Title
Joven vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 80739
Decision Date
Aug 20, 1992
Petitioner failed to redeem foreclosed properties; DBP sold them to private respondents. Petitioner filed for annulment and forcible entry; MCTC ruled in her favor, but RTC reversed. SC reinstated MCTC decision, emphasizing possession rights and jurisdiction in ejectment cases.
registered landowner
possession
unauthorized occupants

Case Summary (G.R. No. 248521)

Factual Background and Competing Possessory Claims

The petitioner’s mortgage and subsequent extrajudicial foreclosure ended in DBP’s purchase of the mortgaged properties at public auction. A certificate of sale was annotated in 1982. After the redemption period passed with no redemption by the petitioner, DBP disposed of the properties to Paguia by deed of sale executed in December 1985. Shortly thereafter, Paguia’s representative took possession in January 1986.

Before that taking of possession, the petitioner had already initiated litigation. On December 3, 1985, she filed in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City an action for the annulment of the mortgage and its foreclosure, later raffled to Branch 55 (and subsequently involved defendants including DBP and the private respondents). Separately, after her application for a preliminary injunction and restraining order was denied, she filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban–Sampaloc a complaint against the private respondents for forcible entry, with a prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 155.

Proceedings in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court initially dismissed the petitioner’s forcible entry case in a decision dated May 14, 1986, citing lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner moved for reconsideration on May 29, 1986. The trial court granted that motion and issued a resolution on July 11, 1986. In that resolution, the private respondents were ordered: first, to immediately restore and deliver possession of the properties to the petitioner; second, to render an accounting of fruits and products gathered from the time they took possession until they vacated; and third, to reimburse the petitioner the total cost of such accounting.

Appeal to the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals

The private respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 59. The RTC reversed the July 11, 1986 resolution. It ruled that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment case because the case involved an issue of ownership. It further held that even if jurisdiction existed, the municipal court’s resolution should not issue because the decision being reconsidered had allegedly already become final and executory.

The petitioner elevated the controversy to the Court of Appeals, which sustained the RTC decision in toto. The petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the rulings that (a) the municipal court lacked jurisdiction, and (b) the private respondents were not guilty of forcible entry.

The Parties’ Contentions in the Supreme Court

The private respondents argued that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over forcible entry because a question of ownership was involved. They relied on provisions of BP Blg. 129 and on the Rule on Summary Procedure. They also asserted that the municipal court’s reconsideration was improper and that it lost jurisdiction once the original dismissal became final and executory.

The petitioner contended that the municipal court had jurisdiction to try the forcible entry case and that the private respondents had entered and occupied the properties without judicial authorization, thereby committing forcible entry.

Jurisdiction over Forcible Entry Despite Allegations of Ownership

The Court held that it was a mistake to suppose that an ejectment action automatically involves a question of title merely because the plaintiff alleges ownership in the complaint. The Court explained that a plaintiff may allege ownership as a material and relevant fact to show the character of prior possession. The essential inquiry remains whether the action is, in substance, one for the restoration of possession as against an intruder within the period allowed.

The decision anchored on consistent authority traced through Chief Justice Moran’s observations, and on the statutory policy reflected in Sec. 33(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which vests municipal courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer. That jurisdiction exists even when ownership is raised, because where the issue of possession cannot be resolved without deciding ownership, ownership is resolved only to determine possession. The Court further stated that even the pendency of an annulment case in the RTC did not disable the municipal court from determining the right of possession in the ejectment case on the basis of the summary remedy.

The Court rejected the private respondents’ arguments that the municipal court was divested of jurisdiction because of ongoing litigation involving ownership in the RTC. It emphasized that the ejectment case, as filed, sought restoration of possession, while ownership was the subject of the separate annulment suit in the RTC.

Applicability of the Rule on Summary Procedure and the Ownership Issue

The Court addressed the private respondents’ reliance on exclusions from summary jurisdiction where ownership is involved, and their attempt to invoke the Rule on Summary Procedure through arguments about estoppel. The Court held that it was incorrect to say ownership was involved in the ejectment case simply because the petitioner alleged she was the original owner. The petitioner’s separate annulment suit reinforced the conclusion that title was already being litigated in the proper forum, so the ejectment action remained one involving possession de facto.

Thus, the Rule on Summary Procedure was applicable. The ejectment complaint involved only restoration of possession and did not convert the case into a title dispute.

The Municipal Court’s Reconsideration and Jurisdiction to Issue the Resolution

The Court also disagreed with the lower courts’ view that the motion for reconsideration did not suspend the reglementary period to appeal. It held that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not err in finding that the motion was not within the prohibition under Sec. 15(c) of the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Court reasoned that the municipal court’s initial dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was not an adjudication on the merits. Accordingly, the petitioner could seek reconsideration of that dismissal, and the motion, being not pro forma, suspended the running of the period to appeal.

Possession after Extrajudicial Foreclosure: Need for Judicial Writ

On the merits of possession and the propriety of entry, the Court analyzed the legal framework governing foreclosure and writ of possession. Under Act No. 3135, in case of extrajudicial foreclosure, a purchaser may obtain a writ of possession as a matter of course during the redemption period upon the satisfaction of requisites, including proper motion, bond approval, and that no third person is involved.

The Court traced the rules governing possession after foreclosure and addressed how the right to possession depends on judicial action. It explained that the purchaser cannot take the law into his own hands and enter without judicial authorization. It further discussed that while the purchaser becomes the absolute owner upon non-redemption, the legal installation in possession still requires resort to the courts and the issuance of the writ of possession.

The Court relied on F. David Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America, which held that after non-redemption and consolidation of ownership in the purchaser’s name and issuance of a new transfer certificate of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial upon proper application and proof of title. The decision stressed that possession becomes an absolute right of the purchaser only after compliance with the mechanisms that enable legal possession and the issuance of the writ.

Applying these principles, the Court found no showing that after the redemption period lapsed, DBP executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership, filed the required documents with the Register of Deeds, or secured a writ of possession authorizing entry. Since the titles remained in the petitioner’s name and DBP did not obtain a writ of possession, DBP had not perfected a right of possession that it could transfer to the private respondents. Consequently, the private respondents could not rely on their deed of sale alone to justify taking possession without a writ.

Forcible Entry as Possession de Facto and the Nature of “Force”

The Court reiterated that in an action for forcible entry, the sole issue is the fact of material or physical possession (possession de facto), not ownership or possession de jure. It explained the underlying philosophy of ejectment remedies: the law prevents breaches of the peace and disorder by discouraging persons who believe they have a right to possession from using force instead of the courts.

Under Rule 70, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, forcible entry exists when one in physical possession is deprived through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The Court stated that “force” does not require violence against persons or the presence of a state of war. It may consist in the wrongful exclusion of the prior possessor, which necessarily involves forc

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