Title
Javate-Asejo vs. Asejo
Case
G.R. No. 247798
Decision Date
Jan 18, 2023
Constancia sought nullity of marriage due to Justiniano’s psychological incapacity, proven by his abuse, dependency, and incurable condition, affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 247798)

Petitioner

Constancia sought a declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Justiniano under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of the respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations.

Respondent and State Participation

Justiniano failed to answer the Petition and did not participate in the proceedings. The State, through the OSG, entered its appearance and opposed the petition; the City Prosecutor investigated and reported no collusion between the parties as required by law.

Key Dates

Marriage: December 23, 1989; Child’s birth: April 1, 1990; Petition filed: September 9, 2013; Summons served: December 19, 2013; RTC Decision declaring nullity: June 19, 2017; RTC denial of reconsideration: January 3, 2018; CA Decision reversing RTC: November 29, 2018; CA denial of reconsideration: May 8, 2019; Supreme Court Decision reinstating RTC: January 18, 2023.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudential Authorities

Governing constitution: 1987 Philippine Constitution (case decided in 2023). Governing statutes and rules: Article 36 (psychological incapacity) and Article 68 (marital obligations) of the Family Code; Rule 45 (Petition for Review on Certiorari). Controlling jurisprudence cited and applied includes Te v. Yu‑Te, Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, Marcos v. Marcos, Azcueta, Antonio v. Reyes, and Tan‑Andal v. Andal (which set the clear and convincing evidence standard for Article 36 cases).

Facts (summary of salient events)

After meeting post‑widowhood in 1987, Constancia and Justiniano developed a relationship and married in December 1989. Throughout the marriage Justiniano was unemployed, lived largely with his family, associated with relatives who gambled and drank, and allegedly spent time drinking and gambling to the detriment of family support. Constancia primarily supported the family, worked abroad in 1992, and later returned to work locally; episodes of verbal and physical abuse, public humiliation (including the throwing out of Constancia’s belongings), and intermittent physical harm to the child were alleged. After a culminant incident of public maltreatment, Constancia left but regained custody of the child a year later.

Procedural History

Constancia filed for declaration of nullity under Article 36 in 2013. The RTC, after hearing testimony including that of the psychiatrist Dr. Pagaddu and lay witnesses, found Justiniano psychologically incapacitated and granted the petition in June 2017. The OSG filed a timely appeal; the CA reversed in November 2018 and denied reconsideration in May 2019. The Supreme Court then entertained a Petition for Review under Rule 45.

Central Issue Presented

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC’s declaration of nullity by finding that the evidence did not establish Justiniano’s psychological incapacity to the requisite legal standard.

Standard of Proof Applied

The Supreme Court applied the legal standard articulated in Tan‑Andal v. Andal: the petitioner in an Article 36 nullity action must prove the psychological incapacity by clear and convincing evidence — a quantum greater than preponderance but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court therefore re‑examined the factual record against this heightened evidentiary threshold.

Expert Testimony and Methodology

The CA criticized the RTC’s reliance on the psychiatric report because Dr. Pagaddu did not personally examine the respondent. The Supreme Court emphasized that personal examination is not an absolute requirement; a psychiatric diagnosis may be supported by credible collateral testimony and other independent evidence. In this case Dr. Pagaddu interviewed the petitioner and two of the respondent’s collateral relatives (his sister and sister‑in‑law), gathered developmental and behavioral history, traced a pattern of dependency and maladaptive personality features originating in childhood, and related these findings to manifestations before and during the marriage. The Court found the expert’s methodology and the scope of her inquiries sufficiently probative and not fatally defective.

Corroborative Witness Evidence

Independent lay testimony by close associates (Venilyn Domingo Gaspar and Lutgarda M. Consolacion) corroborated the expert’s findings and the petitioner’s allegations: observations of the respondent’s habitual idleness and drinking, verbal denigration of the petitioner, sale of household items to fund vices, public humiliation (throwing out the petitioner’s belongings), and the petitioner’s economic burden in supporting the family and child. The Court treated these lay accounts as consistent with and reinforcing the psychiatric evaluation.

Antecedence, Gravity, and Incurability

The Court analyzed the classic threefold requisites for Article 36: juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability. Based on Dr. Pagaddu’s tracing of the respondent’s upbringing (spoiling, dependence, failure to experience frustration), the respondent’s long‑standing behavioral pattern prior to the marriage (as recounted by family members and witnesses), and the chronic, pervasive nature of the respondent’s behavior (incapacity to hold employment, persistent dependence, domination by vices and inability to assume marital roles), the Court found that the psychological condition displayed antecedence, manifested with sufficient gravity in the marital context, and was incurable insofar as there was no reasonable prospect of therapy or intervention restoring marital function.

Evaluation of Court of Appeals’ Reasoning

The CA characterized Justiniano’s conduct as immaturity or irresponsibility and concluded that habitual drunkenness, gambling, and refusal to work do not necessarily establish Article 36 incapacity. The Supreme Court rejected that narrow reading, noting (i) the CA unduly minimized the respondent’s sustained failure to perform essential marital duties and (ii) such conduct, when shown to be a persistent product of a chronic psychological disorder rooted in antecedent personality formation, can constitute psychological incapacity. The Court also criticized the CA’s focus on absence of direct physical‑abuse proof while overlooking the pervasive failure of marital obligations and corroborated expert findings.

Role of State Participation and Effect of Respondent’s Silence

The Court noted the State’s participation through the OSG and the City Prosecutor, including the prosecutorial finding of no collusion. The respondent’s failure to answer or participate was treated as significant: absent challenge or rebuttal, collater

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