Title
Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 205033
Decision Date
Jun 18, 2013
Convicted of statutory rape, Jalosjos faced perpetual disqualification, barring voter registration and candidacy despite commutation; COMELEC upheld the penalty, dismissing his petition.
certificate of candidacy
mayoralty candidate
perpetual absolute disqualification

Case Summary (G.R. No. 205033)

Factual Background

In People v. Romeo G. Jalosjos, the Court convicted petitioner by final judgment on two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, and imposed the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Art. 41, Revised Penal Code (RPC). The President issued an Order of Commutation reducing petitioner’s prison term on April 30, 2007, and petitioner received a Certificate of Discharge on March 18, 2009. Petitioner sought voter registration in Zamboanga City on April 26, 2012; the Acting City Election Officer denied the application because of the prior conviction. Petitioner filed a Petition for Inclusion before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), and while that petition remained pending he filed a CoC for mayor of Zamboanga City on October 5, 2012.

Lower Court Actions on Voter Inclusion and Candidacy

The MTCC denied petitioner’s Petition for Inclusion on October 18, 2012, on account of his perpetual absolute disqualification and resulting loss of the right to vote. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, affirmed on October 31, 2012, and its order became immediately final and executory pursuant to Sec. 138, Omnibus Election Code. Meanwhile, five petitions seeking denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s CoC were filed before the COMELEC First and Second Divisions.

COMELEC En Banc Action

Pending resolution by the divisions, the COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15, 2013, cancelling and denying due course to petitioner’s CoC for mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 elections. The En Banc relied on petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification arising from his final conviction and on his failure to satisfy the voter registration requirement under Sec. 39(a), LGC. The En Banc also invoked precedents including Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and Agapito Cardino v. COMELEC.

Issues Presented to the Court

The Supreme Court identified two questions: (a) whether the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction and violated petitioner’s right to due process by cancelling the CoC motu proprio via Resolution No. 9613; and (b) whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification had been removed by Sec. 40(a), R.A. 7160 (LGC).

Petitioner's Contentions

Petitioner argued that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the divisions’ quasi‑judicial authority under Art. IX‑C, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution by cancelling his CoC motu proprio without a motion for reconsideration and without proceeding through the divisions. He further asserted that Sec. 40(a), LGC partially amended Art. 30, RPC and thereby removed his perpetual absolute disqualification after the lapse of two years from service of sentence.

Respondents' Position and Precedent Relied Upon

Respondents maintained that the COMELEC had a duty to enforce and administer election laws and could cancel a CoC motu proprio when disqualification was conclusively established by a final judgment of conviction. The COMELEC relied on the Court’s prior holdings in Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino and Aratea v. COMELEC establishing that a final conviction imposing perpetual disqualification is notice to the COMELEC and justifies administrative cancellation of a CoC without initiation of a quasi‑judicial proceeding.

Supreme Court Disposition

The petition for certiorari was dismissed. The Court observed that the controversy was largely moot because petitioner had already been excluded from the May 2013 elections, but it nonetheless resolved the legal questions for their doctrinal value.

Nature of COMELEC Action: Administrative versus Quasi‑Judicial

The Court held that the COMELEC En Banc acted within its administrative authority when it issued Resolution No. 9613 motu proprio. The Court distinguished administrative acts from quasi‑judicial acts, citing Villarosa v. COMELEC, and explained that the constitutional requirement that motions for reconsideration to the En Banc follow division decisions applies only to the COMELEC’s quasi‑judicial functions. Where a disqualification is conclusively established by a final judgment, cancellation of a CoC falls within the COMELEC’s duty to enforce and administer election laws and thus may be undertaken administratively and motu proprio.

Procedural Due Process Considerations

Because the cancellation in this case was administrative in nature and predicated on a final, conclusive judicial determination of disqualification, the Court found no violation of procedural due process in the COMELEC En Banc’s motu proprio action. The Court emphasized that administrative power concerns applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by competent organs, and that a final judgment of conviction sufficiently placed the COMELEC on notice to act.

Voter Registration Requirement as Independent Ground

The Court noted that the RTC’s final order denying petitioner’s inclusion in the voters’ list became immediately final and executory under Sec. 138, Omnibus Election Code, thereby establishing petitioner’s noncompliance with the voter registration qualification under Sec. 39(a), LGC. That noncompliance provided an independent and sufficient ground to cancel petitioner’s CoC.

Statutory Construction: Reconciling Sec. 40(a), LGC and the RPC

The Court applied the principle that new statutes must be harmonized with existing laws and that a special statute prevails over a general one (lex specialis derogat generali). It held that Sec. 40(a), LGC, which permits certain convicted persons to run for local office after two years from serving sentence, is a general provision and does not govern where a penal provision more directly and specifically imposes disqualification. The Court observed that Art. 41, RPC attaches the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification to convictions punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal and that Art. 30, RPC effectuates the deprivation of the right to vote and to be elected.

Effect of Commutation and Pardon on Accessory Penalty

The Court explained that Art. 41, RPC expressly provides that the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification is suffered “even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.” The Court found that petitioner’s Order of Commutation did not expressly remit the accessory penalty. Therefore the accessory penalty continued to subsist. The Court further treated the term perpetual as a lifetime restriction, relying on Lacuna v. Abes, and consistent subsequent cases Aratea and Jalosjos, Jr., which held that the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification takes immediate effect upon finality of conviction and does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty or whether the sentence was served.

Application to Petitioner's Status

Applying the foregoing principles, the Court concluded that petitioner remained subject to the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification imposed by his final conviction and that Sec. 40(a), LGC did not remove that penalty. Consequently, petitioner remained

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