Case Summary (A.C. No. L-363)
Legal Issue Presented
Whether a conditional pardon that remits the unexecuted portion of a penal sentence operates to bar disciplinary removal from the roll of lawyers under Rule 127, Section 5, where the removal is sought because of a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (murder).
Definition and Legal Significance of Moral Turpitude
Rule 127, Section 5 authorizes removal or suspension of a member of the bar “by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.” The Court treats murder as unequivocally a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court adopts the cited definitions: moral turpitude encompasses conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals and, as a disbarment concept, denotes acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity in private and social duties toward fellowmen or society. Given these definitions, a murder conviction establishes the statutory predicate for disbarment.
Precedent Considered — In re Lontok and the Distinguishing Principle
Respondent relied on In re Lontok, where the Court declined to disbar an attorney who had been pardoned after a felony conviction (bigamy). The Lontok decision rested on the premise that the pardon there was absolute and, by established authority (including Ex parte Garland and other U.S. precedents cited), a full pardon “blots out” the guilt and restores civil rights such that the conviction can no longer be used as a basis for disbarment. The Court in the present case distinguishes Lontok because the pardon granted to Gutierrez was not absolute but conditional; the Lontok rationale explicitly assumes and requires an unconditional pardon to erase the conviction for purposes of disbarment.
Legal Effect of the Conditional Pardon in This Case
The conditional pardon in Gutierrez’s case remitted only the unexecuted portion of the penal term and was expressly conditional upon future lawful conduct. It did not expunge or reach the offense itself or the legal finding of guilt. Because it is not the operative equivalent of a full pardon that “blots out” the guilt, the conditional pardon cannot be treated as removing the conviction’s legal effect for purposes of disbarment proceedings. Consequently, the existence of the conviction must be judged on its own merits for the purpose of determining fitness to remain on the roll.
Aggravating Circumstances, Moral Fitness, and the Duty of the Bar
The murder for which respondent was convicted involved aggravating circumstances — treachery, commission in band, taking advantage of official position (respondent was a municipal mayor at the time), and use of a motor vehicle — thereby demonstrating a high degree of moral turpitude. The decision emphasizes that the practice of law is a privilege conditioned on continuing adherence to strict standards of moral and
...continue readingCase Syllabus (A.C. No. L-363)
Citation and Procedural Posture
- Report citation: 115 Phil. 647; Administrative Case No. 363; Decision date: July 31, 1962.
- Nature of proceeding: Disbarment proceedings under Rule 127, section 5, of the Rules of Court.
- Deciding justice: Makalintal, J.; Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.
Parties
- Complainant: Widow of Filemon Samaco (victim in the underlying criminal case).
- Respondent: Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez, member of the Philippine Bar.
Bar Admission and Professional Background
- Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez was admitted to the Philippine Bar on October 5, 1945.
- The decision frames the practice of law as a privilege subject to continuing standards of mental and moral fitness.
Underlying Criminal Case: Trial Court Conviction
- Criminal case No. R-793 in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro.
- Respondent was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan.
- At trial, respondent and co-conspirators were sentenced to the penalty of death.
Supreme Court Review and Sentence Modification
- On review by the Supreme Court, the conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G. R. No. L-7101).
- The Supreme Court changed the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
Presidential Pardon and Its Terms
- After serving a portion of his sentence, respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958.
- The pardon remitted the unexecuted portion of the prison term "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
- The pardon is explicitly characterized in the decision as conditional, not absolute, and as merely remitting the unexecuted portion of the term without reaching the offense itself.
Initiation of Disbarment Proceedings
- On October 9, 1958, the widow of Filemon Samaco filed a verified complaint before the Supreme Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.
- Respondent timely filed an answer admitting the facts of his conviction but invoked the conditional pardon as a defense, relying on the precedent In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Legal Issue Presented
- The core legal question: Whether the conditional pardon granted to respondent places him beyond the scope of the disbarment rule (Rule 127, section 5) which authorizes removal for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Governing Rule and Definition of Moral Turpitude
- Rule 127, section 5: A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
- The decision states that murder is unequivocally a crime involving moral turpitude.
- Definitions and authorities cited:
- "Moral turpitude" includes everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals (In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275).
- As used in disbarment statutes, moral turpitude means "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted ru