Title
IN RE: Presbitero Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 102432
Decision Date
Jan 21, 1993
Ricardo Presbitero, Sr. contracted Leonardo Canoso to negotiate Hacienda Maria's sale; disputes arose over Canoso's 17.5% fee. Courts upheld Canoso's claim, ruling he substantially performed his obligations, denying Presbitero's motions and deleting unsupported damages.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 102432)

Factual Background

On 19 August 1981, Presbitero entered into two written agreements with respondent Canoso. The first, titled “Conformity of Agreement” (Exhibit “A”), engaged Canoso to process, negotiate and follow up Presbitero’s claim for the sale of Hacienda Maria, a 270-hectare property under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. The second, a “Contract of Service” (Exhibit “B”), provided that Canoso would be compensated Twenty Five percent (25%) of the gross total sales of the properties, later reduced by a third agreement in Bacolod to 1712%. Presbitero sent letters to the LBP on 16 May 1983 and 14 June 1983 requesting release of the portion due to Canoso and advising he would personally release cash and bonds to him; nevertheless, when part of the proceeds was released the private respondent did not receive the agreed share.

Trial Court Proceedings

Canoso filed suit in RTC Civil Case No. 68 to recover his fee. After issues were joined the case was set for trial. Several postponements were earlier granted to the defendant. A hearing originally set for 1 July 1987 was reset by agreement to 31 August and 1–3 September 1987. Petitioner, through counsel Atty. Alex Abastillas, sent a telegram received 1 September 1987 requesting postponement on grounds of financial handicap. The trial court denied the motion, noting the informal manner of the request, the existence of co-counsel resident in Cotabato City, and that financial hardship did not justify postponement. The court allowed the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte. Petitioner filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and to cross-examine, which was denied on 22 September 1987 but later reconsidered on 20 October 1987 to permit the reception of defendant’s evidence.

Trial Court Judgment

On 18 April 1988 the trial court rendered judgment for Canoso. The dispositive portion ordered the defendant to pay P65,227.01 in cash and P586,875.00 in bonds (characterized as 25% of the collectible), P20,000.00 as attorney’s fee, and P20,000.00 as compensatory damages, and directed the Land Bank of the Philippines to segregate and pay the amount to the plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Decision

Presbitero appealed. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by reducing the principal award from 25% to 1712% of what defendant would collect from the LBP, but otherwise affirmed liability and awarded P20,000.00 as attorney’s fee and P20,000.00 as compensatory damages. The appellate court sustained the trial court’s factual findings that Canoso had substantially complied with his contractual obligations and relied on Exhibits and testimony, including the May 16, 1983 letter (Exhibit “C”) in which Presbitero authorized release to Canoso, as evidence of acceptance and waiver of strict performance of the 120-day stipulation.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Petitioner raised principally: (a) that the trial court denied due process by allowing ex parte reception of evidence after refusing the motion for postponement, and (b) that the courts erred in finding Canoso had complied with the contract and in upholding the validity and enforceability of the agreements, including the reduction of the fee and the award of damages. Petitioner also invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel as enunciated in Ramos vs. Central Bank of the Philippines.

Petitioner’s Contentions

Petitioner argued that the postponement request rested on valid grounds, including perilous travel conditions owing to a coup attempt which disrupted accommodations and rendered travel inadvisable, and that the telegram did not fully convey the exigency. He maintained that the 120-day contractual period was material and that failure to comply extinguished Canoso’s right to compensation. He further contended that promissory estoppel barred enforcement of the contract as construed by respondent.

Private Respondent’s Contentions

Respondent Canoso asserted that the trial court did not deny due process because the defendant had opportunities to cross-examine and in fact declined to exercise that right after evidence was offered. He denied any promise to deliver proceeds within 120 days, contending that the contract obligated him to prepare and submit documents and follow up claims, not to guarantee collection within the stated period. He attributed delays to actions by Presbitero and invoked the parties’ subsequent conduct, including Presbitero’s letter authorizing payment to him, as evidence of acceptance and waiver.

Supreme Court Ruling and Disposition

The Court gave due course to the petition and, after reviewing the records and memoranda, affirmed the Court of Appeals decision with modifications. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed insofar as it found contractual liability and ordered payment at the reduced rate of 1712% of the collectible. The Court deleted the award of P20,000.00 as compensatory damages for lack of factual support in the trial court findings and deleted the directive ordering the Land Bank of the Philippines to segregate funds, on the ground that the LBP was not a party to Civil Case No. 68 and could not be commanded by that judgment. No pronouncement as to costs was made.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court reasoned that a motion for postponement was not a matter of right but rested in the sound discretion of the trial court, citing authorities on discretionary denial and the requirement of meritorious grounds. The informal telegram and the existence of retained co-counsel in Cotabato undermined petitioner’s claim of sudden incapacity; no extraordinary circumstances such as force majeure or sudden death were shown to justify relief. The Court also observed that any procedural due process deficiency occasioned by ex parte reception of evidence could be cured by timely motions for reconsideration, which the defendant filed and which ultimately resulted in the reception of evidence. On the contractual question the Court applied the general rule that obligations arising from contract had the force of law between the parties (Article 1159, New Civil Code) and that clear terms controlled interpretation.

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