Title
IN RE: Cuan
Case
Decision Date
Mar 18, 1954
Republic Act No. 972, lowering bar passing marks, declared unconstitutional for encroaching on judicial power, arbitrary classification, and legislating judicial functions.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 177056)

Key Dates and Applicable Law

Principal statute challenged: Republic Act No. 972, enacted June 21, 1953 (became law without the President’s signature).
Controlling constitutional provisions and authorities cited by the Court: (a) the constitutional rule-making and concurrent power language regarding admission to the practice of law (quoted in the opinion as Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 13), and (b) the constitutional title requirement (quoted as Section 21(1), Art. VI). The Court also relied extensively on Anglo-American precedents (e.g., Cooper, In re Day, State v. Cannon, Ex parte Secombe) and Philippine precedents (e.g., In re Guarina).

Statutory Text and Primary Effects of Republic Act No. 972

Republic Act No. 972 purported to fix reduced passing general averages for bar examinations held from July 4, 1946 through certain subsequent years (70% for 1946–1951; 71% for 1952; 72% for 1953; 73% for 1954; 74% for 1955) provided no subject grade fell below 50%. Section 2 provided that any 75% grade in any subject in examinations after July 4, 1946 would be deemed passing for purposes of subsequent computations. The Act therefore operated retroactively to permit many previously unsuccessful candidates to be admitted to the Bar.

Procedural History and Immediate Relief Sought

Following enactment, numerous unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission invoking RA 972; some also filed motions for reconsideration of their exam papers. The Supreme Court first reviewed pending motions for reconsideration and found no sufficient ground to alter the previously recorded grades. The Court then held a special hearing limited to the constitutional question whether RA 972 was valid. Counsel and amici on both sides submitted extensive memoranda and oral argument. The Court also appended exhaustive statistical data showing how many candidates would be affected.

Statistical Impact and Classification of Beneficiaries

The Court presented statistics of examinees and successful candidates for the years 1946–1953 and concluded that, if RA 972 were applied, about 1,094 candidates would in fact be benefited overall (including some who could aggregate subject grades from multiple examinations to reach the new passing average), though only 604 had filed petitions at that time. The Court highlighted that the law’s declared objective was to remedy alleged disadvantages faced by postwar examinees (insufficiency of legal reading material and inadequate preparation).

Issues Framed for Decision

(1) Whether Congress, by enacting RA 972, exceeded its constitutional power and unlawfully encroached on the judicial function of admitting persons to the practice of law;
(2) Whether RA 972 constituted improper class legislation or an arbitrary classification;
(3) Whether the Act’s retroactive effect and the substance of Article 2 (and related provisions) violated constitutional requirements (including the title requirement) and other constitutional principles; and
(4) Whether parts or the whole of RA 972 must be declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

Majority Holding — Overview of Disposition

After deliberation and voting, eight Justices concluded: (a) the portions of Article 1 of RA 972 referring to the examinations of 1946–1952 and all of Article 2 are unconstitutional and void; (b) for lack of unanimity sufficient to nullify the remainder, the part of Article 1 referring to examinations from 1953–1955 was left in force. Consequent orders: petitions of candidates who failed in 1946–1952 were denied; candidates of 1953 who obtained the prescribed 71.5% (i.e., 71% with rounding) without a grade below 50% were to be considered as having passed and permitted to take the oath.

Majority Reasoning — Encroachment on Judicial Function and Separation of Powers

The majority anchored its decision primarily on separation of powers and the historical and inherent nature of the judicial power to admit, supervise, suspend, disbar and reinstate members of the bar. The Court emphasized that the act of admitting attorneys is a quintessential judicial function that requires application of established rules to concrete facts and entails discretionary judgment about fitness to be officers of the court. The majority relied on U.S. and Philippine precedents (e.g., State v. Cannon, In re Day, Ex parte Secombe, and In re Guarina) to illustrate that: (a) courts have traditionally exercised exclusive authority to determine who may be admitted to practice; (b) legislative attempts to fashion individual admissions or to substitute legislative judgment for the judicial function have been treated as usurpations; and (c) while the Legislature may prescribe minimum qualifications by general law, it may not compel courts to admit persons whom the courts deem unfit.

The Court read the constitutional provision allowing Congress to “repeal, alter, or supplement” rules concerning admission to the practice of law (Article VIII, Sec. 13) narrowly. That constitutional grant, in the Court’s view, permits Congress to enact general rule changes addressing substantive procedures for future regulation, but it does not authorize Congress to directly substitute its judgment for the Court’s determinations as to particular individuals (i.e., to annul or revoke judicial resolutions admitting or denying specific candidates). The majority stressed that RA 972 in effect revoked or supplanted judicial determinations by directing admission of a defined class of persons based on past examinations without giving the Supreme Court the exercise of its traditional fact-specific judgment.

Majority Reasoning — Classification, Public Interest and Reasonableness

The majority also held RA 972 to be an invalid exercise of legislative classification. The statute singled out candidates by examination years and specified reduced passing averages in a graduated fashion for particular years (1946–1955). The Court found no adequate or justifiable basis for the peculiar year-by-year classification and rejected as factually unsupported the legislative premise that postwar examinees uniformly suffered from a lack of reading materials or inadequate preparation to justify treating them as a class entitled to admission. The majority regarded the law’s declared objective — to admit examinees the Court had previously found inadequately prepared — as contrary to public interest because admitting persons who had failed to meet standards established for the profession risks harm to the public and to the administration of justice.

Majority Reasoning — Title and Article 2 Defect

The Court further found Article 2 constitutionally defective because it established a permanent procedural rule (deeming a 75% grade in any subject after July 4, 1946 to be passing for subsequent computation) that went beyond the bill’s title, which announced a temporary adjustment of passing marks for bar examinations 1946–1955. The majority treated the omission as a violation of the constitutional title requirement (cited as Section 21(1), Art. VI) and concluded that Article 2 was not embraced within the Act’s title; being inseparable from Article 1 as enacted the defect tainted the Act so that Article 2 (and the specified retroactive portions) had to be declared void. The Court also characterized the law as trying to “cure” what Congress perceived to be judicial error — i.e., substituting legislative will for the Court’s assessments — which is an impermissible intrusion on judicial prerogatives.

Reliance on Precedents and Distinguishing Cooper

The majority examined authorities cited by proponents of the law. It distinguished Cooper (Cooper v. People of New York or analogous Cooper decision) on the ground that the New York statute there made a law school diploma competent evidence of qualifications, did not remove court discretion nor mandate admission, and rested on a different constitutional text and context. Conversely, Day and Cannon, and the Massachusetts advisory opinion, were read as supportive of the proposition that legislative attempts to command admission of designated individuals or to supplant judicial determination are unconstitutional.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinions — Chief Lines of Disagreement

  • Justice Labrador (concurring/dissenting): Emphasized that admission to the Bar is an exercise of judicial discretion and that RA 972 amounts to a direct mandate to admit particular classes of persons — an exercise of judicial power by the Legislature. Labrador therefore would have declared the Act wholly unconstitutional as beyond Congres

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