Case Summary (G.R. No. 1179)
Petitioner and Relief Sought
Guarina petitioned for admission to the bar without taking the prescribed examination, invoking section 2 of Act No. 1597 (an amendment to Act No. 190) which authorizes certain public officers to be licensed to practice law “without an examination” upon motion and satisfactory proof of holding specified offices. He seeks admission on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for Batanes.
Statutory Provision at Issue (Act No. 1597, sec. 2)
Section 2 of Act No. 1597 amends paragraph one of section 13 of Act No. 190 (the Code of Civil Procedure) by adding a proviso that persons who have held specified offices under United States authority—among them provincial fiscal—“may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.” The question presented is whether “may” confers an absolute right to admission without examination or merely grants the court discretion to admit or refuse.
Relevant Factual Background
The court’s records show that Guarina previously took the prescribed bar examination and failed, receiving an overall average of 71 percent—four points below the 75 percent required for admission. It also affirmatively appears he had not been a practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to his appointment as provincial fiscal. He subsequently served as governor of Sorsogon before being appointed provincial fiscal.
Legal Questions Presented
- Does the proviso in Act No. 1597 vest Guarina with a right to be admitted without examination by virtue of his office (i.e., should “may” be read as mandatory “shall”)? 2. If the local statute could be read to create such a right, would that construction conflict with the statutory jurisdiction and duties previously conferred on the Supreme Court by the Organic Act and the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902?
Canon of Construction for “May” Versus “Shall”
The court recognizes the established principle that the permissive term “may” will be construed as mandatory when necessary to effectuate the legislature’s apparent intent. The opinion cites authorities (including Rock Island County Supervisors v. United States and other precedents) stating that whether “may” is mandatory or permissive depends on statutory context and legislative purpose. Thus, if the statute clearly intends to impose a duty or to grant an enforceable right, “may” can be read as “shall.”
Higher-Law Constraint: Act of Congress (July 1, 1902) and the Commission’s Limits
The court emphasizes that its statutory authority to regulate admission to the bar derives from the Organic Act (Act No. 136), the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), and was confirmed and limited by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (the Philippine Bill). Section 9 of that Act confirms the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance “as heretofore provided” and reserves to Congress and to the government of the Islands certain powers to alter practice and procedure. The court reasons that the Philippine Commission (the local legislature) cannot enact a statute that in effect nullifies or substantially narrows the judicial power and duties previously conferred by Congress. Any Commission act repugnant to the Act of Congress is void to the extent of the conflict.
Interaction of Local Statute with Congressional Grant of Judicial Power
The Code provisions then in force (Act No. 190, secs. 13–16) required the Supreme Court to pass upon moral character, qualifications, and ability of bar applicants, including by examination. The court construes the scope of Act No. 1597 against that backdrop and holds that construing “may” in the proviso as an absolute entitlement to admission without examination would effectively deprive the Supreme Court of the authority conferred by Congress to assess qualifications and deny admission to those who do not meet standards. Because the Commission cannot validly enact a statute that nullifies the court’s congressionally confirmed jurisdiction, the term “may” must be read permissively unless a construction consistent with the higher law is impossible.
Application of Interpretation to the Present Case
Applying the permissive construction, the court treats the proviso as granting the Supreme Court discretion to admit holders of the listed offices without examination when the court is otherwise satisfied the applicant possesses the requisite learning and ability. The court notes that in many prior cases appointment to these offices had been accepted as satisfactory evidence of qualification—typically because those a
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 1179)
Citation and Procedural Posture
- Reported at 24 Phil. 37; G.R. No. 1179; decided January 8, 1913.
- Title: In re Application of Mario Guarina for Admission to the Bar.
- Decision authored by Justice Carson; Chief Justice Arellano, and Justices Torres, Mapa, and Trent concurred.
- The applicant invoked section 2 of Act No. 1597 (enacted February 28, 1907) to seek admission to the bar without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he held the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
- The court considered the applicant’s prior record with the examining board and statutory and constitutional limits upon the authority of the Philippine Commission and the local statutes in light of an Act of Congress (July 1, 1902).
Facts Presented
- The applicant, Mario Guarina, holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
- The records disclose that the applicant previously took and failed the prescribed bar examination.
- The examining board’s report (dated March 23, 1907) showed the applicant’s average was 71%, four points short of the required 75%.
- It affirmatively appears the applicant was not and never had been a practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to his appointment as provincial fiscal.
- Since his prior examination, he held the responsible office of governor of the Province of Sorsogon and subsequently was appointed provincial fiscal — appointments the Chief Executive made with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission.
Statute Invoked (Act No. 1597, Feb. 28, 1907)
- Section 2 of Act No. 1597 amends paragraph one of section 13 of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) and provides, in substance:
- The list of those who may be licensed without examination includes persons who "shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of ... provincial fiscal ... or assistant attorney for the Moro Province" and others.
- The operative clause reads: such persons "may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court."
- The applicant contends that the word "may" in this clause should be read as mandatory ("shall") so as to confer an absolute right to admission without examination upon proof of holding a listed office.
Relevant Local Statutory Background (Act No. 136 and Act No. 190)
- Act No. 136 (Organic Act) created the judiciary structure and vested judicial power in the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance, among others.
- Sec. 2: Constitution of judiciary; Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance are courts of record.
- Secs. 16–17: Define the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction, including power to issue writs in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) provisions relevant to bar admission:
- Sec. 13: Enumerates who may practice as lawyers; includes those licensed under prior sovereigns and those licensed hereafter in the prescribed manner.
- Sec. 14: Qualifications of applicants — resident, not a foreign subject/citizen, age 23, of good moral character, and who "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
- Sec. 15: Certificate of good character required; applicant must satisfactorily pass a proper examination upon all codes and other branches of legal learning as Supreme Court rules provide.
- Sec. 16: Examinations shall be conducted at Manila by the judges of the Supreme Court or by a committee appointed by them.
Federal Legislative Constraint (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, §9)
- Section 9 of the Act of Congress (July 1, 1902) confirms and secures to the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance the jurisdiction theretofore conferred and permits additional jurisdiction subject to the Government of the Islands’ power to change practice and procedure.
- The Act provides appointment processes for Chief Justice and associate justices, compensation rules, and appointment procedures for judges of the Courts of First Instance.
- Critically, the Act limits local authority: while the local government may confer additional jurisdiction or change practice and procedure, it cannot remove or impair jurisdiction formerly granted or otherwise conflict with Acts of Congress.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the word "may" in section 2 of Act No. 1597 is to be construed as mandatory (conferring an absolute right to admission without examination) or permissive (conferring discretionary power upon the Supreme Court).
- Whether Act No. 1597, insofar as it purports to require admission without examination for holders of certain offices, conflicts with or overrides the powers and duties of the Supreme Court as defined by prior statutes and the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
- Whether the applicant’s appointment as provincial fiscal, standing alone, constitutes satisfactory proof that he "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability" to warrant admission without examination, despite his prior failed examination and lack of prior practice as an attorney.