Title
IN RE: Vicente Sotto
Case
Decision Date
Jan 21, 1949
A senator-lawyer criticized the Supreme Court in a published statement, accusing it of incompetence and threatening reorganization. The Court found him guilty of contempt, emphasizing the judiciary's inherent power to punish actions undermining its authority, despite claims of free speech and good faith.

Case Summary (A.C. No. 7121 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1244)

Petitioner and Respondent

Petitioner: The Supreme Court (proceeding initiated by the Court itself to vindicate the administration and independence of justice). Respondent: Atty. Vicente Sotto, author of Republic Act No. 53 (the Press Freedom Law), who published the statement that triggered contempt proceedings.

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

  • December 7, 1948: Court required respondent to show cause for contempt.
  • Respondent requested and was granted an extension to file an answer; the answer was filed late but admitted.
  • Hearing originally set on January 4, 1949, later postponed to January 10, 1949; respondent did not appear and the case was submitted for decision.
  • Judgment: Court found respondent guilty of contempt and imposed penalties; respondent was ordered to show cause why he should not be disbarred.

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

The decision is rendered under the constitutional and statutory framework extant at the time of decision (the 1935 Constitution). The Court relied on: (1) its rule-making authority in matters of pleading, practice, and procedure (referred to as section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution in the opinion); (2) Rule 64 of the Supreme Court rules (which reproduces sections 231–236 of Act No. 190, the old Code of Civil Procedure); and (3) the inherent power of courts of superior jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The Court also referred to relevant jurisprudence, including In re Kelly and cited American authorities on the inherent contempt power.

Statement at Issue

Respondent caused to be published a written statement criticizing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Press Freedom Law in the Angel Parazo case, asserting that the Court had "erroneously interpreted" the law and accusing the majority of being "incompetent" and "narrow minded." The statement went further, announcing the respondent’s intention, as a legislator, to introduce a measure in Congress to “completely reorganize” the Supreme Court and to reduce its membership—an expressed threat intended, in the Court’s view, to influence the pending reconsideration of the Parazo decision. The statement also contained accusations that the Court constituted “a constant peril to liberty and democracy” and other calumnious assertions attacking the Court’s honesty and integrity.

Respondent’s Defenses

Respondent admitted authorship of the publication but advanced multiple defenses: (1) that the Court lacked power under section 13, Article VIII to impose correctional penalties (arguing penal sanctions require statute enacted by Congress and the President’s approval); (2) that his publication was protected by the constitutional freedom of speech and of the press and made in good faith without intent to offend individual justices; (3) that Rule 64 does not punish acts not punishable under the law or the inherent contempt power; and (4) that, as a senator and not a party or witness in the Parazo case, he could not be held for contempt.

Scope of the Supreme Court’s Contempt Power — Court’s Ruling

The Court held that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior jurisdiction and is essential to the exercise of their judicial functions; this principle was supported by both local precedent and American jurisprudence cited in the opinion. The Court observed that Rule 64 reproduces sections 231 and 232 (and related provisions) of Act No. 190 and that statutory authorization is unnecessary to the contempt power of superior courts, though such statutory provisions exist and provide procedural guidance (sections 231, 232, 235, 236, 236 reprinted in the opinion). Consequently, the Court rejected respondent’s contention that the Supreme Court lacked authority to impose correctional penalties or to punish contempt by virtue of its rule-making or inherent powers.

Precedents and Jurisprudential Basis

The Court relied on prior local precedent (In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944) which held that publications reflecting on or tending to influence pending causes constitute misbehavior tending to obstruct the administration of justice and may be punished as contempt. The opinion also cited American treatises and cases to support the proposition that the contempt power is inherent in courts of general jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that mere fair criticism in good faith may be tolerated, but publications intended to influence, intimidate, or obstruct judicial decision-making—especially during pendency—fall outside protected speech and may be punished.

Court’s Analysis of the Statement’s Character

The Court distinguished permissible criticism of judicial rulings from the respondent’s statements. It found that respondent’s publication went beyond criticism: it contained a threat to use legislative power to reorganize and change the Court’s personnel and a deliberate attack on the Court’s honesty and integrity. The Court concluded the statement was made with the apparent purpose of intimidating the justices and influencing the pending Parazo reconsideration, thereby amounting to an attempt to obstruct the administration of justice. Although respondent alleged good faith and that he did not attack individual justices’ integrity, the Court found these contentions insufficient and belied by respondent’s subsequent public statements during the proceeding.

Effect on Judicial Independence and Administration of Justice

The Court stressed that assaults on the honesty and integrity of the Supreme Court—especially when coupled with threats of reorganization by a legislator during a pending case—tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary and could drive citizens to take the law into their own hands. The Court held that an attorney and officer of the court owes a duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the judiciary; a lawyer-senator’s conduct threatening the independence and free exercise of judicial functions is particularly culpable.

Sanctions Imposed

The Court found respondent guilty of contempt. It imposed a fine of P1,000 payable within fifteen days, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The Court declined to immediately impose incarceration (despite recognizing the gravity), but it also ordered respondent to appear within the same fifteen-day period to show cause why he should not be disbarred for the publication and for subsequent public statements that misrepresented the nature of the charge against him.

Additional Statements and Misrepresentations by Respondent

The Court catalogued additional statements by respondent during the pendency of the proceedings—public utterances in newspapers and speeches asserting that imprisonment would not close his mouth, that the Court acted with malice in citing him, and other declarations that misrepresented the cause of the contempt charge (claiming it was mere criticism of the decision and defense of press freedom). The Court found these further misrepresentations reinforced culpability and contradicted the claim of good faith.

Concurring Opinion (Justice Perfecto) — Expanded Findings and R

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