G.R. No. L-78926 - IN RE: Jacinto

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-78926)

Procedural and Administrative Antecedents

Palmario had questioned the decision of the Civil Service Commissioner in G.R. No. 65862 (Facunda Palmario v. Civil Service Commission, et al.) after her resignation from the Social Security System was treated in a manner she challenged. The Court denied her petition in that case on March 7, 1984, for raising factual issues, showing no legal basis, and for lack of merit. On July 7, 1987, she filed a Petition to Reopen the Case, but the Court dismissed it on July 27, 1987, reasoning that it was virtually a reiteration of the dismissed petition and that she invoked no substantial reasons for reopening beyond appeals to justice, equity, and emotional compassion and fairness, particularly considering that the dismissal of the original petition had long since become final and executory. Her motion for reconsideration of that resolution was denied with finality because it raised no new matters warranting modification, and a memorandum subsequently filed by Palmario herself on August 27, 1987 was merely noted by the Court.

Counsel’s Successive Filings and Motions

The Court described counsel’s subsequent conduct as a continuing pattern. On September 23, 1987, Palmario’s counsel, Atty. Jacinto, moved for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, and he thereafter filed a Very Urgent Motion for a Brief Hearing to present what he called newly discovered, hard, and vital evidence. Both motions were denied. On December 9, 1987, counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of a resolution dated October 14, 1987 and a Motion for Leave to File a Brief Memorandum; both were merely noted because the earlier denial with finality of the first motion for reconsideration stood. Thereafter, Atty. Jacinto filed a Special and Very Urgent Manifestation on December 29, 1987, followed by what he termed a Final Plea for the Integrity of the Honorable Supreme Court on January 7, 1988. On February 15, 1988, he filed a Motion to Vacate a resolution dated January 6, 1988, and on March 2, 1988, he filed another Motion to Resolve according to the record of fact and law, logic, reason, good conscience, and common sense. The Court treated these repeated efforts as part of proceedings that did not warrant further review of the merits.

Underlying Facts of Palmario’s Administrative Dispute

The Court recited that Palmario had been transferred on December 27, 1978 from her position as acting section chief of the accounting department of the Social Security System to the real estate department as loans examiner. She claimed mental torture over the transfer, requested a leave of absence for one year, and this request was denied. A second request for a one-month leave was granted for only one week. Palmario left her office earlier and did not report back for more than a year. When required on February 6, 1979, to explain her absence within seventy-two hours, she failed to do so. As a result, she was ordered dismissed effective on her last day of actual service on December 26, 1978.

Palmario appealed her dismissal to the Civil Service Commissioner. After a hearing, the Civil Service Commissioner modified the Social Security System’s decision and considered her not dismissed but merely resigned. Both the Social Security System and Palmario sought reconsideration, but their motions were denied. Palmario then came to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 65862, which the Court dismissed in 1984. The Court later emphasized that Palmario’s petition to reopen in the present proceedings essentially reiterated her original allegations and arguments, and the motion for reconsideration mainly elaborated on the same matters.

Due Process and the Claimed “New Evidence”

The Court rejected Palmario’s claim of denial of due process, stating that the record showed she was given an opportunity to present her side in the hearing of her protest before the Civil Service Commission. Palmario later asserted that she had discovered new evidence showing that she had not been served with a copy of the telegram requiring her to explain her unauthorized leave and also with the charge memorandum of the Social Security System. The Court held that these claimed matters should have been presented not to the Supreme Court, but to the Civil Service Commission, where a petition to reopen the case should have been filed in the first place.

The Court also noted an internal inconsistency in Palmario’s position as reflected in counsel’s statements. It recorded that, in the Addendum to Palmario’s Motion for Leave to File Brief Memorandum, counsel claimed that both the Civil Service Commission and the Social Security System “do not oppose” her reinstatement. If that were so, the Court reasoned that the remedy would lie in going to the Social Security System for reinstatement rather than continuing to litigate the same issues before the Supreme Court.

The Court’s Focus: Merits vs. Counsel’s Deference and Decorum

The Court declared that the merits of the petition were sufficiently clear and did not require further review. It nevertheless expressed serious concern over counsel’s arrogant manner and language. While counsel professed respect for the Court, the Court highlighted statements contained in counsel’s pleadings, particularly those captioned “SPECIAL AND VERY URGENT MANIFESTATION” to alert the Court on a looming danger and those presenting rhetorical warnings about what would happen if the Court continued to disregard its record and the laws, allegedly resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The Court further quoted statements implying that a hypothetical Supreme Court would be better “if inexistent,” and it cited counsel’s framing of a “Final Plea for the Integrity of the Honorable Supreme Court” in which counsel asserted that the Court acted in disregard of legal bases repetitiously cited, and urged the Court to “go into this case personally and in depth” to deny Palmario’s last plea for justice.

The Court found particularly troubling counsel’s insinuations and threats that the Court would knowingly perpetuate an injustice, that the need for a Supreme Court would then be illogical, and that the proceedings were public such that the media would have a “specially keen nose” for news, described as “the most nauseating kind,” involving the Court. The Court also cited counsel’s insinuations likening the Court to a “kangaroo court,” referencing the Sandigan Bayan of Aquino-Galman shame, and suggesting that other jurisdictions would believe the judiciary was not far removed from “Marcosian practices.”

Characterization as Contemptuous and the Doctrine Applied

The Court held that the above statements were contemptuous and could not be countenanced. It reiterated that every lawyer must maintain proper decorum in dealings with courts of justice and is never justified in using scurrilous and threatening language in pleadings. The Court added that while criticism of judicial conduct is not forbidden and zeal in advocacy is encouraged, the lawyer must act within the limits of propriety and good taste, with deference for the judges before whom he pleads. It further emphasized that intimidation does not suit the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court.

The Court treated counsel’s conduct as showing a supercilious and contemptuous regard for the tribunal, and it ruled that it could not permit the affront to pass unnoticed or unpunished if disparagement of the administration of justice was to be avoided in the future. The Court characterized Atty. Jacinto’s actions as demonstrating that he was unfit to continue as a member of the Philippine bar unless he proved himself worthy again to enjoy the privileges of membership.

In support of the corrective measure, the Court invoked the doctrine in In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, stating that rehabilitation must be imposed outside the brotherhood the lawyer had dishonored, and that the lawyer would be allowed to return only after purging himself of his misdeeds.

Dispositi

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-78926)

Parties and Procedural Posture

The matter involved disciplinary action taken by the Court motu proprio against Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto.
The disciplinary action stemmed from his advocacy as counsel for Facunda Palmario in G.R. No. 78926, entitled “Facunda Palmario v. Social Security System, et al.”
The Court previously dismissed Palmario’s petition in a related case, G.R. No. 65862.
The Court addressed repeated motions and pleadings filed by Palmario’s counsel after the dismissal of her petition and her motion for reconsideration in the related case.
The Court ultimately resolved the disciplinary matter by suspending Atty. Jacinto from the practice of law.

Key Factual Allegations

Palmario was transferred on December 27, 1978, from her position as acting section chief of the accounting department of the Social Security System to the real estate department as loans examiner.
Palmario alleged “mental torture” over the transfer or claimed demotion and requested leave of absence for one year.
The Social Security System denied the first one-year leave request and granted a second request for a one-month leave only for one week.
Palmario left her office earlier and did not report back for more than a year.
When required on February 6, 1979, to explain her absence within 72 hours, Palmario failed to comply.
The Social Security System ordered Palmario dismissed as of her last day of actual service on December 26, 1978.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commissioner modified the Social Security System’s action and considered Palmario not dismissed but merely resigned.

Earlier Litigation Timeline

Palmario’s challenge to the Civil Service Commissioner’s decision proceeded to G.R. No. 65862, where the petition was dismissed on March 7, 1984.
The dismissal in G.R. No. 65862 was grounded on the Court’s view that the petition raised factual issues, showed no legal basis, and lacked merit.
On July 7, 1987, Palmario filed a Petition to Reopen the case, which the Court dismissed on July 27, 1987.
The July 27, 1987 dismissal characterized the Petition to Reopen as a virtual reiteration of the dismissed petition and found no substantial new reasons for reopening beyond “justice and equity” and “emotional appeals.”
The Court further invoked the need for orderly administration of justice and treated the prior dismissal as already final and executory.
Palmario moved for reconsideration of the July 27, 1987 resolution, but the motion was denied with finality for raising no new matters that could justify modification.
After the denial with finality, Palmario filed a memorandum on August 27, 1987, which the Court merely noted.
On September 23, 1987, Palmario’s counsel filed a motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, followed by a Very Urgent Motion for a Brief Hearing to present newly discovered, hard, and vital evidence, both of which were denied.
On December 9, 1987, counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for Leave to File Brief Memorandum, but both were merely noted due to the earlier denial with finality.
Counsel thereafter filed a Special and Very Urgent Manifestation on December 29, 1987, and a “Final Plea” on January 7, 1988.
On February 15, 1988, counsel filed a Motion to Vacate Resolution of January 6, 1988, and on March 2, 1988, filed a further motion to resolve according to the record and invoked logic and common sense.
The Court treated the later petitions and motions as lacking proper basis, and it emphasized that the case’s merits did not warrant revisiting.

Due Process and Newly Discovered Evidence Claims

The Court rejected Palmario’s assertion of denial of due process because the record showed she had been given an opportunity to present her side in the hearing before the Civil Service Commission.
Palmario later claimed she discovered “new evidence” that she had not been served with a copy of the telegram requiring her to explain her unauthorized leave and that she had not been served with the charge memorandum of the Social Security System.
The Court held that these supposed se