G.R. No. 131255 - Joson vs. Torres

Case Summary (G.R. No. 131255)

Petitioner

Eduardo N. Joson, elected provincial governor of Nueva Ecija, challenged administrative actions taken against him after private respondents filed an administrative complaint alleging grave misconduct, abuse of authority, intimidation, and endangering the safety of provincial officials.

Respondents

Private complainants were members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Ecija. Public respondents include the Office of the President (acting through the Executive Secretary) as Disciplining Authority and the DILG (through the Secretary and an Undersecretary) as Investigating Authority under the implementing rules.

Key Dates and Procedural Milestones

Alleged incident: September 12, 1996 (petitioner allegedly barged into the session hall accompanied by armed men).
Letter‑complaint filed with the Office of the President and first administrative actions: September 1996.
DILG default order and subsequent reconsiderations: April–June 1997.
Executive Secretary’s preventive suspension order (by authority of the President): July 11, 1997 (60 days).
Executive Secretary’s resolution adopting DILG findings and imposing six‑month suspension without pay: January 8, 1998.
Supreme Court issued temporary restraining order January 14, 1998; final resolution of the petition decided May 20, 1998.

Applicable Law and Governing Rules

1987 Constitution (in particular: presidential supervision and control provisions relied upon in the decision).
Local Government Code of 1991 (Sections 60–65, rules on filing and grounds for discipline, preventive suspension).
Administrative Order No. 23 (Rules and Procedures on Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials), with its provisions on Disciplining Authority (Sec. 2), Investigating Authority (Sec. 3), preliminary investigation (Rule 5), formal investigation (Rule 7), rights of respondent (Sec. 65).
Rules of Court and Administrative Code of 1987 applicable in a suppletory manner.

Factual Allegations and Complaint

Private respondents alleged that on September 12, 1996 petitioner angrily entered the Sangguniang Panlalawigan session hall, kicked doors and chairs, uttered threats, and was accompanied by men bearing firearms, intending to intimidate members into approving a proposed P150 million loan. They claimed a lack of quorum prevented approval that day and sought suspension or removal, emergency audit, review of the proposed loan, police protection for the sanggunian, and other reliefs. The complaint was accompanied by a joint affidavit of two employees who purportedly witnessed the incident and was endorsed by several local officials and congressmen.

Presidential and Investigative Responses

The President annotated the complaint with instructions to the DILG and Justice Department to take preemptive and investigative action. The DILG, acting as Investigating Authority, notified petitioner and directed him to file a verified answer within 15 days. The DILG convened parties, recorded a “peace agreement” (which proved ineffective), and granted petitioner multiple extensions to file an answer. The DILG later declared petitioner in default, then reconsidered that default, then reinstated it when petitioner still failed to file within court‑ordered deadlines.

Administrative Motions, Default and Preventive Suspension

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration; the DILG treated the motion to dismiss as untimely where an answer had been specifically ordered and extensions previously granted. On July 11, 1997, by authority of the President, the Executive Secretary placed petitioner under preventive suspension for 60 days, designating the Vice‑Governor as acting governor. Petitioner sought judicial relief in the Court of Appeals and ultimately in the Supreme Court, contesting procedural rulings, the DILG’s authority and processes, the finding of default, and the imposition of preventive and later disciplinary suspension.

DILG Adjudication and Executive Secretary Resolution

Proceedings continued before the DILG as the parties were directed to submit position papers. Petitioner submitted an Answer ad cautelam and affidavits and repeatedly sought a formal investigation and oral hearing. The DILG denied the motion for formal investigation, treated position papers as sufficient, and recommended disciplinary action. The Executive Secretary adopted the DILG’s findings and recommended penalty and, on January 8, 1998, ordered a six‑month suspension without pay. Petitioner secured a temporary restraining order from the Supreme Court and challenged the validity of the Executive Secretary’s resolution.

Issues Raised by Petitioner

Petitioner’s principal complaints were: (1) rules of procedure and evidence should have been strictly applied; (2) the DILG Secretary exceeded authority and the President improperly delegated disciplinary power (challenge to the alter‑ego application); (3) the declaration of default was improper because petitioner filed a motion to dismiss instead of an answer; and (4) preventive suspension was improper because issues were not joined and there was no evidence of guilt. He also contested the denial of a formal investigation and asserted a constitutional due‑process right to confront and examine witnesses.

Court’s Analysis on Verification and Formal Requirements

The Court held that formal defects in verification or in notarial entries (absence of notarial register page/book numbers) were not fatal. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement; the President’s own action on the complaint amounted to a waiver of strict compliance. The Court emphasized that verification secures good faith but absence thereof does not automatically preclude investigation or action, especially where the President acted on the complaint.

Court’s Analysis on Jurisdiction and the Alter‑Ego Doctrine

The Court reaffirmed the separation of roles: the President (acting through the Executive Secretary) is the Disciplining Authority; the DILG Secretary is the Investigating Authority under A.O. No. 23. The delegation of investigative authority to the DILG is valid and not an unlawful transfer of the President’s disciplinary power. The Court invoked the constitutional grant of presidential general supervision over local governments (Section 4, Article X) and presidential control of executive departments (Section 17, Article VII), and the doctrine of the President’s alter‑ego or qualified political agency to justify departmental action taken in the regular course of executive business. Thus, the DILG’s exercise of investigative functions, and issuance of orders in that capacity, was upheld as within the framework of delegated executive administration.

Court’s Analysis on Default, Motion to Dismiss, and Timeliness

The Court found petitioner’s repeated requests for extensions and his eventual filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of the ordered answer amounted to inexcusable delay. Administrative Order No. 23 and the Local Government Code require expeditious handling of complaints; petitioner’s repeated extensions consumed a large portion of the prescribed period for disposition. The DILG’s declaration of default, after multiple opportunities and after petitioner’s delay, was therefore upheld as reasonable and not arbitrary.

Court’s Analysis on Preventive Suspension

The Court reviewed Section 63 of the Local Government Code authorizing preventive suspension by the President for elective provincial officials and summarized its requisites: (a) that issues be joined; (b) that evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) that continued incumbency could influence witnesses or jeopardize evidence. The Court upheld the Executive Secretary’s imposition of preventive suspension, accepting the DILG’s findings that (i) petitioner’s failure to file an answer was tantamount to waiver and constituted joinder of issues; (ii) the allegations, supported by complainants’ affidavits, constituted strong evidence; and (iii) given the gravity of the allegations and the local political climate, there was a likelihood petitioner could influence witnesses or threaten evidence. The Court found the preventive suspension to satisfy statutory prerequisites.

Court’s Analysis on Right to Formal Investigat

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 131255)

Procedural and Factual Background

The case concerns the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner Eduardo Nonato Joson, Governor of Nueva Ecija.
Private respondents are Vice-Governor Oscar C. Tinio and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon G. Interior.
On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint (said to be dated September 13, 1997 in the record) charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority based on alleged events of September 12, 1996.
The incident alleged: petitioner barged into the session hall, kicked doors and chairs, uttered threats, and was followed by several men armed with long and short firearms who encircled the area.
The alleged motive: petitioner sought to harass members into approving a proposed P150 million loan from the Philippine National Bank which private respondents opposed because of existing unliquidated obligations and fiscal incapacity.
Complainants sought suspension/removal of petitioner, emergency audit of provincial treasury, review of the proposed loan by PNB, police security for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and filing of charges if warranted.
The letter-complaint was accompanied by a joint affidavit of two Sangguniang Panlalawigan employees and endorsed by several local congressmen and the Mayors’ League President.

Presidential Action and Referral to the DILG

The President wrote marginal notes dated 17 Sep 96: he observed that the situation did not justify use of force/intimidation or armed followers, and instructed the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG) to take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions but to “BREAK NOT the PEACE.” (Signed Fidel V. Ramos).
The complaint with the President’s marginal notes was transmitted to SILG Secretary Robert Z. Barbers on September 20, 1996.
Acting on the President’s instructions, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the complaint and directed him to submit a verified/sworn answer with documentary evidence within fifteen (15) days from receipt.

DILG Proceedings: Notices, Extensions, and Default Orders

Secretary Barbers convened the parties in Nueva Ecija; the parties executed a peace agreement in which petitioner promised to maintain peace and private respondents agreed to refrain from filing adverse cases — an agreement later not respected and private respondents reiterated their complaint.
Petitioner received an order to file answer on November 13, 1996 and requested a 30-day extension to secure counsel; the DILG, through Director Almario de los Santos, granted an extension reckoned from November 13, 1996.
Petitioner sought further extensions (letters dated December 9, 1996; request of January 7, 1997); DILG granted one extension “for the last time up to January 13 only,” then later granted a final ten (10) day extension to January 23, 1997, warning failure to answer would be considered a waiver and allow complainants to present evidence ex parte.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating reasons for needing more time; on April 22, 1997 Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez issued an order declaring petitioner in default and directing complainants to present evidence ex parte, deferring actual presentation until after barangay elections.
On April 24, 1997, Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time to File Answer ad cautelam; petitioner received a copy of the default order on May 2, 1997 and moved for reconsideration.
On May 19, 1997 Undersecretary Sanchez reconsidered the order of default in the interest of justice, noting counsel’s appearance and granting petitioner “for the last time” fifteen (15) days from receipt to file answer.
On June 23, 1997 Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the order of default, finding counsel should have received the May 19 order and petitioner still failed to file answer; the DILG directed private respondents to present evidence ex parte on July 15, 1997.

Petitioner’s Responses, Motions, and Answer

On June 24, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a “Motion to Dismiss” alleging the letter-complaint was unverified when filed and that the DILG lacked jurisdiction to require an answer.
On July 4, 1997 petitioner filed an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration” of the June 23, 1997 reinstated default and sought abeyance of the hearing until the Motion to Dismiss was resolved.
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, by authority of the President, placed petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending investigation; PNP was directed to assist, and Vice-Governor Tinio designated Acting Governor.
Petitioner filed certiorari/prohibition in the Court of Appeals challenging the preventive suspension and order of default; the CA dismissed that petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 44694).
On August 20, 1997 Undersecretary Sanchez denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration, and directed parties to submit position papers within an inextendible ten (10) days, after which the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 27 and September 10, 1997 petitioner filed motions to lift the suspension and the default order and submitted an “Answer Ad Cautelam” with sworn witness statements; complainants manifested that they were submitting the case for decision on the records.
Undersecretary Sanchez on October 8, 1997 rejected Petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration but admitted the Answer Ad Cautelam as petitioner’s position paper; petitioner on October 15 and October 29 filed motions to conduct a formal investigation and reiterated his right to one.
On November 11, 1997 the DILG denied the Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation, holding that submission of position papers substantially complied with procedural due process in administrative proceedings.

Preventive Suspension: Rationale, Timing, and Implementation

Section 63, Local Government Code, authorizes preventive suspension by the President for elective provincial officials and permits suspension “at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and … there is great probability that the continuance in office … could influence witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of records and other evidence,” with a single preventive suspension not to exceed sixty (60) days.
Secretary Barbers recommended preventive suspension in a memorandum dated 23 June 1997, citing: petitioner’s failure to file answer despite opportunities (waiver of right to present evidence), joinder of issues by waiver, the alleged act of barging into the session hall with armed men constituting grave misconduct, corroboration by joint-affidavit of two employees, petitioner’s capacity to influence witnesses as chief executive, and the province’s history of violent politics necessitating precautionary measures.
Executive Secretary Torres, adopting the DILG recommendation, placed petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days effective 11 July 1997, and directed PNP assistance; Vice-Governor Tinio was installed as Acting Governor.

DILG Resolution, Executive Secretary Action, and Subsequent Events

The DILG conducted proceedings on position papers and affidavits; Secretary Barbers found complainants’ affidavits “more natural, reasonable and probable” than petitioner’s.
On January 8, 1998 Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, by authority of the President, adopted the DILG Secretary’s findings and recommendation and imposed a penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay on petitioner, stating he was “found guilty of the offenses charged.”
Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to seek TRO/Preliminary Injunction in this Court, alleging undue haste, violation of the Local Government Code and A.O. No. 23, and deprivation of constitutional due process.
On January 14, 1998 the Court issued a tempo