Title
Javier vs. Reyes
Case
G.R. No. L-39451
Decision Date
Feb 20, 1989
Isidro Javier’s appointment as Chief of Police was upheld over Bayani Bernardo’s, as Javier assumed duties and took oath, while Bernardo did not. CSC approval validated Javier’s appointment, entitling him to reinstatement and back salaries.
appointment of municipal officers
acceptance of appointment
contesting appointment

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-39451)

Factual Background

Petitioner alleged, and the trial court found, that petitioner had been “duly appointed Chief of Police of Malolos” on November 7, 1967 by the then Mayor Victorino B. Aldaba, and that the appointment was confirmed and approved by the Municipal Council through Resolution No. 210, series of 1967. Petitioner took his oath of office the next day and assumed the office, performing its duties.

On January 3, 1968, while his appointment was still pending approval and attestation by the Civil Service Commission, respondent, who had by then assumed the position of Municipal Mayor, wrote a letter recalling petitioner’s appointment from the Civil Service Commission. Dissatisfied with the recall letter, respondent then summarily and arbitrarily relieved petitioner from the position and designated Police Lt. Romualdo F. Clemente—a non-eligible person—as officer-in-charge, pursuant to a memorandum dated January 12, 1968.

On February 2, 1968, pursuant to the recall letter, the Civil Service Commission returned petitioner’s appointment papers without action. Petitioner excepted to that return through a motion for reconsideration dated February 16, 1968. Subsequently, on May 2, 1968, the Civil Service Commission attested and approved petitioner’s appointment in a 3rd Indorsement, reasoning that a prior council situation concerning another appointee rendered that other appointment null and void for failure to obtain the legally required council consent. The Civil Service Commission then directed respondent to take steps to install petitioner as Chief of Police, which respondent allegedly ignored.

Petitioner thus claimed he was deprived of salary from November 8, 1967 up to his ouster on January 13, 1968, and beyond. He further alleged humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, and attorney’s fees.

Respondent denied liability and asserted, as special defenses, that another person, Bayani Bernardo, had been appointed Chief of Police by the prior mayor on September 4, 1967, and that both appointments were approved by the Civil Service Commission. Respondent also pointed to the Commission’s conflicting reasoning regarding the consent requirement. Respondent maintained that due to the alleged conflict between the Civil Service Commission approvals, she faced a choice that could render her personally liable in favor of one candidate or the other.

Bayani Bernardo also intervened, moving to dismiss on grounds of prescription or barred action under the statute of limitations, and on the theory that petitioner failed to assert a clear and complete undisputed right. The motion to dismiss was not resolved and Bernardo was declared in default.

Admitted Facts and the Competing Appointments

The decision records several facts admitted by the parties. Petitioner was appointed Chief of Police on November 7, 1967, and the Civil Service Commission approved the appointment on May 2, 1968. Petitioner took his oath of office on November 8, 1967 and immediately discharged the duties until January 13, 1968, when respondent separated him from office. Respondent recalled the appointment on January 3, 1968, and, after the Civil Service Commission returned the appointment papers for reconsideration, the Commission later approved the appointment on May 2, 1968. From May 2, 1968 onward, respondent had not reinstated petitioner despite a follow-up letter-circular dated July 9, 1968 from the Civil Service Commission directing immediate reinstatement.

It was also admitted that Bayani Bernardo was appointed Chief of Police on September 4, 1967, and that the Civil Service Commissioner approved Bernardo’s appointment on September 17, 1967. However, Bernardo’s appointment was not referred to the police commission for decision.

The Legal Questions Raised

The parties framed two legal questions. First, the appellants argued the applicability of sec. 8 of Republic Act 4864 (the Police Act of 1966) when a municipal chief-of-police appointment was made by the mayor without approval by the Municipal Council, and that the lack of approval endured for more than ninety days. Second, they asked, where two appointments to the same position were both approved by the Civil Service Commission under two legal provisions, which one should prevail.

The Court treated the matter as turning preeminently on which appointment was effective as between petitioner and Bernardo, given their actual acceptance and assumption of office.

Determinative Issue: Which Appointment Prevails

The Court focused on the contest between petitioner’s appointment and Bernardo’s appointment. Petitioner had been appointed on November 7, 1967 and took his oath on November 8, 1967. He performed the powers and duties of the office until respondent removed him on January 13, 1968 in favor of Bernardo. Bernardo, by contrast, never assumed office and never took his oath.

From these facts, the Court held that it could not be said Bernardo had accepted his appointment. The Court stressed that acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. It further held that Civil Service Commission confirmation or attestation—even if an essential component of the appointing process—did not itself complete the appointment for the purpose of establishing an effective entitlement to the office. The Court reasoned that Civil Service confirmation or attestation served to assure the appointee’s eligibility, but did not supply acceptance as a completion element where the appointee had not actually assumed office.

The Court also addressed Bernardo’s procedural and substantive stance. It found that Bernardo had not contested petitioner’s right to office. Although Bernardo intervened in the mandamus suit, the Court considered that intervention a belated effort that did not reflect genuine assertion of rights. It characterized Bernardo’s justification for waiting for “clarification” as a weak excuse and held that Bernardo should have challenged petitioner’s subsequent appointment instead of allowing events to proceed. The Court therefore found Bernardo guilty of laches.

By contrast, the Court found that laches did not similarly attach to petitioner. The records showed petitioner was appointed and took his oath, then discharged the duties until respondent recalled the appointment and then replaced him. The Court held that petitioner’s actions amounted to acceptance and created a vested right to the office, especially after the Civil Service Commission later approved the appointment on May 2, 1968 and directed reinstatement.

Distinction from Prior Jurisprudence on Reinstatement and Laches

The Court distinguished the case from Cristobal v. Melchor (No. L-43203, July 29, 1977, 78 SCRA 175), where the Court held that reinstatement was not barred by laches despite the expiration of the one-year period for quo warranto. The Court noted that in Cristobal, it was impressed by the dismissed employee’s efforts to seek reinstatement upon assurances from superiors.

The Court likewise referred to Ingles v. Mutuc (No. L-20390, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 171), where the Court had ordered reinstatement, noting that the decision therein was treated as the law of the case among the parties even if the dismissed employee was not a party to that earlier litigation. In the present case, however, the Court observed that Bernardo did not undertake steps that would show interest or acceptance sufficient to affect the assessment of rights.

Effect of the Court’s Findings on the Initial Questions

The Court stated that, given the findings on acceptance and effective entitlement, there was no necessity to resolve the initial legal questions raised at the outset. The Court declared those questions moot and academic because the controlling issue had been resolved by determining which appointment was effective under the circumstances—specifically, that petitioner’s appointment prevailed.

Ruling and Disposition

The Court ordered respondent Mayor, or her successor in office, as well as the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, to reinstate petitioner to the office of Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan, or to any equivalent position in rank and pay, subject to requirements of age and fitness. The Court further ordered payment of back salaries equivalent to five (5) years, without qualification or deduction.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded from the principle that acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment and tha

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