Legal Standards to the Case Facts

Applying these standards, the Supreme Court found the process server’s return inadequate. Only two attempts were recorded; the return reflected that the security guard stated respondent visited occasionally and was presently residing in Antipolo City. That information—i.e., that respondent frequented the summoned address and an alternative city of residence—was a lead that the process server could have pursued by a third attempt at the address, inquiry into the Antipolo lead, or substituted service (leaving the summons with a person of suitable age and discretion). The Court held the process server did not exercise the requisite diligence or zeal to accomplish personal service, and petitioner improperly and prematurely sought service by publication without first pursuing substituted service or further inquiry that the return suggested would be likely to succeed. Because the statutory and jurisprudential prerequisites for substituted service and for publication were not met, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over respondent’s person, and its decision was void.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Arguments (Including Reliance on Macasaet and In Rem Character)

Petitioner argued that three attempts are not mandatory and relied on Macasaet for fewer attempts being acceptable and further contended that a proceeding to nullify a marriage is in rem so jurisdiction over the res sufficed. The Court distinguished Macasaet: in that case, the sheriff reasonably concluded a third attempt would be futile based on the specific facts, and substitu

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