Title
Keister vs. Navarro
Case
G.R. No. L-29067
Decision Date
May 31, 1977
James Keister contested jurisdiction in a case involving unauthorized sale of a Batjak-owned car, claiming improper summons service; Supreme Court ruled in his favor, nullifying trial court orders due to defective summons.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-29067)

Factual Background

Batjak, Inc. purchased a Dodge 440 four-door sedan on November 12, 1965 for P19,000.00 and registered it under Registration Certificate No. 1160094.
On December 27, 1966, James A. Keister, then President and General Manager of Batjak, Inc., sold the automobile to Juan T. Chuidian for P5,000.00.
Two days later, on December 29, 1966, Chuidian reconveyed the automobile to Keister for P5,000.00, and Keister registered the vehicle in his own name with the Land Transportation Commission.
Batjak, Inc. alleged that the December 27 and December 29 transfers occurred without its authority, knowledge or consent.
Batjak, Inc. regained physical possession of the automobile on March 30, 1967, but the vehicle disappeared from the NIDC Compound in May 1967 and was recovered by the Land Transportation Commission on October 16, 1967. The Land Transportation Commission delivered the automobile to the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary for investigation.

Commencement of Civil Action and Service

On November 22, 1967, Batjak, Inc. filed Civil Case No. 10392 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, against the Criminal Investigation Service and James A. Keister, praying for annulment of the sale, attachment of the automobile, cancellation of the registration issued in favor of Keister, issuance of a new registration in favor of Batjak, Inc., and recovery of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
The complaint alleged that Keister, an American citizen, might be served "c/o Chuidian Law Office, Suite 801, JMT Bldg., Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal" and averred that Keister had "secretly and surreptitiously left the Philippines for the United States" on or about March 27, 1967.
A summons with the complaint attached was served on December 1, 1967, purportedly at the Chuidian Law Office and acknowledged by one Vicente Basallote, an office clerk.

Trial Court Motions and Orders

On December 15, 1967, Keister, through counsel, filed a special appearance and a motion to dismiss contending that the Court had no jurisdiction over his person because service was not effected at his residence or regular place of business as required by law.
The motion was heard December 23, 1967, and on January 12, 1968 the respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss. The January 12 Order rested on the complaint’s averment that service could be made "c/o Chuidian Law Office" and on the proof of service indicating that the summons and complaint had in fact been received at that office.
Keister moved for reconsideration on February 7, 1968. Batjak, Inc. opposed. By Order dated March 28, 1968, the respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration and directed the defendants to file answers within ten days.

Petition for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction

Petitioner Keister invoked a special civil action for prohibition to prevent Judge Pedro C. Navarro from enforcing the orders requiring him to answer and from proceeding to trial in Civil Case No. 10392 on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition accompanied by a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court, on June 22, 1968, granted a writ of preliminary injunction pendente lite upon the filing of a bond.

Issue Presented

The sole issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Court of First Instance had lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner James A. Keister by the service of summons effected at the Chuidian Law Office.

Governing Law on Service of Summons

The Court reiterated that service of summons is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of a defendant and that trial and judgment without valid service are null and void. The Court emphasized that service is for the defendant’s benefit and that its purpose is both to confer jurisdiction and to afford an opportunity to be heard.
The Court stated the general rule that summons must be served personally and that substituted service is permissible only when personal service cannot be effected within a reasonable time. The Court observed that the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating the efforts made and their failure in the proof of service because substituted service is extraordinary and in derogation of the common law.
The Court quoted Section 8, Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court, which permits substituted service by leaving copies at the defendant’s dwelling or residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein or by leaving copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with a competent person in charge. The Court explained that the terms "dwelling house" and "residence" refer to the place where the defendant was living at the time of service and that "office" or "regular place of business" likewise refer to the defendant’s actual office at the time of service.

Application of Law to the Facts

The Court found it undisputed that Keister’s residence was 11 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, and that his office or regular place of business, prior to his temporary departure, was the Batjak corporation office in Sarmiento Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
The Court found it conceded that service was not effected at either the residence or the regular place of business in the manner prescribed by the Rules. The Court held that the allegation that Keis



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