Case Summary (G.R. No. 233073)
Petitioners’ constitutional and procedural contentions
Petitioners argued that Sections 28(a)–(b) permit evictions and demolitions without prior court order and thus violate due process (Section 1, Article III) and the constitutional protection of the liberty of abode (Section 6, Article III). They invoked the right to adequate housing (referenced under RA 7279 and UDHR) and alleged past violent evictions contrary to constitutional guarantees (Section 10, Article XIII). They filed a direct Rule 65 petition, asserting absence of plain, speedy, and adequate remedy and claiming direct injury and public importance to establish standing.
Respondents’ principal defenses and procedural objections
Respondents raised multiple procedural defects: (1) the petitioners bypassed the hierarchy of courts by filing directly in the Supreme Court; (2) they improperly invoked prohibition and mandamus when the acts at issue are discretionary and not the proper targets of those writs; (3) many challenged evictions had already been effected, rendering parts of the petition moot; (4) claims were time‑barred in instances where petitioners received notices months earlier; and (5) RA 7279 and its IRR already provide procedural safeguards (including 30‑day notice and consultation) that satisfy the Constitution. Respondents also argued that liberty of abode does not confer a right to occupy others’ property and that implementation of RA 7279 in good faith is not grave abuse of discretion.
Issues presented to the Court
The Court distilled the issues as: (1) whether the petition must be dismissed for procedural defects (including violations of the hierarchy of courts and misuse of Rule 65 remedies); and (2) whether Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate Sections 1 and 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution by authorizing evictions/demolitions without court order.
The Court’s ruling on forum and the principle of hierarchy of courts
The Court dismissed the petition chiefly for procedural defects. It held that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and not the appropriate first forum for Rule 65 petitions absent exceptional justification. Although concurrent jurisdiction exists among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Regional Trial Courts to issue extraordinary writs, that concurrence does not grant petitioners unfettered choice of forum. Direct filing before the Supreme Court improperly taxed the Court’s limited time and diverted attention from matters of exclusive jurisdiction; trial courts are better suited to fact‑intensive inquiries and the Supreme Court is not the trier of facts.
The Court’s analysis on the improper use of writs of prohibition and mandamus
The Court found that petitioners misused petitions for prohibition and mandamus. A writ of prohibition targets usurpation or grave abuse of judicial, quasi‑judicial or ministerial jurisdiction; a writ of mandamus compels performance of a ministerial duty. The statute’s use of the permissive term "may" in Section 28(a)–(b) shows that the decision to execute eviction/demolition under those subsections is discretionary, not ministerial or judicial. Because the duty was discretionary—i.e., the public officer must exercise judgment as to the timing and circumstances of eviction/demolition—mandamus and prohibition were not proper remedies to control that judgment.
The Court’s view on justiciability and necessity of constitutional adjudication
Even if the petition were treated as certiorari attacking the constitutionality of Section 28(a)–(b), the petitioners failed to meet requisites for judicial review of a statute: (1) an actual case or controversy; (2) personal and substantial interest; (3) recourse to judicial review at the earliest opportunity; and (4) necessity of the constitutional question to decision of the case. The Court emphasized the lis mota principle: the constitutionality of a law should not be decided unless resolution of the constitutional question is unavoidable. Because several evictions had already occurred (rendering the controversy moot as to certain respondents) and because other non‑constitutional grounds could dispose of the petition, the Court declined to reach the constitutional merits.
Precedent relied upon and consistency with prior rulings
The Court cited Magkalas v. NHA (G.R. No. 138823) where the Court previously affirmed instances in which evictions and demolitions could validly be carried out without judicial order, including Section 28(a)–(b) of RA 7279. The Magkalas line was invoked to show that summary eviction/demolition under the enumerated statutory circumstances has precedent and that RA 7279’s grant of authority is not per se unconstitutional.
On procedural safeguards in RA 727
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 233073)
Nature of the Case and Reliefs Sought
- Original petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus filed directly with the Supreme Court (Rule 65) on March 23, 2012.
- Petitioners sought to enjoin public respondents from evicting individual petitioners and petitioner-association members from dwellings in San Juan, Navotas, and Quezon City without any court order.
- Petitioners sought to compel respondents to afford judicial process prior to evictions and demolitions, effectively requiring prior court eviction/demolition orders before implementation of Section 28(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act).
- Primary objective: declare Sections 28(a) and 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279 unconstitutional insofar as they authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order.
Factual Antecedents
- Petitioners (Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners' Association, and individual petitioners Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas, Jocy Lopez, Elvira Vidol, Delia Frayres) occupied parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon City (collectively referred to as LGUs).
- The LGUs served notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 7279 to make way for government infrastructure projects with available funding such as construction of city hall, roads, and public school (Annexes D–F, 1–3).
- Petitioners alleged prior violent evictions and demolitions by respondents, contrary to constitutional protections and statutory prescriptions.
Statutory Provision at Issue (Text and Scope)
- Section 28, paragraph 1, R.A. No. 7279 (as quoted in the decision):
- "Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. a Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations: (a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; (b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or (c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition."
- The use of the permissive word "may" in Section 28 indicates discretionary authority for evictions/demolitions under subsections (a) and (b).
Mandatory Procedural Safeguards in Section 28(2) of R.A. No. 7279 (as Quoted)
- When executing eviction/demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following are mandatory:
- Notice to affected persons/entities at least thirty (30) days prior to eviction/demolition.
- Adequate consultations with duly designated representatives of families and affected communities regarding relocation.
- Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction/demolition.
- Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition.
- Execution only during regular office hours (Mondays–Fridays) and during good weather, unless affected families consent otherwise.
- No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for permanent, concrete structures.
- Proper uniforms for PNP members who shall occupy the first line of law enforcement and who shall observe proper disturbance control procedures.
- Adequate relocation, temporary or permanent; for evictions/demolitions pursuant to a court order, relocation to be undertaken by LGU and NHA within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment, with financial assistance if relocation is not possible within said period.
- DILG and HUDCC to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the above.
Petitioners’ Claims and Legal Grounds
- Procedural claim: petitioners asserted they had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and therefore directly filed with the Supreme Court.
- Substantive constitutional claims:
- Section 28(a) and (b) offend the constitutional right to due process (Section 1, Article III) and liberty of abode (Section 6, Article III) by permitting evictions/demolitions without court order.
- Violation of right to adequate housing, referencing Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 7279.
- Alleged prior violent evictions contrary to Section 10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution (urban/rural poor shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner).
- Standing and urgency: petitioners alleged direct injury and alternatively invoked transcendental public importance to justify standing.
Respondents’ Principal Arguments
- Overall procedural attack:
- Petition improperly filed directly with the Supreme Court, violating the hierarchy of courts and principle that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort.
- Rule 65 petition for prohibition and mandamus incorrectly invoked to challenge constitutionality and respondents’ actions.
- Petition failed to allege specific grave abuse of discretion by public respondents.
- Petition rendered moot or academic with respect to LGUs (Navotas and San Juan) which had allegedly already effected evictions.
- Petition filed out of time in Navotas where notice of intended eviction was given on September 23, 2011 (challenged as late filing).
- Substantive defenses:
- Section 10, Article XIII of the Constitution allows evictions/demolitions without court order provided they are "in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner"; R.A. No. 7279 qualifies as such law.
- R.A. No. 7279 and its implementing rules and regulations provide adequate safeguards (e.g., 30 days notice, consultations, relocation) to ensure just and humane execution.
- Liberty of abode is not unlimited and does not include vested right to occupy another’s property; petitioners have no vested property right to occupy lands they do not own.
- Faithful implementation of R.A. No. 7279 by mayors and agencies cannot be equated to grave abuse of discretion.
Positions of Individual Public Respondents (as pled in Comments)
- Mayor of Navotas:
- Seeks dismissal for procedural defects, contends petitioners violated hierarchy of courts, misused Rule 65 remedies.
- Argues Section 28 and IRR provide 30-day notice and consultation; petitioners have no vested right to trespass on property.
- Notes Navotas had successfully evicted petitioners in San Roque (November 28, 2011).
- Mayor of San Juan:
- Argues improper use of prohibition and mandamus; asserts she performed neither judicial nor ministerial functions when implementing RA 7279.
- A