Case Summary (G.R. No. 75502)
Factual Background: The Promissory Notes and the Alleged Indebtedness
On 17 November 1976, Joaquin Miguel de Jesus and Alfredo T. Salonga, in the capacities of President-General Manager and Comptroller, respectively, of P.B. De Jesus and Company, Inc., executed promissory note PBC No. 1202-76 in the amount of P600,000.00, payable on 29 December 1976, bearing interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per annum from the date of execution until paid, with an automatic increase in interest if unpaid at maturity. On 2 December 1976, they executed promissory note PBC No. 1255-76 for P300,000.00, payable on or before 3 January 1977, under substantially the same interest framework.
Both instruments were signed not only “for and in behalf of” the corporation but also in the signatories’ “personal capacities.” After a corporate name change on 5 March 1978, P.B. De Jesus and Company, Inc. became Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation, an act that was later validated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Despite several letters of demand served by respondent Bank, petitioner Kalilid disowned the alleged indebtedness under both promissory notes.
Initiation of the Civil Action and Procedural Posture in the Trial Court
On 15 May 1981, respondent Bank filed a complaint for collection (Civil Case No. 41268) before Branch 23 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Seventh Judicial District) against petitioner Kalilid and Messrs. de Jesus and Salonga. The complaint alleged that Kalilid, as principal, was solidarily liable under the promissory notes, together with the individual defendants who had signed for and on behalf of the corporation and in their own personal capacities. The complaint further alleged that, as of 30 April 1981, the total indebtedness had grown to P1,780,253.08, consisting of P1,186,496.96 under PBC No. 1202-76 and P593,756.12 under PBC No. 1255-76. To support those figures, respondent Bank attached two Statements of Account as Annexes “C” and “D,” respectively, and the promissory notes as Annexes “A” and “B.”
In its Answer dated 10 July 1981, petitioner Kalilid asserted a lack of knowledge to form a belief regarding the truth of the material allegations. As an affirmative defense, it claimed that authority to borrow on its behalf had not been granted to Messrs. de Jesus and Salonga, and that they should be solely liable. Notably, the Answer was not verified. The trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice as to Messrs. de Jesus and Salonga due to their whereabouts being unascertained. No amicable settlement was reached during pre-trial. Thereafter, respondent Bank moved for summary judgment, to which petitioner Kalilid did not raise any objection or opposition.
Trial Court Ruling: Summary Judgment and Basis of Liability
In a three-page decision dated 12 October 1983, the trial court found petitioner Kalilid liable for the obligations under PBC No. 1202-76 and PBC No. 1255-76. The dispositive portion ordered petitioner to pay: (i) P1,780,253.08 plus legal interest from April 9, 1981 until full payment; (ii) attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due; and (iii) the costs of suit.
The trial court grounded its ruling primarily on two considerations. First, it treated petitioner’s failure to verify its Answer as amounting to an admission of the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes annexed to the complaint. Second, it noted that the disputed promissory notes had been signed by Messrs. de Jesus and Salonga both “for and in behalf of” the corporation and in their personal capacities. Summary judgment was thus rendered on the premise that no genuine issue existed as to the existence and authenticity of the promissory notes and petitioner’s resulting liability under them.
Appellate Review: Intermediate Appellate Court Affirmation
Petitioner appealed, but the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in toto. In its decision dated 8 November 1985, the appellate court rejected petitioner’s contention that the promissory notes only covered P900,000.00, and that respondent Bank failed to prove how the total indebtedness rose to P1,780,253.08. The appellate court treated the argument as “flimsy” and emphasized that the promissory notes, being due and demandable since their respective maturity dates, bore 14% interest and contained a stipulation for attorney’s fees of 10% of the amount due, including interest, if collection was pursued through a lawyer. It also relied on the fact that respondent Bank had attached the Statements of Account (Annexes “A” and “B” as described in that portion of the decision) as integral parts of the complaint, and that those statements reflected charges for past due interest and penalty charges, culminating in a total of P1,780,253.08 as of April 30, 1981. The appellate court further reasoned that the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes and statements of account were deemed admitted due to petitioner’s failure to deny under oath.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 29 July 1986.
Issues Raised in the Petition for Review
In its Petition for Review, petitioner no longer disputed the fact of its liability under the promissory notes, but it challenged the correctness of the aggregate amount claimed by respondent Bank. Petitioner argued that while it may have impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes as a result of its failure to deny under oath and verify its Answer, such admission should not be extended to the Statements of Account (Annexes “C” and “D”). It claimed that no duly authorized representative participated in the preparation of the statements, and thus petitioner did not effectively admit their contents. Petitioner also objected to respondent Bank’s inclusion of service charges, penalty charges, and interest charges on past due interest, contending that these were not part of its undertakings under either promissory note.
The Court’s Ruling on Deemed Admissions: Promissory Notes Versus Statements of Account
The Court agreed with the trial court and the appellate court that petitioner’s failure to verify its Answer resulted in the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes PBC No. 1202-76 and PBC No. 1255-76, since those instruments were annexed to and made the basis of the complaint. Consequently, defenses aimed at negating the existence and validity of those promissory notes—such as spuriousness, forgery, unauthorized signatures, corporate authorization issues, misrepresentation of signing capacity, or non-delivery—were treated as effectively foreclosed, placing petitioner in estoppel from disclaiming liability under the notes.
However, the Court held that the lower courts erred when they expanded the scope of petitioner’s implied admission so as to include the Statements of Account annexed to the complaint. The Court invoked Rule 8, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that when an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument copied in or attached to a pleading, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument are deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth the facts being claimed. The Court further noted the rule’s specific limitation: the provision does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument, or when compliance with an order for inspection of the original instrument is refused.
The Court examined the nature of respondent Bank’s Statements of Account and found that they were printed under respondent Bank’s letterhead, were prepared by respondent Bank’s Loans and Discounting Department, and bore the signature of approval of respondent Bank’s authorized officer, with no other signatures appearing on their face. The Court concluded that, because petitioner was not privy to their preparation, petitioner did not admit their genuineness and due execution merely by failing to verify or oppose the complaint. It therefore held that petitioner was not conclusively bound by respondent Bank’s charges nor by the computations embodied in those Statements of Account.
Determination of Liability Amount: What the Promissory Notes Actually Stipulated
While the Court thus confirmed petitioner’s liability under the promissory notes, it ruled that the amount due had to be determined from the common stipulations contained in the promissory notes themselves. Aside from the principal loans totaling P900,000.00, the Court identified only these monetary undertakings from the face of the promissory notes: (i) interest at fourteen percent (14%) per annum, payable monthly, compounded monthly if unpaid; and (ii) attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the entire amount due, including interest if collection became necessary through an attorney.
The Court emphasized that it did not appear from the face of either promissory note that petitioner agreed to pay service charges and penalty charges in case of late payment. Since such additional charges on top of interest and interest on past due interest could not be presumed, the Court required evidence to determine whether those charges were properly due and in what amounts. The Court likewise recognized the need for evidence regarding the computation of interest on past due interest, insofar as such interest was due and payable.
Disposition and Remand to the Trial Court
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s and the appellate court’s decisions only to t
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 75502)
- The petition involved a Complaint for Collection filed by Philippine Banking Corporation against Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation and its alleged signatories, Joaquin Miguel de Jesus and Alfredo T. Salonga.
- The controversy arose from two promissory notes executed in 1976, which documented bank loans allegedly remaining unpaid.
- The trial court rendered judgment against Kalilid, and the Intermediate Appellate Court (Third Civil Cases Division) affirmed the decision in a ruling dated 8 November 1985.
- The Supreme Court resolved the petition by affirming the finding of liability under the notes, but remanded the case for determination of additional charges not conclusively proved from the notes themselves.
Parties and Procedural Posture
- Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation was the petitioner, and it carried the adverse judgment from Branch 23 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Seventh Judicial District) in Civil Case No. 41268.
- Philippine Banking Corporation was the respondent and the creditor-plaintiff that sued to collect the outstanding obligations.
- The individual defendants, Joaquin Miguel de Jesus and Alfredo T. Salonga, were defendants in the trial court, but the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as to them due to their whereabouts being unascertainable.
- The record reflected a dismissal without prejudice only as to Messrs. de Jesus and Salonga, while the case proceeded against Kalilid.
- The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment after Kalilid raised no opposition despite the filing of the motion.
- The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court in toto in its decision dated 8 November 1985, and later denied reconsideration on 29 July 1986.
- In the Supreme Court petition, Kalilid did not continue to deny execution and liability under the promissory notes, but challenged the correctness of the computed total indebtedness.
Key Factual Allegations
- On 17 November 1976, Joaquin Miguel de Jesus and Alfredo T. Salonga, as P.B. De Jesus and Company, Inc. officers, executed Promissory Note PBC No. 1202-76 for P600,000.00, payable on 29 December 1976.
- On 2 December 1976, the same individuals executed Promissory Note PBC No. 1255-76 for P300,000.00, payable on or before 3 January 1977.
- Both promissory notes were executed to reflect loans secured from Philippine Banking Corporation.
- The notes stated that the makers would pay the bank a fixed interest rate of 14% per annum, with provisions for an automatic increase of the interest rate if the note was not paid at maturity.
- The notes also required attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the amount due (including interest) in case collection was done through an attorney.
- On 5 March 1978, P.B. De Jesus and Company, Inc. changed its corporate name to Kalilid Wood Industries Corporation, and the change was later validated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
- After the alleged loans remained unpaid, the bank served letters of demand upon Kalilid to pay the obligations under PBC No. 1202-76 and PBC No. 1255-76.
- Kalilid disowned the alleged indebtedness under both promissory notes.
- On 15 May 1981, the bank filed the collection complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 41268, alleging solidary liability of Kalilid as principal and the individual signatories both for and in behalf of the company and in their personal capacities.
- In support of the claimed amounts, the bank attached two Statements of Account (Annexes “C” and “D”) and attached the promissory notes as Annexes “A” and “B”.
- By the time the complaint was answered, the bank alleged an aggregate indebtedness as of 30 April 1981 amounting to P1,780,253.08, consisting of P1,186,496.96 for PBC No. 1202-76 and P593,756.12 for PBC No. 1255-76.
- Kalilid’s Answer dated 10 July 1981 alleged lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material allegations, but it was not verified.
- Kalilid’s affirmative defense asserted that authority to borrow money or contract loans for the company had not been granted to de Jesus and Salonga, and thus they should be solely liable.
Submissions and Arguments
- Kalilid argued that, although it impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes by failing to deny under oath, that implied admission should not extend to the Statements of Account (Annexes “C” and “D”).
- Kalilid contended that it had no participation in the preparation of the Statements of Account and that they were not part of the instruments whose execution could be deemed admitted under Rule 8, Section 8.
- Kalilid also disputed the computation of total indebtedness, asserting that the Statements of Account included service charges, penalty charges, and interest on past due interest that were not part of the undertakings appearing on the face of the promissory notes.
- The bank maintained that the trial court and appellate court properly treated the failure to verify the Answer as an admission of the genuineness and due execution of the documents annexed to the complaint.
- The bank’s position effectively supported the total indebtedness computed and reflected in its attached Statements of Account.
Applicable Procedural Rules
- The Supreme Court treated summary judgment as properly and appropriately