A.M. No. 02-1-12-SC - IN RE: Pardo

Case Summary (A.M. No. 02-1-12-SC)

Parties and Setting

The initiating letter came from Justice Pardo, who had earlier served in multiple judicial posts and later in an election-related constitutional office. The Court En Banc addressed the request in administrative proceedings, referring the letter to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, for comment and recommendation. The applicable constitutional framework was Section 1, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which establishes the COMELEC as an independent constitutional commission. The longevity pay computation issue implicated Section 3 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Executive Order No. 33 (July 28, 1986), concerning the organization of the Court of Appeals and the continuity of service for reappointed members.

Factual Background

Justice Pardo’s letter dated 3 January 2002 requested that his longevity pay be adjusted by including in the computation his service as COMELEC Chairman. He claimed that his service in the judiciary for more than thirty years was continuous. The narrative of his public service begins with his appointment on 21 July 1971 as Acting Assistant Solicitor General with the rank, salary, and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). He later retired compulsorily on 10 February 2002. Between these dates, he occupied several judicial positions, namely: District Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 34, Caloocan City, from 3 May 1974 to 17 January 1983; Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila, from 18 January 1983 to 29 March 1993; Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, from 30 March 1993 to 16 February 1995; Chairman, COMELEC, from 17 February 1995 to 6 October 1998; and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, from 7 October 1998 to 10 February 2002. Justice Pardo thus asserted a total of thirty years and six months of service.

Procedural History and Referral for Comment

On 14 January 2002, the Court En Banc referred Justice Pardo’s letter to Atty. Candelaria for comment and recommendation. On 15 January 2002, Atty. Candelaria submitted her comment and recommendation, expressing that she was “not amenable to Justice Pardo’s request.” Her recommendation addressed both grounds invoked by Justice Pardo: the nature of COMELEC vis-à-vis the judiciary, and the scope of Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended.

The Parties’ Contentions

Justice Pardo advanced two principal arguments. First, he maintained that his service was continuous because, in his view, COMELEC should be considered part of the judiciary due to its quasi-judicial, and even judicial, functions. Second, he relied on Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which provided that any member reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in government “shall retain the precedence” and that his service “shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as continuous and uninterrupted.” He argued that the term “Court” in that provision included not only the Court of Appeals but also the Supreme Court, so that his service as COMELEC Chairman would not break the continuity for longevity pay purposes.

Atty. Candelaria rejected both grounds in her comment. She reasoned that COMELEC is an agency not pertaining to the judiciary and, more properly, to the Executive Department. She also asserted that Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, applied explicitly only to reappointed members of the Court of Appeals, not to Justice Pardo’s subsequent appointment to the Supreme Court.

Court’s Evaluation of the First Ground

The Court En Banc agreed with Atty. Candelaria on the first ground. It held that COMELEC is not an organ pertaining to the judiciary. Relying on the constitutional text, the Court stated that under Section 1, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, COMELEC is an independent Constitutional Commission. Consequently, the Court found Justice Pardo’s first ground untenable.

Court’s Treatment of the Second Ground: Meaning of “Court”

On the second ground, however, the Court accepted Justice Pardo’s position. Justice Pardo had argued that the term “Court” used in Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129 should be read to include the Supreme Court. He emphasized that, although he served as COMELEC Chairman after resigning as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 16 February 1995 and before being appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on 7 October 1998, his service in the judiciary should still be considered continuous.

The Court focused on the statutory language. Section 3 created a Court of Appeals and provided rules on precedence and continuity of service for reappointed members. The provision stated, in substance, that a reappointed member retained the precedence from his original appointment and that his service “in the Court” would be considered continuous and uninterrupted. The Court held that the term “Court” was used in a generic sense and referred to the judiciary in general. The Court reasoned that if the lawmakers intended the rule to cover reappointments only within the Court of Appeals, the law should have said “reappointed to the Court of Appeals.” It treated the choice of the broader term as indicative of the intended reach of the continuity rule.

The Court applied statutory construction principles to avoid limiting the provision in a manner that would defeat its apparent purpose. It stated that statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the lawmakers’ clear purpose, courts may consider the spirit and reason of the statute.

Application to Justice Pardo’s Career and Longevity Pay

The Court found that Justice Pardo resigned from the Court of Appeals on 16 February 1995, thereafter served as Chairman of the COMELEC from 17 February 1995 to 6 October 1998, and then was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on 7 October 1998. The Court concluded that this sequence amounted to being reappointed to the Supreme Court after rendering service in COMELEC, which falls within the “other position in the government” contemplated by Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Accordingly, his service in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court was considered continuous, despite his intervening appointment as COMELEC Chairman, for purposes of longevity pay.

The Court also related the statutory scheme to the rationale for longevity benefits. It explained that the purpose of longevity pay for Judges and Justices was to recompense them for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary. It emphasized that the rewarded long service extends from the lowest to the highest court.

Disposition of the Request

The Court GRANTED Justice Pardo’s request to have his service as COMELEC Chairman i

Case Syllabus (A.M. No. 02-1-12-SC)

The matter arose from a letter of Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (retired) dated 3 January 2002 requesting an adjustment of his longevity pay.
The Court En Banc treated the request as an administrative matter concerning the computation of judicial retirement-related benefits.

Request and Invoked Grounds

Justice Pardo sought to include his service as Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the computation of his longevity pay.
Justice Pardo argued that his service in the judiciary for more than thirty years was continuous, despite his stint as COMELEC Chairman.
Justice Pardo relied on the theory that the COMELEC should be considered part of the judiciary because it allegedly exercises quasi-judicial or even judicial functions.
Justice Pardo also invoked Section 3 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, asserting that reappointment after serving in other positions maintains continuity.
Justice Pardo contended that the term “Court” in Section 3, B.P. Blg. 129 includes not only the Court of Appeals but also the Supreme Court.
Justice Pardo described his career timeline as including: Acting Assistant Solicitor General (with the rank, salary, and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance) on 21 July 1971; subsequent judicial posts; service as COMELEC Chairman from 17 February 1995 to 6 October 1998; and later appointment as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on 7 October 1998 until 10 February 2002.
Justice Pardo asserted a total of thirty years and six months of service based on the positions he enumerated.

Procedural Posture

On 14 January 2002, the Court En Banc referred Justice Pardo’s letter to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, for comment and recommendation.
On 15 January 2002, Atty. Candelaria submitted her comment and recommendation, expressing regret that she was “not amenable” to the request.
The Court En Banc resolved the matter by adopting part of the recommendation and rejecting other aspects in light of its own legal conclusions.

Comment of the Administrative Officer

Atty. Candelaria opined that, as to the first ground, the COMELEC is an agency not pertaining to the judiciary, but more properly belonging to the Executive Department.
Atty. Candelaria further maintained that, as to the second ground, Section 3, B.P. Blg. 129 as amended applies only to reappointed members of the Court of Appeals.
Atty. Candelaria’s recommendation thus opposed inclusion of the COMELEC service in the longevity pay computation.

Constitutional Placement of COMELEC

The Court agreed with Atty. Candelaria that the COMELEC is not part of the judiciary.
The Court relied on Section 1, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for an independent constitutional commission structure for the COMELEC.
The Court held that the first ground was untenable because the COMELEC is constitutionally identified as an independent constitutional commission, not a judiciary organ.

Statutory Text Considered

The Court analyzed Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Executive Order No. 33 on July 28, 1986.
The provision created a Court of Appeals consisting of a Presiding Justice and fif