Title
Jose vs. Alfuerto
Case
G.R. No. 169380
Decision Date
Nov 26, 2012
Petitioner leased land occupied by respondents, filed ejectment case; courts ruled for petitioner, but CA reversed, finding no unlawful detainer due to lack of initial lawful possession. SC affirmed CA, holding ejectment improper as respondents’ possession predated lease.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 169380)

Factual Background

The disputed property was a parcel registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52594 in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing, measuring 1,919 square meters and located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paranaque City. Chua Sing acquired the lot in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua Sing executed a lease with Petitioner for a term of five years, renewable, but conditioned to commence upon the total eviction of any occupant or occupants; the lease was neither notarized nor registered with the Registry of Deeds. The lease purported to transfer to the lessee the lessor’s rights to evict existing occupants and to make the lessee responsible for eviction expenses. The respondents were already occupying the land before the lease. Petitioner sent written demands on April 28, 1999 demanding vacatur within thirty days and payment of PHP 1,000.00 monthly until vacatur, but the respondents refused both to vacate and to pay.

Pleadings and Allegations

In the amended complaint dated March 17, 2000, Petitioner alleged that as lessee he had the right to eject respondents who "defiantly erected their houses" without contract or permit and only by the "mere tolerance" of the registered owner; he alleged that respondents were aware of their unlawful occupancy and that they refused his written demand. He prayed for an order to vacate, for rentals of not less than PHP 41,000.00 per month from May 30, 1999 until vacatur, attorneys fees of not less than PHP 50,000.00, and costs. In their Answer the Respondents asserted prior possession predating Chua Sing’s 1991 acquisition, tendered a Deed of Assignment dated February 13, 2000, and maintained that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction because the dispute involved ownership; they filed a counterclaim for damages for a baseless suit.

Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court

The MeTC, after receiving position papers, affidavits and other evidence, rendered its decision on January 27, 2003 in favor of Petitioner. The MeTC found respondents’ occupation to be by owners tolerance and held that respondents could not challenge ownership because a previous RTC ruling had validated Chua Sing’s title. The MeTC ordered respondents to vacate and remove structures, to each pay PHP 500.00 per month from filing until vacatur, and to pay costs jointly and severally with PHP 20,000.00 as attorneys fees.

Proceedings in the Regional Trial Court

On appeal the RTC (Branch 257) affirmed the MeTC decision in its October 8, 2003 judgment. The RTC reiterated that as lessee Petitioner had the right to file ejectment; it found that respondents’ possession was by tolerance and became unlawful upon the petitioner’s demand of April 28, 1999. The RTC also concluded that the complaint for unlawful detainer was timely, having been filed within one year of the alleged unlawful deprivation, and relied on prior authorities including Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar and Yu v. Lara.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals reversed on March 14, 2005 and dismissed the amended complaint. The CA held that the complaint did not allege tolerance in the sense required for unlawful detainer because the complaint also described the respondents’ occupation as unlawful from the outset. The CA defined tolerance as permission by the owner at the inception of possession, deriving from neighborliness or familiarity, and explained that where possession dates earlier than the lessor’s title acquisition tolerance cannot be presumed. The CA emphasized that the petition effectively asserted an accion publiciana because Petitioner claimed a better right to possession by virtue of a lease contracted after respondents’ occupation, and concluded that ejectment, a summary remedy, could not properly resolve such claim. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in its August 22, 2005 resolution.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Petitioner advanced three principal issues: whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling the cause of action to be for recovery of possession rather than for unlawful detainer and dismissible; whether the CA erred in deciding the case based on an alleged material change of theory by the respondents on appeal; and whether the Supreme Court should decide the case on the merits to avoid circuitous procedure in the administration of justice.

The Supreme Court’s Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision dated March 14, 2005 and resolution dated August 22, 2005. The Court held that the action for unlawful detainer was not the proper remedy on the facts pleaded and shown, and that the Court of Appeals did not deprive Petitioner of due process by deciding the case on the issue of tolerance.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Unlawful Detainer

The Court reviewed the law: unlawful detainer is a summary remedy for recovery of possession where defendant’s original possession was lawful by virtue of an express or implied contract and became unlawful only after the plaintiff’s demand and the defendant’s refusal; the action must be instituted within one year from the unlawful withholding. The Court stressed that the face of the complaint must allege the jurisdictional facts of unlawful detainer, including when and under what permission possession began. The Court found fatal the contradiction in Petitioner’s amended complaint which, on the one hand, described respondents’ occupation as by mere tolerance yet also averred that the occupancy was unlawful from the start and lacked contractual or legal basis even before demand. The Court concluded that the complaint failed to allege when respondents entered or who granted permission; therefore the MeTC lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute as unlawful detainer. The Court drew on prior doctrines in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., Unida v. Heirs of Urban, Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation v. Cruz, Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, and Padre v. Malabanan to reinforce that tolerance must exist at the inception and must be pleaded and proved; mere knowledge and silence do not suffice.

Change of Theory and Due Process Considerations

The Court addressed the contention that Respondents changed their theory on appeal. It noted the settled rule that a party may not change theory on appeal, but found the rule inapplicable because the respondents had consistently questioned the existence of Petitioner’s tolerance in their Answer and Position Paper, alleging possession predating the lessor’s 1991 title and reliance on a Deed of Assignment. The Court held that the dismissal rested on the petitioner's deficient allegations and contradictory averments, not on a prejudicial change of theory by respondents.

Distinction Between Summary and Plenary Remedie

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