Case Summary (G.R. No. 103119)
Procedural History
Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (Branch XIV, Oroquieta City) for attempted murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC conviction in toto. Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Supreme Court seeking modification of the judgment to characterize the conduct as an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code rather than attempted murder.
Facts of the Incident
On the morning of February 4, 1979, Intod and three companions went to Salvador Mandayas’s house and later met with Aniceto Dumalagan, who expressed a desire that Bernardina Palangpangan be killed for a land dispute and threatened Mandayas. At about 10:00 p.m. that same day, Intod, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig—each armed—arrived at Palangpangan’s house, were guided to the bedroom’s location by Mandaya, and four of them fired at the room. Unknown to them, Palangpangan was in another city and no one was in the bedroom; no one was wounded. Before leaving, the men shouted threats including that they would kill Palangpangan and would return.
Identification and Trial Evidence
Witnesses positively identified petitioner and his companions as the persons who fired at the bedroom and who made the threats. Trial testimony included the shouting of threats before the group left the premises. The factual record therefore supported intent, armed action directed toward where the victim was believed to be, and extraneous circumstances (the victim’s absence) preventing consummation.
Legal Issue Presented
Whether petitioner’s conduct constituted attempted murder or, instead, an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code because the intended victim was not present in the place where the gunfire was directed.
Governing Statute and Legal Framework
Article 4(2) (Revised Penal Code) penalizes conduct that would be an offense against persons or property but for “the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.” Article 59 prescribes penalties applicable to impossible crimes. The Court distinguished the doctrines of attempt and impossible crimes under the Revised Penal Code and applied the statutory taxonomy in the case at hand.
Doctrine: Impossible Crime vs. Attempt under the Revised Penal Code
The Court explained that Article 4(2) was a legislative innovation addressing a lacuna in the old Penal Code by penalizing acts that manifest criminal intent but are inherently impossible of accomplishment or executed with inadequate/ineffectual means. The provision is designed to punish the dangerous criminal tendency represented by such acts. The statutory phrase “inherent impossibility” is broad and, under Philippine law, does not make the legal distinction between factual (physical) impossibility and legal impossibility determinative; both varieties fall within the scope of Article 4(2).
Distinction Between Legal and Factual Impossibility
The Court reiterated doctrinal distinctions: legal impossibility occurs where, even if the intended acts were completed, they would not constitute a crime (e.g., attempting to kill a person already dead), and is traditionally a defense in jurisdictions that do not recognize impossible crimes. Factual (physical) impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor prevent consummation (e.g., pocket empty when intending to steal). The Court found the present case to involve factual/physical impossibility because the victim’s absence, an extraneous circumstance unknown to petitioner, made consummation impossible.
Comparative Jurisprudence Considered by the Court
The Court surveyed American decisions cited by the parties (People v. Lee Kong; Stokes v. State; Clark v. State; State v. Mitchell; and federal cases such as U.S. v. Berrigan and U.S. v. Wilson) to delineate differences in approach. It noted that U.S. courts generally treat factual impossibility as no defense to an attempt charge, while legal impossibility can be a defense. However, the Court emphasized that Philippine law expressly recognizes impossible crimes under Article 4(2), so the policy and statutory frameworks differ; in the Philippines impossibility can ground a separate penal characterization and sanction, rather than merely being a defense to attempt.
Court’s Reasoning
Applying Article 4(2), the Supreme Court held that petitioner’s act was inherently impossible of producing the result because the intended victim was not present where the assailants fired. The Court rejected respondent’s submission that the victim’s absence was merely a supervening accidental cause that would sustai
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 103119)
Facts
- On the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, together with Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig, went to the house of Salvador Mandayas in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked Mandayas to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
- Mandayas and the four men met with Aniceto Dumalagan, who told Mandayas he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute and threatened Mandayas with death if he did not accompany the four men.
- At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day, petitioner Intod, Mandayas, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental.
- Mandayas pointed out the location of Palangpangan’s bedroom at the instance of his companions.
- Thereafter, petitioner Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at the bedroom. Palangpangan, however, was in another city at the time; her home was occupied by her son-in-law and his family.
- No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots, and no one was hit by the gunfire.
- Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises they shouted: “We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured.” (TSN, p. 4, July 24, 1986.)
Procedural History
- The Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City convicted Sulpicio Intod of attempted murder.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in toto (People vs. Intod, C.A.-G.R. Cr. No. 09205, August 14, 1991; Justice Fidel P. Purisima, Ponente; Justices Eduardo R. Bengzon and Salome A. Montoya, concurring).
- Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 103119), challenging the Court of Appeals’ affirmance and seeking modification of the conviction to that of an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue(s) Presented
- Whether petitioner’s act of firing at the bedroom constituted attempted murder or an impossible crime as defined in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
- Whether Palangpangan’s absence from the bedroom at the time of the shooting rendered the commission of the intended offense inherently impossible.
- Whether Article 4(2) should be applied to penalize the act as an impossible crime rather than sustain the conviction for attempted murder.
Petitioner’s Contentions
- Petitioner argues that because Bernardina Palangpangan was absent from her bedroom at the time the shots were fired, the crime of murder was inherently impossible of accomplishment and thus the appropriate classification is an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
- Petitioner seeks modification of the judgment from attempted murder to liability for an impossible crime pursuant to Article 4(2).
Respondent’s (People’s) Contentions
- The People contend the offense was not inherently impossible and that the facts are sufficient to constitute an attempt, warranting conviction for attempted murder.
- The People allege the presence of intent on petitioner’s part to kill.
- In its Comment to the Petition, the People argued that the crime was not consummated due to a cause or accident other than petitioner’s and his co-accused’s own spontaneous desistance (Article 3, Revised Penal Code). The People emphasized that Palangpangan’s absence was a factual circumstance and that had she been present, the crime could have been consummated.
Legal Provision Invoked
- Article 4(2), Revised Penal Code, is quoted and relied upon:
- “ART. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. -- Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred: x x x x x x x x x 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.”
- Article 59, Revised Penal Code, referenced as the provision that penalizes impossible crimes (as applied in the final disposition).
- Article 3, Revised Penal Code, is referenced by the People in relation to spontaneous desistance.
Doctrinal Background on Article 4(2) and Impossible Crimes
- Article 4(2) is identified as an innovation of the Revised Penal Code intended to remedy a void in the Old Penal Code where liability required that execution of the act had commenced, appropriate means employed, and physical possibility of the contemplated result existed.
- The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, seeks to penalize criminal tendencies by making punishable acts which, but for inherent impossibility or inadequate means, would be felonies against persons or property.
- The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies and to fill the protection gap left by earlier doctrine.
- Under Article 4(2), the act performed cannot produce the substantive offense because either:
- (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment