Intod vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 103119
Armed group fired at intended victim's house; victim absent, making crime inherently impossible. Supreme Court ruled it an impossible crime, not attempted murder.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 103119)

Factual Background

On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod together with Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to the home of Salvador Mandaya in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked Mandaya to accompany them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Mandaya and the four men met with Aniceto Dumalagan, who expressed his desire that Palangpangan be killed because of a land dispute and threatened Mandaya with death if he refused to go. At about ten o’clock in the evening, Intod, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed, arrived at Palangpangan’s house. Mandaya pointed to the location of Palangpangan’s bedroom and, at his companions’ instance, Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired upon the room. Palangpangan, however, was absent from the house; no one was in the bedroom and no one was hit. Before leaving the premises, the group shouted threats that they would kill the witness and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and that they would return if she was not injured.

Trial Court Proceedings

The Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City conducted trial on the incident. Witnesses positively identified Sulpicio Intod as one of the shooters and testified to the threats uttered by the group. After trial, the RTC found Intod guilty of attempted murder and imposed the appropriate penalty for that crime.

Court of Appeals Decision

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the RTC in toto. The appellate decision is reported as People vs. Intod, C.A.-G.R. Cr. No. 09205, rendered August 14, 1991, with Justice Fidel P. Purisima as ponente and Justices Eduardo R. Bengzon and Salome A. Montoya concurring.

Issues Presented

The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the act of firing at the bedroom occupied by the supposed victim, when in fact the victim was absent, constituted attempted murder or an impossible crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Related issues were whether the impossibility was inherent and whether factual impossibility may be punished as an impossible crime in Philippine law.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner contended that the absence of Bernardina Palangpangan rendered the commission of the intended killing inherently impossible and therefore that the act fell within Article 4(2) as an impossible crime, deserving the lighter punishment provided for such acts. Respondent People of the Philippines argued that the facts established intent and that the offense was not inherently impossible but only failed to be consummated because of an extraneous circumstance; thus the proper conviction was for attempted murder and not for an impossible crime. The People further contended that the failure to consummate the murder was not due to the actor’s spontaneous desistance.

Legal Doctrine on Impossible Crime

The Court recounted the purpose and scope of Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes a person who performs an act that would be an offense against persons or property were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. The Court explained the distinction between legal impossibility, where the completed act would not constitute a crime, and factual or physical impossibility, where extraneous or unknown circumstances prevent consummation. The Court noted that the Revised Penal Code expressly recognizes impossible crimes and punishes them, distinguishing Philippine jurisprudence from certain American authorities that treat impossibility only as a defense to attempt.

Court’s Analysis and Reasoning

The Court found that the case involved a factual or physical impossibility: the shooters believed the victim to be in the bedroom and fired at that spot, but the victim was not present. The Court rejected the People’s argument that the absence of the victim was a supervening cause that should sustain a conviction for attempted murder. The Court reasoned that construing such extraneous circumstances uniformly as causes converting the act into an attempt would render Article 4(2) meaningless. The Court examined foreign authorities cited by the parties but emphasized that Philippine law, by the express text of Article 4(2), tre

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