Title
Javier vs. Javier
Case
G.R. No. L-2209
Decision Date
Jan 2, 1907
Dispute over ownership of a house and lot; plaintiff claims exclusive ownership, supported by evidence; Supreme Court ruled in favor, excluding property from estate inventory.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-2209)

Factual Background

The property was treated by the parties as falling within the estate inventory of Manuel Javier and Perfecta Tagle. The administrator insisted that both the lot and the house should remain in the inventory as estate property. Segundo Javier countered that he owned the lot and that he owned, in his own right, the house built on it, so that neither should be included in the estate inventory. Alongside the issue of ownership, the administrator’s counter-complaint prayed for the return of the property and for Segundo to pay the rent he had received.

The Lot: Competing Claims of Ownership

The Court found it undisputed that the lot had originally belonged to Manuel Javier, under whom both parties derived their claims. Manuel Javier sold the lot, together with another lot, to Ceferino Joven for three hundred and fifty pesos on September 11, 1862, through a public document in the record. The Court treated the deed’s terms as decisive. It described an actual sale and transfer, with Manuel Javier declaring that he “actually sells and transfers” the two lots to Ceferino Joven for the sum stated and transferring “the title and ownership” to the purchaser so that the purchaser could dispose of and alienate the property as his own. The Court concluded that the transaction was an absolute and irrevocable sale, not a mortgage and not a conditional sale subject to redemption, because the deed contained no redemption clause.

Given that conclusion, the Court reasoned that, absent proof that Manuel Javier or Perfecta Tagle repurchased or otherwise reacquired the lot, the lot could not be considered part of the estate, as the administrator contended. The administrator relied on testimony from Gavina Javier and Romualda Javier, sisters and coheirs of the parties. They claimed that they and their brother Martin repurchased the lot, paying three hundred and fifty pesos from their own funds, matching the price paid by Ceferino Joven. The Court noted that if that account were true, ownership would vest in those repurchasers, not in the estate, because they would have repurchased on their own account and with their own funds. However, the Court found their testimony entirely contradicted by more conclusive evidence presented by Segundo.

The Court held that, besides Segundo’s testimony, there was proof that Segundo and his brother Luis bought the property from the heirs of the original purchaser, Ceferino Joven. Segundo ultimately became sole owner after Luis sold to him his share. The Court credited Luis’s sworn statement because it came from a heir who would have an interest adverse to Segundo’s claim against the estate, and there was no attempt by the administrator to show collusion.

Most decisively, the Court relied on an instrument executed on March 12, 1884 before the gobernadorcillo of the district of Malate, introduced by Segundo. It purported to be executed by Ceferino Joven, jr., in his own capacity and as attorney-in-fact for his mother, Josefa Casas, and for his brothers Roman and Francisco Joven. It recorded that Ceferino Joven, in those capacities, sold and transferred to Segundo and to Luis the lot in question, with another building lot, for three hundred and fifty pesos. The Court observed that, although the intrinsic probative force of the instrument could vary, its authenticity was admitted at trial by the vendor, Ceferino Joven. The Court also emphasized that Segundo was then in physical possession of the property and that such possession was recorded in the Register of Property in his name, a fact admitted by the administrator at trial. The Court therefore treated these circumstances as conclusive evidence that Segundo, not the estate of Manuel Javier and Perfecta Tagle, was the legitimate owner of the lot. It further held that the lower court’s contrary conclusion on the lot was manifestly erroneous.

The House: Ownership and the Effect of Good-Faith Construction

The Court next addressed the house. It clarified that the dispute concerned the ownership of the building only, exclusive of the land, because the land was treated as belonging to the estate according to the complaint. The Court described the house as apparently built in 1880. It was almost entirely destroyed by a typhoon in 1882, and it was rebuilt while Manuel Javier—who owned the land—was still alive. Manuel Javier died in 1885. The house became habitable in 1884, though completion and painting proceeded slowly and were finished in 1895.

Segundo alleged that he built the house with the knowledge and consent of his father and at his own expense. The Court found this allegation supported by five documents: three signed by Felix Javier on June 1, 1887, November 11, 1900, and January 15, 1903; and two signed by Martin Javier on April 1 and July 4, 1901. Felix and Martin were, like Segundo, children and heirs of Manuel Javier, and thus had an interest in the estate. Each receipt referred to money borrowed by them from Segundo as advances upon the lots left by their deceased father. The receipts specifically identified that one of the lots was the lot on which the house of strong materials, No. 520 Calle Real or Cabanas, the exclusive property of Segundo, was built. The Court held that the documents acknowledged that the house belonged exclusively to Segundo.

The Court gave weight to the fact that Felix’s authenticity was admitted at trial, while Martin’s signatures were identified by Santos Javier, Martin’s son, who also had an interest. It found the acknowledgement more persuasive because it came from persons who had an adverse interest to Segundo’s position, being heirs of Manuel Javier and thus not naturally aligned with his claim against the estate. This documentary proof was further strengthened by Segundo’s continuous possession of the house since its construction. Even Romualda Javier, a witness for the defendant, testified that Segundo’s possession was uninterrupted and that actions brought against Segundo had never succeeded in taking away possession. Romualda confirmed that Segundo always received the rents.

The Court rejected an attempt by Felix to defeat the documentary evidence by claiming he signed the receipts without first informing himself of their contents except as to the amounts. The Court applied the presumption that a person does not sign a document without informing himself of its contents, and it found the presumption even stronger because multiple documents were signed at different times and places.

Evaluation of the Administrator’s Evidence and Application of Civil Code Articles

The Court treated the administrator’s witnesses who claimed that the house belonged to the estate as failing against the documentary and possession evidence. It characterized the testimony of Romualda Javier and Gavina Javier as interested and lacking corroboration, noting internal inconsistency. Romualda testified that the house was constructed at the expense of herself, her father, and Gavina, while Gavina testified that Romualda, Martin, and Gavina paid for construction. Under Gavina’s version, the Court reasoned, the parents would have contributed nothing, so ownership would belong to the heirs who paid, not to the estate. Moreover, Segundo’s account that his father knew of and consented to the construction was not contradicted. The Court added that Segundo testified his father lived with him in the house during the period of construction, supporting the inference of the father’s consent.

On these findings, the Court concluded that Segundo built the house in good faith and held that Article 361 of the Civil Code applied. Under that provision, the owner of the land where building is done in good faith may either appropriate the work after paying indemnity or compel the builder to pay the value of the land and force the builder to pay proper rent. The Court connected Article 361 with Article 453 on reimbursement of useful expenses, which grants the possessor in good faith the right of retention and provides the defeated possessor options of refunding useful expenses or paying the increase in value.

Procedural History and Issues Raised on Appeal

In the trial court, the administrator prevailed, and Segundo excepted to the judgment. He then moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was not justified by the weight of the evidence. After denial or adverse disposition, he brought the matter to the Court by bill of exceptions for review. The Court noted the appellant’s observation that the description of the property was not very clear and definite, but it held that the matter was of no practical importance because no specific question had been raised on that point and the parties treated the description as correct in discussing their respective rights.

Ruling of

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