Title
Jebsens Maritime, Inc. vs. Undag
Case
G.R. No. 191491
Decision Date
Dec 14, 2011
Seafarer Undag claimed disability benefits for cardiovascular disease and diabetes, alleging work-related aggravation. The Supreme Court denied his claim, citing lack of substantial evidence, non-compliance with the 3-day reporting rule, and failure to prove work-relatedness. NLRC’s dismissal reinstated.
disability benefits
substantial evidence
mandatory reporting requirements

Case Summary (G.R. No. 191491)

Factual Background

Respondent’s contract with petitioners was not renewed after its expiration. Approximately two months after repatriation, on September 24, 2003, he consulted Dr. Efren Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo) for a physical check-up and was diagnosed with Hypertensive cardiovascular disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Diabetes Mellitus II, and Impediment Grade X (20.15%). Dr. Vicaldo reported that respondent had a history of hypertension and diabetes and was at risk of developing stroke, coronary artery disease, and congestive heart failure. Dr. Vicaldo further stated that respondent’s ailment was aggravated by his work as a seaman and that he was no longer fit for work.

Respondent then demanded financial assistance from petitioners, but petitioners denied the request. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint before the NLRC, alleging that he had been suffering from chest pains and difficulty of breathing since July 2003 while aboard petitioners’ vessel and that petitioners’ denial of assistance caused him damage. He sought reimbursement of medical expenses and sickness allowance amounting to US$3,224.00, including damages and attorneys’ fees.

Labor Arbiter Proceedings

After a hearing, the Labor Arbiter issued a decision on October 17, 2005 ordering petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay respondent the Philippine peso equivalent of US$60,000.00 as total permanent disability compensation, corresponding to the claimed sickness allowance of US$3,224.00, plus ten percent (10%) attorneys’ fees.

NLRC Proceedings

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter. It dismissed respondent’s claim for disability benefits through its resolution on January 24, 2006. The NLRC held that respondent failed to present substantial evidence to prove that he had suffered an illness while on board or after disembarking from petitioners’ vessel.

Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Court of Appeals Proceedings

Respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeals. On September 16, 2009, the CA rendered a decision setting aside the NLRC resolutions and reinstated entitlement to disability benefits. The CA found that respondent established by substantial evidence that his work as a seafarer caused, or at least served as a relevant factor in the contraction of, his hypertensive cardiovascular disease. It emphasized the physical and mental demands of respondent’s multitasking functions as Lead Operator, including exposure to perils of the sea and extreme and unpredictable climate changes. The CA also took judicial notice that overseas workers endure emotional strain due to separation from their families during the contract period.

The CA reasoned that these inherent job difficulties caused respondent’s illness and that his occupational condition aggravated his injury, which it viewed as pre-existing at the time of employment. It also ruled that respondent was entitled to total and permanent disability benefits, relying on the undisputed doctors’ findings that he was unfit to resume sea duty in any capacity, which the CA treated as permanent and total disability as defined by law.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it through a resolution dated March 3, 2010.

The Parties’ Contentions in the Petition for Review

In their petition for review, petitioners raised a single issue: whether the CA erred in awarding full disability benefits. Petitioners argued that the CA committed reversible error by awarding benefits despite alleged evidence that respondent committed fraudulent misrepresentation, which, petitioners asserted, forfeited his right to benefits under the POEA-SEC. Petitioners contended that respondent intentionally lied in his pre-employment medical examination (PEME) by failing to disclose prior illness—particularly diabetes and heart problems. Petitioners also insisted that respondent failed to show that his heart ailment and hypertension were acquired during the term of the contract, and that passing the PEME did not prove the absence of pre-existing illness or establish that the disease was contracted on board. Petitioners further argued that the Labor Code provision on permanent disability was not applicable to claims for disability benefits under the POEA-SEC.

Respondent countered that petitioners did not raise fraudulent misrepresentation before the labor tribunals, and that they were therefore estopped from raising it for the first time on appeal. Respondent also argued that he did not commit fraud because he underwent a stringent PEME, including blood and urine examinations, performed by the company-designated physician, and that his illness was therefore not pre-existing. He maintained that pre-existence did not bar compensability of a seafarer’s illness and that the failure to comply with the mandatory three-day reporting requirement was irrelevant because it applied only to seafarers repatriated for medical reasons. He further argued that repatriation due to contract expiration did not preclude recovery of benefits since the requirement was that the disease was a consequence of the work performed. Finally, respondent maintained that his disability was permanent and total and that he was entitled to attorneys’ fees and litigation costs under Article 2208.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court began by stating that entitlement to disability benefits on overseas work is governed not only by medical findings but also by law and contract. The material provisions were Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code, in relation with Rule X of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV. By contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided under Department Order No. 4, series of 2000, and the parties’ CBA bound the seafarer and employer.

The Court explained that the POEA-SEC contains standard terms deemed incorporated in every Filipino seafarer’s contract. Under Section 20(B), paragraph 6, of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions, employer liability for disability compensation under the schedule of benefits applies only when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of the employment contract.

Thus, the Court held that two elements must concur: first, the injury or illness must be work-related; and second, the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. The Court reiterated the POEA-SEC definitions of work-related injury and work-related illness, and emphasized that for occupational diseases to be compensable, all conditions under Section 32-A must be satisfied, including that the seafarer’s work involves the required risks, the disease was contracted as a result of exposure to those risks, the contracting period and other necessary factors were satisfied, and there was no notorious negligence on the seafarer’s part.

For cardiovascular disease, the Court noted that it may be considered an occupational disease if contracted under specific conditions. Where heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof of an acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by unusual strain from the nature of work. Where strain brings about an acute attack, it must be sufficient in severity and be followed within twenty-four (24) hours by clinical signs of cardiac insult. Where a person was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work and signs and symptoms appeared during performance and persisted, a causal relationship may be reasonably claimed. The Court held that, under these rules, it was incumbent upon the seafarer to show that the cardiovascular disease developed under any of the three identified conditions.

The Court then applied the doctrine on evidentiary burden in labor cases. It reiterated that a claimant must prove entitlement by substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla and must be real and substantial. The duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation was characterized as real, not merely apparent.

On the merits of work-relatedness and contract-period acquisition, the Court ruled that respondent failed to prove that the ailment was work-related and contracted during the four-month deployment. Respondent asserted that he experienced manifestations of heart disease in July 2003, including chest pains, shortness of breath, and fatigability, but the Court found that respondent did not substantiate these claims. The Court observed that respondent presented no written note, request, or record of any medical check-up, consultation, or treatment during the claimed period. It also found no support for respondent’s allegation that he reported to petitioners’ office for medical consultation after arrival in Manila, and no documentary record for his alleged examination at a maritime clinic for international service. The Court found that what appeared in the records was respondent’s demand for disability benefits only on September 24, 2003.

However, the Court’s decisive reasoning centered on respondent’s failure to comply with the POEA-SEC’s mandatory post-repatriation medical reporting and examination requirement. It held that respondent failed to comply with the requirement under Section 20(B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions, which provides that after sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer must submit to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician within three working days upon return, except when physically incapacitated, in which case written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed compliance; failure to comply results in forfeiture of the right to claim the relevant sickness allowance and benefits.

The Court found that respondent sought medical opinion only on September 24, 2003, more than two months after repatriation on July 18, 2003. It held that respondent offered no credible explanation for the delay, given his claim that he had chest pains, shortness of breath, a

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