Title
Inquimboy vs. Vda. de Cruz
Case
G.R. No. L-13953
Decision Date
Jul 26, 1960
Inquimboy sold land to Albea, who resold to Cruz. Inquimboy sued Cruz to annul title, but SC ruled Cruz was a buyer in good faith, unbound by prior case due to no lis pendens notice.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-13953)

Factual Background

Inquimboy was the registered owner of the disputed land under T.C.T. No. 15600. On October 31, 1941, he sold that land, together with another parcel described in T.C.T. No. 15599, to Cenon Albea for P4,000.00. The agreement contemplated a down payment and installment payments: P2,500.00 on November 15, 1941, and P500.00 in May, 1942.

On December 20, 1943, Albea sold the disputed land, together with two other parcels, to Pedro Cruz through a deed of sale (Annex D). The deed was presented for registration on January 3, 1944. While registration proceeded for the two other parcels, registration of Cruz’s deed over the disputed land was refused because the land remained in Inquimboy’s name, there being no registration yet of Albea’s deed of sale from Inquimboy.

On February 18, 1944, the sale in Albea’s favor was registered. Inquimboy’s title was cancelled, and T.C.T. No. 20142 was issued to Albea (Annex E). Shortly thereafter, on February 23, 1944, Inquimboy filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint against Albea (Civil Case No. 93-J). He alleged, among others, that Albea failed to pay the installments due on November 15, 1941 and May, 1942, and sought rescission and the return of T.C.T. Nos. 15599 and 15600.

As the litigation unfolded, T.C.T. No. 20142 in Albea’s name was cancelled on May 26, 1944, and in lieu thereof T.C.T. No. 20584 was issued to Pedro Cruz. The earlier civil case brought by Inquimboy was resolved through the lower court, the Court of Appeals, and ultimately this Court, which rendered its decision on May 29, 1950. In that decision, this Court ordered Albea to reconvey and deliver the properties litigated therein, including the one now in dispute, unless Albea paid within thirty days after final judgment the remaining balance of the purchase price plus P500.00 as liquidated damages and attorney’s fees.

Then, on October 11, 1957, Inquimboy instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against Maria Concepcion Paez Vda. de Cruz, the surviving spouse of Pedro Cruz, seeking the annulment of T.C.T. No. 20584 and the issuance of a new title in his name. The parties submitted the case on a stipulation of facts containing the above narrative.

Trial Court Proceedings

The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint. Inquimboy appealed, insisting that the dismissal was erroneous based on his three grounds, which directly attacked the validity of Pedro Cruz’s acquisition and asserted the binding effect of the earlier Supreme Court judgment, while also defending his own conduct against a charge of laches.

The Parties' Contentions

Inquimboy’s first line of attack was anchored on the claim that Pedro Cruz was not a buyer in good faith. His second contention invoked the doctrine that Cruz was bound by this Court’s earlier decision in G.R. No. L-1601. His third position was that he was not guilty of laches in asserting his right.

The appellee’s stance, as adopted by the appellate reasoning in this case, was that Cruz’s purchase should be regarded as one made in good faith, and that Cruz could not be prejudiced by the outcome of Inquimboy’s earlier suit against Albea because the statutory mechanism of notice through lis pendens was not invoked.

The Supreme Court’s Evaluation of the Good-Faith Issue

The Court treated Inquimboy’s contention that Cruz was not a buyer in good faith as the decisive issue. It acknowledged that there exist several decisions reiterating the general rule that one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner is not a purchaser in good faith. The Court noted the rule has been stated in cases such as Veloso and Rosales vs. La Urbana and Del Mar, Mari vs. Bonilla, Mirasol vs. Gerochi, De Lara and De Guzman vs. Ayroso, and Revilla and Fajardo vs. Galindez.

However, the Court emphasized that the legal environment of each case must be considered when applying that general rule. It distinguished the earlier situations from the case at hand by observing that, in the cases where the rule was applied, the buyer dealt with a transferor who never became the registered owner, so the buyer’s transaction necessarily should have prompted investigation because the certificate’s transfer did not regularize the title through the registered owner’s status.

Application of Article 1434 and the Meaning of Good Faith

In the present case, the Court explained that although Albea had sold to Cruz when the land was still registered in Inquimboy’s name (at the time of the December 20, 1943 deed), later events altered the title’s registration status. Specifically, on February 18, 1944, Inquimboy’s title was cancelled and a new title was issued to Albea. Then, on May 26, 1944, Albea’s title was cancelled and in lieu thereof T.C.T. No. 20584 was issued to Cruz.

The Court reasoned that when a non-owner sells and delivers property, and later acquires title, the seller’s subsequent acquisition passes to the buyer by operation of law, invoking Article 1434 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the Court treated Albea’s later acquisition and registration as legally significant to the transfer to Cruz.

The Court further defined a purchaser in good faith by reference to Cui and Joven vs. Henson, describing such a purchaser as one who buys property of another without notice—actual or imputable—that some other person has a right or interest in the property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of purchase or before receiving notice of another’s claim. The Court found this definition to fit Cruz.

At the time Cruz bought from Albea, Cruz had no knowledge, actual or imputable, of another person’s right. The Court highlighted that Albea had in his possession the proper deed of conveyance executed by Inquimboy and Inquimboy’s certificate of title. As between Inquimboy and Albea, the land thus already belonged to Albea at the relevant stage because of the effect attributed under Section 50, Act 496. The registration of the land in Albea’s name then effectively conveyed it to him, and the Court characterized Albea’s title as clean at the time—there being no annotated lien or encumbrance.

Effect of the Prior Suit and Absence of Lis Pendens

The Court addressed the fact that Inquimboy had already filed suit against Albea as early as February 23, 1944, while Cruz’s title ultimately became that reflected in the record only after May 26, 1944, when the title was transferred to Cruz. Still, the Court held that Cruz could not have been bound by the prior action because Inquimboy never filed a notice of lis pendens.

On this point, the Court invoked Section 79, Act 496, holding that the absence of lis pendens meant Cruz could not be charged with knowledge of the pending litigation. Consequently, Cruz could not be deemed bound by the result of Inquimboy’s suit against Albea.

Disposition and the Court’s Declination to Resolve Other Issues

Having found that Cruz’s purchase was characterized by good faith, the Court ruled that it was unnecessary to resolve the other points raised by Inquimboy, including the contention that Cruz was bound by the earlier Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. L-1601 and the argument on laches.

The Court therefore affirmed the appealed decision dismissing the complaint, and it assessed costs against appellant. Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Barrera, J. concurred.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court’s legal reasoning rested on three linked propositions. First

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