G.R. No. L-550 - IN RE: Gregorio

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-550)

Factual Background

On May 10, 1940, the petitioner filed with the Commission an application for a certificate of convenience and public necessity to install, operate, and maintain an ice plant service in Pasay. The application was docketed as case No. 59690. Petitioner complied with the usual procedure, including publication of notice of hearing and other steps to bring the case to a hearing-ready posture. Hearings were repeatedly postponed until the outbreak of war caused the case to be shelved indefinitely.

In February 1945, the Commission’s records, including those of case No. 59690, were lost or destroyed. According to the petitioner, when the Commission was re-established, it announced that it would entertain requests for reconstitution of burned records within one year, later extended by an additional six months. Petitioner then moved for reconstitution of case No. 59690. He alleged that the Commission docketed his motion as a new application under a new number and required him to pay again P25 as a fee and to publish anew the notice of hearing, though the Court found this last allegation not entirely accurate.

The Commission then set for hearing on September 17, 1945 the petitioner’s case together with eleven other applications for authority to install and operate ice plants in various places around the City of Manila. Before trial began, the Commissioner informed the parties that any certificates, if granted, would be temporary, not more than three or four years. The Commissioner also announced that no ice plant applications would be considered unless applicants already had complete machineries and equipment ready to be set up. After trial, the Commission granted certificates to six applicants who had the required machineries and equipment. It denied the petitioner, who allegedly had no ice-making machineries and equipment.

Commission Policy and the Denial of the Petitioner’s Application

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, and the Commission issued an order elaborating the grounds for dismissal. The Commission explained that it had adopted a policy to ensure that applicants for ice plant certificates would render the urgently needed service as soon as possible after approval and to discourage speculative applications without intention to render service. It stated that after the Commission was organized, many applicants desisted once the policy was announced, and those showing real disposition to render service by obtaining the necessary equipment were granted certificates and were operating or about to operate. The Commission characterized the policy as an exercise of regulatory power under Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, and justified it as required by conditions substantially different from those prevailing before the war.

Nature of the Petition and the Court’s Framework for Review

The Court emphasized that the petition before it was one for a writ of certiorari, not a petition for review. It noted the fundamental difference between the two remedies under law. Citing Section 36 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, and Manila Railroad Co. vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., 48 Phil., 266, the Court held that certiorari is available only when the Commission exceeded jurisdiction or gravely abused discretion. When the grievance involves mere error of law or fact without any jurisdictional issue, review—not certiorari—is the proper remedy, as reflected in Genanichi Ishi vs. Public Service Commission, 63 Phil., 428. The Court further observed that the allegations in the petition and the prayer—to annul the Commission’s order and direct it to reconstruct and reconstitute the original application—did not match the broader arguments later raised in the brief.

Construing the “trends” of petitioner’s arguments, the Court treated the case as raising three principal questions: first, whether the Commission had jurisdiction to disregard the old application and consider petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as a new application; second, whether the Commission had authority to dismiss solely because petitioner had no ice-making equipment on hand; and third, whether petitioner was denied his day in court.

Question One: Jurisdiction Over Reconstitution and Conversion into a New Application

On the first question, the Court reasoned that Act No. 3110, which prescribes reconstitution methods for lost or destroyed records of judicial tribunals, did not govern Commission records. Reconstitution in the Commission was said to be governed instead by Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, which directed the Commission to make needful rules for its government and other proceedings not inconsistent with the Act. The Court held that under this framework, the Commission could decree that a lost or destroyed application need not be reconstituted, and that the applicant should file a new application if he intended to proceed with his purpose to secure a certificate.

The Court further noted petitioner’s own conduct. In the course of his prayer, petitioner asked that if reconstitution could not be done, the petition be treated as an application. This, in the Court’s view, precluded petitioner from objecting to the conversion he had earlier proposed or acquiesced in.

The Court also underscored the absence of substantial injury or manifest injustice. It ruled that certiorari generally does not issue in the absence of substantial injury to the petitioner. It concluded that petitioner was not deprived of any legal right. The Court treated the pre-war application as not having matured into any enforceable right that could be restored merely because records were burned; at the time the records were lost, no action had been taken beyond bringing the application to the point of trial readiness. The Court added that the outcome would have been the same even if the original application had been considered rather than the substituted one.

As to the fee and new publication costs, the Court found that the petitioner did not raise the objection before the Commission and mentioned it only in the petition as a descriptive detail. It also noted petitioner’s implied conformity, given his expressed willingness to have his motion treated as a new application, which carried implied acceptance of expenses incident to filing a new application.

Question Two: Authority to Dismiss for Lack of Equipment and Reasonableness of the Policy

The second question required the Court to assess the reasonableness of the Commission’s policy as the basis for dismissal. The Court stated that the key premise of petitioner’s argument—that the old application was the one being dismissed—was legally and factually inapt because the Commission did not reconstitute the old case. Nevertheless, the Court added that even if the premise were accepted, the Commission still had authority to dispose of applications at the same level as new applicants, because certificates and applications were to be adjudged in the light of conditions obtaining at the time of hearing or decision, not only at the time of filing.

The Court cited Cebu Ice & Cold Stores Corp. vs. Veluz, 57 Phil., 309, to support that public interest and convenience guided the Commission’s first consideration. It also cited Section 16[m] of Act No. 146, as amended, and Pasay Transportation Co. vs. Public Service Commission and Perez Samanillo, 59 Phil., 278, to establish that the Commission could revoke certificates when conditions under which they were granted had materially changed.

The Court then framed the controlling inquiry on certiorari as whether the policy constituted grave abuse of discretion. It adopted an approach drawn from Tolentino’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Commercial Laws of the Philippines, summarizing that the Commission was vested with the power under Section 15 of Act No. 146, as amended to authorize public services and issue certificates. It must be guided by public necessity and convenience as primary considerations, a principle supported by cases including Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil., 825, Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 66 Phil., 36, and Manila Railroad Co. vs. Parsons Hardware Co., 66 Phil., 706. The Court added that the decisive question in granting or refusing certificates was what best served public interest, citing Carmelo and Oriol vs. Monserrat, 55 Phil., 644.

From these principles, the Court held that where public convenience would not be served, issuance was not in order. It further referenced A. L. Ammen Transportation Co. vs. De Margallo, 54 Phil., 570, for the proposition that where a certificate’s underlying route was merely a proposed road not yet constructed, the certificate would be null and void. Tested against this standard, the Court found the Commission’s order not arbitrary.

The Court held that, although no evidence was adduced to support the policy order, the underlying bases were matters of public knowledge and thus subject to judicial notice. It declared it was judicially noticeable that destruction of ice plants in Manila and environs during the war, and the use by the United States Army of what remained of ice cold storage, created an acute shortage of ice upon liberation.

Given that emergency, the Court reasoned that the Commission could reasonably grant certificates to those with facilities to produce ice and deny applicants without such facilities. It characterized the policy as an emergency measure addressing a serious crisis. The Court held that issuing permanent certificates to applicants with no visible means to supply public needs would not promote public interest. It said such certificates would likely be used for speculative purposes and could create complications and hamper the Commission’s later freedom of action in reorganizing service operations.

The Court also explained the transitional nature of the policy: as rehabilitation progressed, the Commission would need to ma

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-550)

The case arose from a petition for certiorari filed by Quirino G. Gregorio, seeking to annul an order of the Public Service Commission and to require the Commission to proceed with the reconstruction and reconstitution of his original application for authority to operate an ice plant service.
The controversy involved the post-war handling of an application whose records were lost or destroyed during World War II, and the Commission’s refusal to grant ice plant authority based on a postponed policy tied to applicants’ possession of complete equipment.
The Court treated the petition as one for certiorari rather than review, and it resolved whether the Commission acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and whether the petitioner was denied due hearing.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Quirino G. Gregorio was the petitioner who invoked certiorari to annul the Public Service Commission’s action dismissing his application for an ice plant certificate.
The respondent was the Public Service Commission, whose order denied the petitioner authority after reconstitution was not pursued through the original record.
The petition sought to annul the Commission’s order and to direct the Commission “to proceed for the reconstruction and reconstitution of petitioner’s original application (case No. 59690).”
The Court emphasized a marked difference between certiorari and review as the only remedies provided by law for considering Public Service Commission orders or decisions by the Court.
The Court noted that the petition, on its face, challenged only dismissal of the application, but the petitioner’s arguments in brief raised issues with only remote relation to the petition’s allegations.
The Court concluded by denying and dismissing the petition without costs.

Key Factual Background

On May 10, 1940, petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission an application for a certificate of public convenience and public necessity to install, operate, and maintain an ice plant service within the municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal, docketed as Commission case No. 59690.
Petitioner complied with the usual pre-hearing requirements, including publication of the notice of hearing and steps to place the case in hearing condition.
Hearing on the application was postponed several times until the war began, and the case was then shelved indefinitely.
In February 1945, the Commission records, including those of case No. 59690, were lost or destroyed.
After re-establishment of the Commission, the petitioner claimed it announced a period for reconstitution of records burned, and petitioner moved for reconstitution of case No. 59690.
Petitioner alleged that the Commission docketed the motion for reconstitution as a new application under a new number, required payment of a new fee, and compelled re-publication of the notice of hearing.
The Court later found the allegation about re-publication was not entirely accurate.
In September 1945, the Commission set for hearing and considered jointly the petitioner’s case and eleven other applications for ice plant authority around the City of Manila.
Before trial, the Commissioner announced that if certificates were granted, they would be for a temporary period only, not more than three or four years.
The Commissioner also announced that no applications for ice plant service would be considered unless applicants already possessed complete machineries and equipment ready for setup.
The Commission granted certificates to six applicants who had the required machinery and equipment, and it denied the present petitioner because he lacked the equipment.
On the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the Commission issued an order explaining that the policy aimed to ensure the urgently needed service would be rendered promptly and to discourage speculative attempts to obtain certificates without an intention to operate.
The Commission justified the policy as an exercise of the regulatory power under Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, and it stressed that post-war conditions were materially different from pre-war conditions.
The petitioner’s additional contention was that he was denied his “day in court,” because the application was dismissed without a proper hearing on the merits.

Statutory and Jurisprudential Framework

The governing statute for the Commission’s remedial framework was Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, especially Section 36, which provided that the Court’s remedies for Public Service Commission orders were limited to certiorari or review.
The Court recognized that under Section 36, Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, certiorari lay only when the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion.
The Court contrasted the appropriate remedy for mere errors of law or fact by citing Genanichi Ishi vs. Public Service Commission, 63 Phil., 428, holding that review—not certiorari—was proper.
The Court invoked Manila Railroad Co. vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., 48 Phil., 266 to underscore the jurisdictional distinction between certiorari and review in Public Service Commission matters.
The Court discussed the reconstitution of records in relation to Act No. 3110, stating that it prescribed methods for reconstitution of records of judicial tribunals and made no reference to lost or destroyed records of the Public Service Commission.
The Court held that reconstitution of Commission records had to be governed by Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, which required the Commission to make rules for its government and other proceedings not inconsistent with the Act.
The Court relied on Section 15, Act No. 146, as amended, for the Commission’s authority to authorize public services through certificates of public convenience.
The Court treated public necessity and convenience as primary considerations in granting or refusing certificates, citing Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil., 825; Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 66 Phil., 36; and Manila Railroad Co. vs. Parsons Hardware Co., 66 Phil., 706.
The Court cited Cebu Ice & Cold Stores Corp. vs. Veluz, 57 Phil., 309 for the proposition that an application must be decided in light of conditions obtaining at hearing or decision, not at filing.
The Court cited Section 16(m) of Act No. 146, as amended and Pasay Transportation Co. vs. Public Service Commission and Perez Samanillo, 59 Phil., 278 to support the Commission’s authority to revoke certificates if circumstances materially change.
The Court relied on Section 35, Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, to support non-interference with Commission discretion absent clear showing of arbitrariness, illegality, or lack of jurisdiction.
The Court invoked judicial-notice reasoning for facts of post-war ice shortages, and it cited Carmelo and Oriol vs. Monserrat, 55 Phil., 644 for the test of what best serves public interest.