Title
Inciong vs. Tolentino
Case
G.R. No. L-10923
Decision Date
Sep 23, 1959
Libel case refiled in Batangas after improper venue dismissal; separate defamation suit dismissed for multiplicity, lack of cause, and prescription.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-10923)

Factual Background

On October 8, 1952, Miguel Tolentino filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for damages (Civil Case No. 17822) against Ceferino Inciong and his wife Concepcion G. Inciong, seeking recovery for libel committed by Ceferino Inciong, for which Ceferino had been found guilty in a related criminal case. After the Manila case was dismissed for improper venue upon defendants’ representation that Tolentino was a resident of Balayan, Batangas, Tolentino refiled the action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas as Civil Case No. 256, this time against Ceferino Inciong alone.

In Civil Case No. 256, Ceferino Inciong filed an answer with a counterclaim for damages. The record on appeal did not contain the counterclaim, but the court below found that it rested on general allegations that Tolentino’s complaint contained false assertions. Dissatisfied with that counterclaim, Ceferino Inciong and Concepcion G. Inciong later filed in the same court a separate action for damages (Civil Case No. 380) against Miguel Tolentino. That later action was anchored on Tolentino’s alleged false and libelous allegations in his earlier complaint in Civil Case No. 17822, which had already been dismissed for improper venue.

The spouses alleged that Tolentino’s first complaint contained defamatory and damaging statements, including: first, that Inciong was the “Supremo of the Samahang Magbubukid”; second, that Inciong and his wife owned real and personal properties forming part of their conjugal property, including the income from the Samahang Magbubukid; and third, that Inciong had “an awful record, being the permanent Supremo of the Samahang Magbubukid.”

Motion to Dismiss and Grounds Asserted

Instead of answering the complaint, Tolentino filed a motion to dismiss, asserting two grounds. First, he argued that there was another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. Second, he contended that the complaint stated no cause of action. Tolentino later invoked prescription as an additional ground. He argued that the action was filed only on May 24, 1954, which was beyond the one-year period under Art. 1147 of the New Civil Code, measured from the time the cause of action arose, which Tolentino fixed at the filing of his alleged libelous complaint in October 1952.

Proceedings and Ruling of the Court of First Instance

The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. The order also stated that the dismissal was “without prejudice” to plaintiffs’ inclusion of their causes of action as a counterclaim in the answer filed in Civil Case No. 256.

From this dismissal, plaintiffs took the present appeal.

The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal

On appeal, plaintiffs insisted that the complaint in the later case was based on Tolentino’s earlier libelous allegations in Civil Case No. 17822, and they emphasized that Civil Case No. 256 did not include Concepcion G. Inciong as a party defendant. They argued, in substance, that because Concepcion was not included in Civil Case No. 256, she could not have filed a counterclaim there, and thus the dismissal should not bar their separate suit.

Tolentino, for his part, defended the dismissal by pointing out that the later complaint essentially reproduced the earlier libel allegations and that allowing the suit to proceed would encourage a multiplicity of suits. He also pressed the further argument that the action was already barred by prescription.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Court

The Court held that the order of dismissal must stand. It agreed with the court below that Tolentino’s complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 256 was, in effect, “more or less a reproduction” of the complaint in Civil Case No. 17722 (as referred to by the Court), which the appellants asserted was the basis of their own damages action, except that Concepcion G. Inciong was dropped as defendant and the specific allegation about ownership of conjugal property and income from the Samahang Magbubukid was omitted in the later case.

The Court reasoned that because Ceferino Inciong, as defendant in Civil Case No. 256, had already filed an answer with counterclaim based on the same alleged libelous and false allegations contained in the earlier complaint, allowing the separate present action to continue would only encourage a multiplicity of suits. The Court further held that the argument that Concepcion G. Inciong’s non-inclusion as a party defendant in Civil Case No. 256 prevented any counterclaim did not preclude dismissal. The Court found it difficult to see how the allegation omitted in the refiled case—an allegation of ownership of conjugal property—could validly constitute an independent cause of action for damages.

In addition to the pending-action ground, the Court upheld the dismissal on the basis of prescription, which Tolentino had raised before the court below. Citing Tejuco vs. E. R. Squibb & Son Phil. Corp., et al. (103 Phil. 594), the Court reiterated that a civil action arising from libel prescr

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