Title
Jamaca vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 183681
Decision Date
Jul 27, 2015
SPO2 Jamaca convicted of Grave Threats despite Ombudsman's dismissal; SC upheld CA ruling, rejecting double jeopardy, jurisdiction, and evidence sufficiency claims.
double jeopardy
sufficient evidence
complaint
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 183681)

Factual Background

Private complainant Atty. Emilie Bangot filed a complaint for Grave Threats against petitioner with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, docketed as OMB-MIL-CRIM-97-0754. He also filed a substantially similar complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. In a Resolution dated January 26, 1998, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the accusation was unfounded and based only on the statement of Rustom Roxas, who allegedly claimed that petitioner had not uttered any threatening words.

A petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court to assail the Deputy Ombudsman’s dismissal. The petition was dismissed in a Resolution dated July 29, 1998, with the Court emphasizing that it did not review findings and conclusions of investigators conducting preliminary inquiry or investigation into criminal charges.

The complainant’s complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor instead progressed and led to the filing of an Information charging petitioner with Grave Threats, allegedly committed “on or about July 22, 1997” in the evening in Kalambaguhan/Burgos Streets, Cagayan de Oro City, and within the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Information alleged that petitioner, with intent to kill and moved by personal resentment against Atty. Bangot, threatened the offended party with the infliction of a wrong amounting to a crime subject to a condition, by threatening to kill him, and by uttering or shouting the words in the presence of, and within the hearing distance of Jay Jay R. Bangot, the son of the offended party. It further alleged that petitioner did not attain the purpose of the threats but thereby cast fear upon the offended party and endangered his life.

Trial Court Proceedings and Evidence

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, and trial followed. The prosecution presented three witnesses, including Jay Jay R. Bangot, who testified that while petitioner was at the house of Rustom Roxas, they all heard petitioner utter words threatening to cause Atty. Bangot grave bodily harm.

Petitioner, however, claimed that he went to the Roxas residence to ask Rustom Roxas to mediate and reconcile petitioner with Atty. Bangot. He denied having uttered threatening words. His wife, Elisea Jamaca, corroborated petitioner’s testimony.

As rebuttal, the prosecution presented Phoebe Roxas, the wife of Rustom Roxas. She testified that she was in the same room and clearly heard petitioner utter words to the effect that if petitioner lost his job, he would break the head of Atty. Bangot. She also stated that Jay Bangot was present, sitting approximately two and a half meters away from petitioner when the threats were made.

The trial court found the prosecution witnesses more credible and ruled that the evidence established petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of Grave Threats and sentenced him to an imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day, together with a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (500.00) and the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment under Article 44 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court did not pronounce the credit for preventive imprisonment, stating that petitioner had immediately put up a bond for temporary liberty without waiting for arrest.

Court of Appeals Ruling

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 26, 2004, the CA affirmed the conviction in toto for Grave Threats. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 19, 2008 through a CA Resolution. The appellate rulings thus upheld both the factual determinations of witness credibility and the conclusion that the elements of the offense were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issues Raised on Review

In his original petition, petitioner raised the issue of whether the CA should have dismissed the case outright on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction because the private complainant allegedly committed forum shopping by filing similar complaints with both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and the Office of the City Prosecutor.

In a supplemental petition, petitioner advanced additional contentions: first, that res judicata and double jeopardy barred the conviction because the Deputy Ombudsman had already dismissed the complaint for the “exactly same crime,” a dismissal petitioner asserted had been upheld by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 134664, with an entry of judgment allegedly made on December 1, 1998; second, that the Information filed by the City Prosecutor was allegedly null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the Deputy Ombudsman had already dismissed the case; and third, that there were no Grave Threats because the allegations were allegedly based only on hearsay.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court found the petition without merit. On the claim of double jeopardy, the Court held that the petitioner had to prove that a first jeopardy had attached before the second. Citing Braza v. Sandiganbayan, it reiterated that the first jeopardy attaches only after a valid indictment before a competent court, after arraignment, with a valid plea, and when the accused is acquitted or convicted, or the case is dismissed or otherwise terminated without the accused’s express consent. The Court emphasized that in this case the complaint before the Deputy Ombudsman was dismissed at the preliminary investigation stage, meaning there had been no indictment and no case before a competent court. It therefore concluded that none of the conditions for first jeopardy had been satisfied.

To support the proposition that dismissal during preliminary investigation does not trigger double jeopardy, the Court relied on Vincoy v. Court of Appeals, which it described as closely analogous. In that case, the Court had ruled that dismissal of a complaint during preliminary investigation does not exculpate an accused because preliminary investigation is not part of trial and does not amount to a judicial acquittal. The Supreme Court also cited Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, reiterating that preliminary investigation is not part of the trial, so dismissal there does not place an accused in danger of double jeopardy in the event of re-investigation or filing of a similar case. The Court further stated that an investigating body is not bound by the findings or resolution of another investigating office, tribunal, or agency, particularly when the evidence presented may differ.

Consequently, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s double jeopardy theory and held that petitioner’s indictment by the City Prosecutor and subsequent conviction for grave threats did not subject him to double jeopardy.

On petitioner’s argument that the Information was null and void because the Deputy Ombudsman had already dismissed the case, the Supreme Court also found the claim tenuous. It cited Flores v. Montemayor to clarify that the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction under Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770 was not exclusive. The Court explained that the Ombudsman’s power of investigation is shared concurrently with other authorized agencies, including agencies such as the PCGG, and with the Department of Justice for preliminary investigations. It also noted that, despite the Local Government Code of 1991, the Ombudsman retained concurrent jurisdiction with other bodies to investigate complaints against certain local officials. In that light, the Supreme Court treated petitioner’s view that the Deputy Ombudsman’s dismissal necessarily deprived the City Prosecutor of authority as unsupported.

The Court likewise declined to entertain the forum shopping contention as a basis for outright dismissal. It invoked De Guzman v. Ochoa in stating that failure to comply with the requirements of forum shopping is not a ground for motu proprio dismissal because the rules require dismissal only upon motion and after hearing. The Supreme Court further invoked appellate restraint and procedural fairness, citing S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada, which holds that issues not raised in proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal due to fairness and due process concerns and may be barred by estoppel. It referenced Young v. John Keng Seng as well, which it described as warning that invoking forum shopping at later stages or on appeal may result in dismissal of the action, and that the issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity through a motion to dismiss or similar pleading.

As to petitioner’s evidentiary argument that the allegations of grave threats were hearsay, the Supreme Court deferred to the trial court and the Court of Appeals. It reiterated the longstanding rule that factual findings, credibility assessments, and probative weight determinations of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest respect. It held that it would not recalibrate or reexamine evidence absent clear showing of overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts. It also characterized the alleged inconsistencies in how witnesses recounted the exact wording of petitioner’s threats as trivial and inconsequential, citing People v. Cabtalan, which held t

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