Title
Jutic vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. L-44628
Decision Date
Aug 27, 1987
Dispute over property ownership; affidavit deemed invalid as donation, petitioners' exclusive claim denied, respondents entitled as co-heirs.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 92328)

Factual Background

During his lifetime, Arsenio Seville owned two agricultural parcels, Lot No. 170 (11.9499 hectares) and Lot No. 172 (9.6862 hectares), a residential house on Lot 172, rice and corn mills valued at P5,000.00, and five carabaos. On March 4, 1963, Arsenio executed an affidavit declaring his desire that, upon his death, his brother Melquiades Seville should succeed to the properties; the affidavit expressly stated that while Arsenio remained alive he would possess and enjoy the properties. From 1954 Melquiades and his family allegedly occupied and cultivated Lots 170 and 172 in the concept of owner. On May 24, 1968, Arsenio mortgaged the parcels to the Philippine National Bank with Melquiades’ knowledge and acquiescence. Arsenio died intestate on May 15, 1970, single and without issue. Melquiades later died and his children are the petitioners. Other heirs of Arsenio and of his sisters included the respondents who claimed co-ownership as heirs of Arsenio Seville.

Procedural History

Vicente Sullan and the other respondents filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Tagum for partition and accounting as heirs of Arsenio Seville. The petitioners answered claiming ownership through the affidavit of March 4, 1963 and by continuous possession since 1954, and alleged the affidavit constituted a valid donation inter vivos. The trial court rendered judgment for the private respondents on September 19, 1972. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. The petitioners then sought review by the Supreme Court by certiorari.

The Parties' Contentions

The petitioners argued that Exhibit 4, the March 4, 1963 affidavit, was a deed of donation inter vivos or otherwise a valid disposition that conveyed ownership of Lots 170 and 172 to Melquiades Seville, and that the lower courts erred in not so declaring. The petitioners further contended that the affidavit manifested an effective and acceptable donation and that ownership passed thereby to Melquiades and to his heirs. The respondents maintained that Exhibit 4 was a mere declaration of intention or desire and not an effective donation either inter vivos or mortis causa, that Arsenio continued to treat and deal with the land as owner, and that the petitioners’ possession and acts were consistent with their status as heirs rather than as donees.

Trial and Appellate Findings

The trial court found Exhibit 4 to be a declaration of intention and not a formal or concrete act of donation, and accordingly ruled for the respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed and remanded for implementation and partition in accordance with the rights as determined, ordering compliance with Rule 69, Revised Rules of Court. The courts noted that the affidavit expressed a desire that, in case of Arsenio’s death, Melquiades should succeed, but that there was no present intention to transfer ownership at the time of execution. The courts relied on documentary and factual circumstances showing Arsenio’s continued exercise of ownership: prosecution of the homestead application in Arsenio’s name, the mortgage executed in 1968 by Arsenio to PNB, and subsequent transactions involving the property which indicated co-ownership claims by respondents rather than a donee’s exclusive title.

Supreme Court's Analysis and Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court accepted the characterization of Exhibit 4 as an expression of intention rather than an operative donation, applying established precedent that a mere declaration of intention is not a disposition of property. The Court cited Aldaba v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 263) for the proposition that an expression that property is “intended for” another does not effectuate a conveyance absent further evidence that the intention was carried into effect. The Court explained that dispositions intended to take effect only upon the donor’s death partake of testamentary character and are governed by succession rules under Art. 728, Civil Code, and hence require compliance with formalities applicable to testamentary dispositions. The Court observed that Exhibit 4 contained no clear and express terms transferring ownership immediately; it only expressed a future succession wish. The Court further relied on surrounding facts demonstrating Arsenio’s continuing ownership and control: the homestead application in his name, the 1968 mortgage to the Philippine National Bank executed by Arsenio (where he affixed a thumbmark), and his dealing with the land as owner with Melquiades’ acquiescence. The Court noted allegations that Exhibit 4 bore Arsenio’s signature while later instruments showed his thumbmark, raising a challenge to the affidavit’s authent

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