Title
IN RE: R. McCulloch Dick
Case
G.R. No. 13862
Decision Date
Apr 16, 1918
R. McCulloch Dick detained for deportation as "undesirable alien" over critical articles; Supreme Court ruled Governor-General lacked authority under Section 69, ordering his release.
deportation order
aliens
act of state

Case Summary (G.R. No. 13862)

Factual Background

The petition alleged that R. McCulloch Dick, editor and proprietor of the weekly Philippines Free Press, was detained under an executive deportation order. The order recited that after an investigation under section 69 of Act No. 2711 it appeared that Dick was a subject of a foreign power and an undesirable alien whose presence was a menace to public peace and safety, and ordered his deportation to Hongkong and exclusion thereafter. The report and transcript of the investigation were lodged in the record.

Investigation and Hearing Proceedings

By authority of the Governor-General, Colonel D. P. Quinlan was designated to investigate charges lodged against R. McCulloch Dick that certain publications in the Philippines Free Press tended to obstruct governmental policies in the prosecution of the European war and to create unrest. Notice of a hearing under the procedure prescribed by the Administrative Code was served and accepted. The petitioner attended with counsel, offered testimony and witnesses, cross-examined adverse witnesses, and his counsel expressly thanked the commissioner for the fairness of the proceedings at their conclusion.

Publications and Charges

The charges relied upon two articles in the February 16, 1918 issue of the Philippines Free Press, including a pointed cartoon and a column titled "KNOW HOW TO FORAGE," which accused members of the Philippine National Guard of petty thefts and improprieties. The complaint was made by officers of the National Guard in the form of a protest alleging a malicious campaign of discredit against the Guard which might create discord and thereby menace public order during the war.

Procedural Posture

A writ of habeas corpus issued by a member of the Court upon petition of R. McCulloch Dick. The return asserted that the detention was by virtue of the Governor-General's deportation order issued after investigation pursuant to section 69, Act No. 2711. The parties agreed that if the Governor-General had power to deport aliens as an act of state, and had followed the procedure of section 69, and if petitioner was a "subject of a foreign power," then the Court had no authority to interfere with the deportation order.

Issues Presented

The Court framed and examined three principal issues: (1) whether the petitioner qualified as a "subject of a foreign power"; (2) whether the procedure required by section 69 of the Administrative Code had been followed; and (3) whether the Governor-General had lawful power to deport aliens as an act of state, either by virtue of his office or under authority conferred or confirmed by Philippine statutory law and applicable acts of the United States.

Petitioner’s Contentions

The petition contended that the Governor-General had no authority to issue the deportation order and that the order violated the Constitution, treaties, United States law, and international law in force in the Islands. The petition further asserted absence of lawful basis for detention because no court process or judgment was involved.

Majority Disposition

The Court (Carson, J.) denied the petition for habeas corpus and remanded the petitioner to the custody of the chief of police. The majority held three propositions in favor of the Government: that the petitioner was a subject of a foreign power; that the Governor-General had followed the procedure of section 69, Act No. 2711; and that the Governor-General had power to deport aliens as an act of state, enforceable when exercised after the prescribed investigation. Costs were assessed against the petitioner and the record was ordered filed among original proceedings.

Determination that Petitioner Was a Subject of a Foreign Power

The Court reviewed the petitioner’s personal history and documents. R. McCulloch Dick was born in Scotland, declared intention to become a United States citizen in 1902 in New York, later obtained a British passport in 1912, and continued to reside in the Philippine Islands without completing naturalization. Citing United States authorities and departmental rules, the Court concluded that a mere declaration of intention did not effect expatriation or naturalization, that issuance and use of a foreign passport and the lapse of time without naturalization defeated any claim to have ceased being an alien, and that the petitioner therefore remained a "subject of a foreign power" within the meaning of the statute.

Determination that Section 69 Procedure Was Observed

The Court examined the record of the investigation and found that it complied with section 69: written notice was given; the petitioner had at least three days to prepare; he appeared with counsel; he presented witnesses; he cross-examined adverse witnesses; and the investigating commissioner submitted a report to the Governor-General. The Court found no divergence of opinion among its members about the procedural compliance and accordingly held that the statutory hearing requirements were satisfied.

Legal Basis for Deportation Power: Statutory and Executive Arguments

The majority addressed whether the Governor-General had power to deport aliens as an act of state. Relying on the Supreme Court of the United States in Tiaco vs. Forbes (228 U.S. 549) and on local authority, the Court concluded that deportations by the Governor-General could be seen as actions under the combined powers of the Governor-General and the Philippine Legislature. The Court found that the Philippine legislative history—Act No. 1986 (ratifying an earlier deportation), Act No. 2113 (Feb. 1, 1912), and the incorporation and reenactment of those provisions in the Administrative Codes as section 83 (1916) and section 69 (1917)—evidenced legislative intent to confer, or at least to regulate and thereby validate, the power to deport aliens upon prior investigation. The Court invoked doctrine of statutory construction and congressional acquiescence under the Jones Law to treat the earlier judicial constructions as integral to the meaning of the reenacted provisions.

Relation of Congressional Acts and the Immigration Law

The majority considered whether subsequent federal legislation, including the Jones Law (Act of August 29, 1916) and the Immigration Act (Act of February 5, 1917), occupied the field or otherwise deprived the Philippine Government of deportation authority. The Court held that the Jones Law expressly continued local statutes in force unless altered and thus did not divest the Governor-General of deportation authority where the Philippine statutes supplied it. The Court further held that the Immigration Act of 1917 did not oust the local Government's power to deport aliens as an act of state, and observed that the Immigration Act itself contemplated enforcement in the Islands by local officers "unless and until" superseded by Philippine legislation approved by the President. The majority therefore concluded that the local statutory scheme, as construed by prior judicial decisions and reenacted in the Administrative Code, sustained the Governor-General's authority when exercised after the prescribed investigation.

Doctrinal and International-Law Considerations

The majority reiterated established principles that sovereigns possess an inherent power to exclude or deport aliens and that Congress may regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens in the United States. The Court recognized the line of authority treating expulsion as an act of state and observed that delegation of the power to deport to the political department is consistent with precedent and international law so long as the exercise conforms with due process as prescribed by local statute. The Court cautioned that it was not deciding the precise boundary between executive and judicial authority in all cases, but found the present case fell squarely within the statutory framework that permitted executive deportation after investigation.

Relief Ordered and Mandate

On the foregoing grounds the Court denied the petition and ordered that three days after filing the opinion the petitioner be remanded to custody of the chief of police, with costs assessed against him. The Court directed that ten days thereafter the record be filed with the archives of original proceedings.

Dissenting Opinions: Johnson, J.

Justice Johnson dissented in a separately reasoned opinion. He agreed that the Court has authority to hear a habeas corpus petition and to inquire into alleged illegal deprivation of liberty, but concluded that no law presently authorized the Governor-

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