G.R. No. 210612 - People vs. Mateo

Case Summary (G.R. No. 210612)

Key Places and Property Details

Subject property: a 1,791-square meter parcel covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. PT-66585 (later TCT No. PT-92579 in JILCSFI’s name). Portion sought to be expropriated: 51 square meters abutting E.R. Santos Street intended for conversion into a three-meter-wide access road (Damayan Street) to serve Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig.

Key Dates and Procedural Milestones

Municipal ordinance authorizing expropriation: April 19, 1993. Complaint for expropriation filed: July 21, 1993 (amended August 6, 1993); deposit of at least 15% of market value made with the RTC as required. Annotation of lis pendens on JILCSFI’s title: November 26, 1993. JILCSFI’s asserted purchase transactions and title issuance occur in late 1993–early 1994 (down payment, deed of sale December 13, 1993; TCT issuance and tax declaration dates noted in the record). RTC order declaring right to take property: September 3, 1997. CA affirmed RTC: March 13, 2001; CA denied reconsideration: February 18, 2002. Present Supreme Court decision: August 9, 2005 (governing law applied: 1987 Constitution).

Applicable Law and Rules Referenced

Constitutional principle: Takings clause of the 1987 Constitution (private property not to be taken for public use without just compensation). Statutory authority: Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) governing a local government unit’s exercise of eminent domain. Implementing rules: Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code (requirements for offer to buy), Article 33 (enumerating public use items such as construction/extension of roads), Section 4, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court (procedural direction), Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court (form of denial), and Civil Code provisions on easements (Articles 649–657) as argued by the petitioner.

Factual Background and Municipal Purpose

The Municipality sought a three-meter-wide access road from E.R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid because the area lacked vehicle access adequate for emergency services (Fire Code requirement) and for provision of utilities (water and electricity). Municipal authorities represented that the 51-square meter portion of the subject lot constituted the most convenient and shortest access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid and hence was identified for expropriation to construct Damayan Street, which was indeed constructed and later used by residents.

Trial Evidence and Conflicting Proofs

The respondent relied on testimonial evidence (municipal engineer, fire marshal, residents) describing the practical necessity for a vehicular-accessible road and attesting that Damayan Street, as constructed, enabled vehicles including fire trucks to enter Sto. Tomas Bukid. The municipality produced a photocopy of a letter from Engr. Jose Reyes addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco inviting him to a conference to discuss the road project and price. The trial court excluded the letter’s photocopy as not being the original. The respondent also relied on a municipal ordinance clause stating that property owners were notified of the intent to purchase. JILCSFI produced documents of purchase (deeds, down payment, title issuance) and testified regarding intended use (school and church) and asserted denial of a proper offer and of due process relative to any ocular inspection.

Procedural Posture and Claims on Appeal

JILCSFI intervened and raised defenses and counterclaims, including denial that a valid and definite offer was ever made to the true owner, contention that the expropriation was not necessary or that the selected portion was not least burdensome, and an assertion that its intended public use (school and worship center) precluded expropriation. The RTC declared the municipality had the lawful right to take the property and directed submission of recommended commissioners. The CA affirmed, treating the letter and ordinance declaration as substantial compliance and finding public necessity established. JILCSFI then advanced the present petition to the Supreme Court raising principally: (1) failure of the municipality to comply with Section 19’s valid and definite offer requirement; (2) whether a property already intended for public use may nonetheless be expropriated; and (3) whether civil-law easement requisites apply or can be dispensed with.

Legal Standards on Eminent Domain and Burden of Proof

The Court reiterated that eminent domain is a sovereign power available to government but exercised in derogation of private rights; therefore its grant must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner. The condemning authority bears the burden of proving all statutory requisites for valid exercise, including the mandatory prior valid and definite written offer and its rejection. The Court emphasized that only questions of law are properly reviewable on certiorari and factual findings of the CA affirming the trial court are generally conclusive, except where such findings rest on speculation, conjecture, misapprehension, or where an appellate review can reexamine misapplied facts.

Analysis of the “Valid and Definite Offer” Requirement

Article 35 and Section 19 require a written offer specifying the property, reasons for acquisition, and the offered price; the offer must be made to the registered owner(s) and must be definite so as to permit acceptance into a contract of sale. The Court held that a bona fide reasonable offer is required—more than perfunctory or pro forma communications—and that a single bona fide offer rejected by the owner suffices. The condemnor may rely on the certificate of title to identify registered owners and make the offer accordingly, but it must prove that such offer was made to all registered owners.

Application of the Offer Requirement to the Record

The Court found that the only documentary proof of an offer was the photocopy of Engr. Reyes’ letter, which: (a) the RTC excluded because the original was not produced; (b) in substance, invited one co-owner to a conference to discuss a potential price rather than making a definite and certain written offer to buy a specified portion at a stated price; and (c) was not shown to have been delivered to all co-owners. The municipality’s ordinance recitation that owners had been notified did not substitute for evidence of the required written definite offer to each registered owner. Testimony of the municipal messenger was insufficient to establish receipt by the named owner because the messenger did not know the addressee and did not see the recipient sign; the messenger’s account did not prove delivery to the proper recipients. The Court therefore concluded the municipality failed to prove compliance with the statutory prior-offer requirement.

Rejection of Lis Pendens and Ordinance Clauses as Substitutes

The Court rejected the CA’s reasoning that a subsequent annotation of a notice of lis pendens on JILCSFI’s dorsal title or the ordinance’s general statement constituted substantial compliance with the prior-offer requirement. A lis pendens is notice of litigation affecting title or possession but does not stand in place of a required written offer to purchase delivered to the owner before filing expropriation proceedings. The lis pendens annotation occurred after filing and so could not retroactively satisfy the prerequisite.

Public Necessity and Route Selection Analysis

On the question of public necessity, the Cou

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 210612)

Procedural History

Petition for review to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 59050 and its Resolution dated February 18, 2002, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The CA had affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 160, Pasig, which declared the Municipality (now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take possession of the subject property.
The RTC issued a writ of possession; plaintiff (Municipality) deposited 15% of the market value based on the latest tax declaration as required by law.
The RTC, by Order dated September 3, 1997, declared the plaintiff entitled to take the property and directed parties to submit names of recommended commissioners for determination of just compensation.
JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA; CA Decision dated March 13, 2001 affirmed the RTC; motion for reconsideration denied April 2001.
JILCSFI filed the present petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, raising issues of compliance with Section 19, R.A. No. 7160, public necessity, and applicability of easement requisites; the Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the CA and RTC orders, ordering dismissal of the complaint without prejudice.

Antecedent Facts and Property Details

Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street (near Pasig Public Market) to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid to serve 60–70 houses (mostly light materials); road required to be at least 3 meters wide to comply with Fire Code so fire trucks could pass.
The Municipality decided to acquire 51 square meters out of a 1,791-square meter parcel covered by TCT No. PT-66585, owned by Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho, abutting E. R. Santos Street.
Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved Ordinance No. 21 on April 19, 1993 authorizing the mayor to initiate expropriation and appropriate funds; ordinance stated property owners were notified but rejected the offer.
On July 21, 1993 (amended Aug 6, 1993), Municipality filed an expropriation complaint under Section 19, R.A. No. 7160, and deposited required 15% with the RTC; writ of possession was issued.
Municipality annotated notice of lis pendens on the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 (in the name of JILCSFI) on November 26, 1993.
Municipality constructed a 3-meter-wide cemented road named Damayan Street on the subject portion.
JILCSFI asserted it had purchased the property: agreement to sell dated February 27, 1993 (price P1,719,000.00), downpayment P1,000,000.00; Deed of Absolute Sale executed December 13, 1993; TCT No. PT-92579 issued in JILCSFI’s name December 21, 1993; Tax Mapper testified records show JILCSFI became owner on January 13, 1994.
JILCSFI intervened in the RTC proceedings as defendant-in-intervention on August 26, 1994 and filed crossclaims and counterclaims (including reimbursement, moral damages, attorney’s fees) and averred denial of use/enjoyment due to road location.

Testimony and Evidence Presented at Trial

Municipality’s messenger Rolando Togonon testified he served a letter from Engr. Jose Reyes to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street on February 23, 1993; a lady received it and returned it bearing a signature of Luz Bernarte; Togonon admitted he never met Lorenzo or Bernarte and did not see Bernarte sign the letter.
Resident Edgardo del Rosario testified prior to the road there was a wooden bridge that was slippery and hazardous; after Damayan Street construction residents had water and electricity.
Project Engineer Augusto Paz testified the road built in 1992 was 70 meters long and 3 meters wide and that no other road allowed fire trucks to access Sto. Tomas Bukid.
Fire Marshall Manuel Tembrevilla testified Damayan Street could accommodate a fire truck and estimated 300–400 houses in the area; stated Damayan Street is the only road in the area.
Tax Mapper Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. testified records showed JILCSFI became owner on January 13, 1994.
JILCSFI’s Eduardo Villanueva testified land was purchased for a school building and church; projects delayed by expropriation ordinance.
JILCSFI offered documentary proof of the February 27, 1993 sale agreement, downpayment, Deed of Absolute Sale (Dec. 13, 1993) and TCT issuance (Dec. 21, 1993).
The RTC rejected a photocopy of Engr. Reyes’ letter for being merely a photocopy; CA later considered its existence corroborated.

RTC Findings and Order

RTC found substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19, R.A. No. 7160 (as gleaned from Ordinance No. 21) and that the expropriated portion was the most convenient access to Sto. Tomas Bukid.
RTC concluded the 51-square meter portion produced a 3-meter wide public road, a short cut and easy path for vehicles, and complied with Fire Code requirements.
RTC ordered parties to submit names of commissioners for determination of just compensation.
RTC excluded the photocopy of Engr. Reyes’ letter from evidence for failure to present the original.

Court of Appeals’ Decision and Rationale

CA (Decision dated March 13, 2001) affirmed RTC’s order declaring plaintiff had lawful right to take the property.
CA held that the letter of Engr. Reyes (photocopy) constituted substantial compliance with the “valid and definite offer” requirement of Section 19 as it invited Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to discuss the road project and price.
CA found constructive notice to defendants via annotation of notice of lis pendens on petitioner’s TCT on November 26, 1993.
CA upheld public necessity, adopting trial court findings that the portion was most convenient access and suitable for vehicles and fire trucks, and cited Article 33 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code (listing construction/extension of roads as public use).
CA denied JILCSFI’s motion for reconsideration, holding that the photocopy’s existence was corroborated by Togonon’s testimony and Ordinance No. 21, and that petitioner failed t