Title
Jose vs. Alfuerto
Case
G.R. No. 169380
Decision Date
Nov 26, 2012
Petitioner leased land occupied by respondents, filed ejectment case; courts ruled for petitioner, but CA reversed, finding no unlawful detainer due to lack of initial lawful possession. SC affirmed CA, holding ejectment improper as respondents’ possession predated lease.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 169380)

Factual Background

Rodolfo Chua Sing purchased and held title to the subject lot in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua Sing leased the property to petitioner Jose pursuant to a five-year lease providing that the lessor transferred to the lessee the rights and prerogatives to evict occupants and that the lessee would bear eviction expenses. The lease was neither notarized nor registered at the Registry of Deeds. Respondents were already occupying the property prior to the lease; on April 28, 1999 the petitioner demanded that respondents vacate within 30 days and pay P1,000 monthly pending vacation. Respondents refused.

Procedural History — Lower Courts

Petitioner filed an ejectment complaint in the Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Civil Case No. 11344, on October 20, 1999. A barangay conciliation was conducted and a Certification to File Action was issued on March 1, 2000; petitioner subsequently filed an amended complaint (March 17, 2000) incorporating barangay proceedings. The MeTC ruled for petitioner on January 27, 2003, finding respondents had no right to possess the land and that their occupation was by the owner's tolerance; it ordered respondents to vacate, pay P500 per month each from filing until vacation, and to pay attorney’s fees and costs. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 257, affirmed the MeTC decision on October 8, 2003, treating the action as one for unlawful detainer and confirming jurisdiction and timeliness.

Court of Appeals Disposition

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC on March 14, 2005 and dismissed the amended ejectment complaint. The CA held respondents’ possession was not by the petitioner’s or lessor’s tolerance; tolerance requires permission at the inception of possession and is not established merely by allegations or the owner’s silence. Because respondents had possessed the property prior to 1991 (before Chua Sing’s acquisition), their possession was not shown to have originated by permission from the lessor or petitioner; thus the complaint did not state the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer action and the MeTC/RTC lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate title or a full recovery of possession by plenary action. The Court of Appeals’ resolution denying reconsideration was later affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Issues Presented in the Petition

The petitioner raised: (I) whether the CA erred by treating the complaint as one for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) rather than unlawful detainer; (II) whether the CA relied on a material change of theory by respondents on appeal; and (III) whether the Supreme Court could decide the case on the merits to avoid circuitous procedure.

Governing Legal Principles — Unlawful Detainer and Tolerance

Unlawful detainer is a summary remedy to recover physical possession where the defendant’s initial possession was lawful by virtue of an express or implied contract and became unlawful only after demand and refusal; it must be filed within one year from the unlawful withholding. The complaint must allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer on its face because jurisdictional facts must appear in summary actions. Tolerance (sufferance) is permission, tacit or express, present at the inception of possession; it arises from neighborliness or familiarity and is distinguishable from mere owner knowledge or silence. If possession was unlawful from the start (e.g., forcible entry or entry without permission), unlawful detainer is inappropriate and the proper remedies are plenary actions such as accion publiciana (for better right to possession) or accion reivindicatoria (for recovery of ownership).

Application of Law to the Amended Complaint

The amended complaint alleged that respondents’ occupancy was unlawful from the outset and “bereft of contractual or legal basis,” yet elsewhere asserted the occupation was by “mere tolerance.” The Supreme Court found these allegations contradictory: unlawful detainer requires that tolerance or permission existed at the start of possession, and the petitioner's pleadings failed to allege when respondents entered or who authorized their entry. The record contained respondents’ assertions that they had possessed the land since the late 1970s and that Chua Sing never had physical possession upon acquiring title in 1991, further undermining petitioner’s claim of tolerance. Because the complaint lacked essential averments and evidence showing tolerance at the inception of possession, the summary remedy of unlawful detainer was improperly pleaded.

Precedents and Doctrinal Support

The Court relied on longstanding precedents establishing that tolerance must be present at the start of possession (Sarona v. Villegas; Ten Forty Realty v. Cruz; Go, Jr. v. CA; Padre v. Malabanan), that contradictory statements in a complaint for unlawful detainer are fatal (Unida v. Heirs of Urban), and that summary ejectment proceedings cannot be converted into plenary actions (Regis, Jr. v. CA; Gonzaga v. CA). The Court emphasized the policy reasons: summary proceedings must remain expeditious, and permitting ejectment suits to substitute for plenary actions would undermine procedural safeguards an

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