Case Summary (G.R. No. L-35546)
Procedural posture and relief sought
- Multiple habeas corpus petitions were consolidated or heard together. Writs issued and returns filed. Hearings were held in September–October 1972; memoranda and supplemental petitions followed. Some petitioners withdrew, some were released subject to conditions, Diokno moved to withdraw his petition (motion filed Dec. 28/29, 1973) while still detained. The Court considered the motion to withdraw and the merits; Diokno was released by the President on September 11, 1974. Final judgment as to the petitions was rendered dismissing them (except those withdrawn).
Central legal question
- Whether the President’s Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under martial law, and the arrests and detentions effected under General Order No. 2/2‑A pursuant to that Proclamation, were constitutional and lawful — specifically: (a) whether the existence of conditions justifying martial law is subject to judicial inquiry (justiciability v. political question); (b) if justiciable, whether the President acted arbitrarily; and (c) whether proclamation of martial law carries with it suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and authorizes the continued detention and restrictions imposed.
Court’s locus of review and political‑question analysis
- Division of views: the Justices were divided on the extent of judicial review. Some Justices (Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Aquino and others in their separate opinions) held the question political or that, in policy and constitutional design, the President’s factual determinations on the existence of rebellion/insurrection are to be respected and not subject to the type of judicial re‑weighing that would supplant executive judgment. Other Justices (Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Munoz Palma) read Lansang as permitting limited judicial inquiry into whether executive action was arbitrary, and, applying that test, found no arbitrariness.
- Practical result: whether characterized as political/non‑justiciable or justiciable under an arbitrariness review, the majority outcome was that the President had adequate factual basis for Proclamation No. 1081 and its continuance; the Court declined to overturn it.
Factual findings and assessment of arbitrariness
- The Court (collectively, through separate opinions and the lead opinion) accepted that there existed a widespread, mounting program of Communist insurgency, subversion and related lawlessness (including raids, bombings, kidnappings, armed engagements, and supply of arms) that presented a grave danger to public order and national security at the time of Proclamation No. 1081 and thereafter. The lead opinion emphasizes the contemporary historical record and events (e.g., “Karagatan” arms landings, documented operations in Luzon and Mindanao, front organizations, attacks on installations) as sufficient, on judicial notice and the record, to conclude that the President did not act arbitrarily.
- Even those Justices who would have treated the matter as justiciable applied the Lansang standard (whether the President acted arbitrarily) and concluded there was no arbitrariness.
Suspension of the writ and legality of arrests/detentions
- The Court’s practical holding: the proclamation of martial law (Proclamation No. 1081) resulted in the suspension, with respect to the categories recited in the proclamation and implementing orders, of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order to effectuate the objectives of the martial regime. Arrests and preventive detentions of persons reasonably believed to be participants in, or aiding, rebellion or insurrection, or otherwise falling within the classes described in the Proclamation and General Order No. 2, were within the President’s power and not unconstitutional under the circumstances. The Court observed that preventive detention in emergencies can be a legitimate instrument of public safety when undertaken in good faith and not arbitrarily.
Release subject to conditions and the “conditional release” petitions
- Many petitioners were released from military custody but “conditionally,” e.g., restrictions on travel and communications. The Court held that in the martial‑law context the Executive may impose conditions or restrictions germane to the purposes of the proclamation and necessary to carry out its objectives. Such conditional releases, where reasonably related to national security and not arbitrary, did not render the habeas corpus petitions justiciable in the sense of mandating release.
Effect of the 1973 Constitution’s transitory provision
- The Court emphasized the transitory clause of the 1973 Constitution (Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)) providing that proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts of the incumbent President are part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, binding and effective after the ratification of the Constitution unless modified, revoked, or superseded. Several Justices relied on that transitory provision as an additional basis for upholding Proclamation No. 1081 and related orders. The Court also observed that its earlier Javellana decision had removed judicial obstacles to the new Charter’s effectivity, and the popular referenda weighed in favor of continuance of the President’s powers as exercised.
Petitioner Diokno’s motion to withdraw; mootness and dismissal
- Diokno moved to withdraw his petition (Dec. 28/29, 1973) asserting delay and loss of confidence in judicial relief; the Court initially could not reach the eight‑Justice majority required to grant the motion, but after Diokno’s release by Presidential order on Sept. 11, 1974 the petition was treated as moot/withdrawn and not adjudicated on the merits. Several Justices explained why the motion to withdraw could be granted or denied; the Court’s final disposition treated the Diokno petition as no longer requiring decision.
Petitioner Aquino — military charges and separate proceedings
- Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. remained in military custody and had been formally charged (Aug. 11, 1973) before a Military Commission with murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. Aquino filed a separate certiorari/prohibition action challenging the jurisdiction of the Military Commission (G.R. No. L‑37364). A subset of Justices (including in separate writings) made clear that issues peculiar to Aquino’s trial before military tribunals would be decided in the separate proceeding; for purposes of these habeas petitions the Court held that the proclamation and General Orders did support detention and that his habeas corpus petition was dismissed on the grounds set forth.
Judgment, votes and separate opinions
- Judgment: the petitions were dismissed (the Court rendered judgment dismissing all petitions except those previously withdrawn). No costs. The decision was accompanied by numerous separate opinions: the lead opinion by Chief Justice Makalintal (with concurrences and dissents by multiple Justices), and additional separate opinions by Justices Antonio, Castro, Barredo, Esguerra, Munoz Palma, Fernando, Teehankee and others — reflecting differences on the political‑question and justiciability points and on remedial nuance, while the ultimate outcome — dismissal of the petitions (except withdrawals) — was the practical result reached by the Court.
Separate‑opinion themes (summary)
- A multi‑opinion dis
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-35546)
Case Caption, Reports and Dates
- Official reporter citation: 158-A Phil. 1 FIRST DIVISION.
- Principal docket examples and promulgation date(s):
- G.R. No. L-35546 (Sept. 17, 1974) — Aquino et al. habeas corpus petitions.
- Related docket numbers: L-35538, L-35539, L-35540, L-35547, L-35556, L-35567, L-35571, L-35573 and others (all Sept. 17, 1974 entries in the consolidated decision).
- Decision announced by Chief Justice Makalintal (opinion and summary of voting), with multiple separate opinions by individual Justices.
- Prominent subsequent related case referenced: Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-36142 (March 31, 1973) — treatment of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
Central Subject Matter
- Core petitions: multiple petitions for the writ of habeas corpus filed by persons arrested and detained by military authorities pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) and implementing military/general orders.
- Primary legal question: the validity and constitutional sufficiency of Proclamation No. 1081 (martial law) and the legality of arrests, detentions and related restrictions imposed under it.
- Secondary but interlocking questions: whether the President’s factual determination justifying martial law is reviewable by the judiciary (justiciability vs. political question); whether suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus follows from proclamation of martial law; effect of the 1973 Constitution’s transitory provisions (Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)) on the validity of acts issued under Proclamation No. 1081.
Factual Background (as recited in the record and the proclamation)
- Proclamation No. 1081 (Sept. 21, 1972):
- Recites detailed factual assertions: existence of lawless elements, organization of front groups, a reorganized Communist Party and a New People’s Army, acts of violence, bombings, assassinations, sabotage, recruitment and infiltration of labor and student groups, and alleged importation of arms and materiel (e.g., Karagatan landing at Digoyo Bay, Palanan, Isabela).
- Concludes that the danger and activities constituted rebellion or imminent danger thereof demanding placement of the entire Philippines under martial law, suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus as to specified crimes, and detention of persons “until otherwise ordered released” by the President or his representative.
- General Order No. 2 / 2-A (Sept. 22 and Sept. 26, 1972): directed Secretary of National Defense to “forthwith arrest” persons named in attached lists and to hold them until released by the President or his representative.
- General Order No. 3 / 3-A (Sept. 22 / Sept. 24, 1972): addressed the continued functioning of government agencies and the judiciary but excluded certain categories of cases from judicial determination (as originally promulgated; respondents later retreated from asserting judicial ouster).
- Military arrests and detentions occurred beginning September 22–23, 1972; petitioners were held in military camps (Fort Bonifacio, Camp Crame, Camp Aguinaldo) or released under conditions.
Parties and Representative Counsel
- Petitioners: numerous individuals (journalists, legislators, delegates, commentators and others) including Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.; Jose W. Diokno; Joaquin P. Roces; Teodoro M. Locsin, Sr.; Maximo V. Soliven; Ramon V. Mitra, Jr.; Francisco S. Rodrigo; Napoleon G. Rama; and others — identified throughout the record by docket numbers.
- Respondents: Executive officers — Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile (Secretary of National Defense), Gen. Romeo Espino (Chief of Staff, AFP), Gen. Fidel V. Ramos (Chief, Philippine Constabulary) and other military officers.
- Counsel: petitioners were represented by a number of prominent lawyers (including Senators and private counsel named in the record); respondents were represented principally by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and assistants.
Procedural History (key events and motions)
- Writs of habeas corpus issued and hearings held Sept. 26 and 29 and Oct. 6, 1972; memoranda filed by parties (petitioners’ consolidated memorandum Nov. 9, 1972; respondents’ memorandum Nov. 17, 1972; further pleadings thereafter).
- Numerous petitioners later withdrew their petitions on motion and/or were released from custody subject to restrictions; the record contains a detailed list (by case) of petitioners who withdrew or were released and those who remained detained (notably, Diokno and Aquino at various times).
- The Court sat in extended deliberations; multiple separate opinions were written because of differing approaches on breadth and method of constitutional analysis.
- Petitioner Jose W. Diokno moved on Dec. 28, 1973 to withdraw his petition; motion was voted upon and seven Justices supported granting it whereas five Justices opposed — procedural controversy ensued about whether withdrawal should be allowed. Subsequent to the internal voting process but before promulgation, President released Diokno (Sept. 11, 1974), rendering his petition moot (Court members subsequently treated Diokno’s petition as moot in the published judgment).
Constitutional Provisions and Statutory Context Cited
- 1935 Constitution (article cited): Art. VII, Sec. 10(2) — Commander-in-Chief clause: authority to call out armed forces; in case of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, President may suspend privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines under martial law.
- 1973 Constitution (corresponding provisions): Art. IX, Sec. 12 (Prime Minister as commander-in-chief; same language regarding suspension of habeas corpus and martial law); Art. IV, Sec. 15 (Bill of Rights: privilege of the writ); Transitory provisions: Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2) — “All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective … unless modified, revoked or superseded … or expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.”
- Cases and prior jurisprudence relied upon in the opinions: Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87 (1905)); Montenegro v. Castaneda (91 Phil. 882 (1952)); Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. L-33964 et al., Dec. 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448 (discussion of test of arbitrariness and judicial inquiry into suspension of habeas corpus); Javellana v. Exec. Secretary (L-36142), decision on effectivity of 1973 Constitution (March 31, 1973) — referenced as final background.
Issues Presented (organized)
- Core issues:
- Was Proclamation No. 1081 (placing the Philippines under martial law) valid and constitutional at its inception?
- Is the President’s factual determination that justifies a martial law proclamation subject to judicial inquiry (i.e., political question vs. justiciable issue)?
- If the proclamation is valid, may the Court review the continuance of martial law and the continued detention of persons — what is the proper test (arbitrariness/ reasonableness)?
- Does proclamation of martial law ipso facto suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons specified? Scope and duration?
- What effect do the transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution (Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)) have on the legality/validity of acts done under Proclamation No. 1081?
- Incidental questions:
- Procedural: whether a detained petitioner may withdraw his petition while confined; whether petitions become moot upon conditional release; whether Court may or should receive classified military information or hold closed sessions for fact-finding.
- Whether military tribunals have jurisdiction to try civilians for certain offenses under martial law (not resolved in full here — left for the separate Aquino prohibition proceeding L-37364).
Majority Ruling — Disposition, Judgment and Relief
- Judgment (as rendered by the Court): All petitions for habeas corpus were dismissed, except those previously withdrawn with leave of the Court (per the principal judgment). The Court ordered “no costs.”
- Practical effect:
- Dismissal of petitions challenged the legality of certain arrests/detentions; the Court found that martial law proclamation and its continuance were valid and that arrests/detentions made under General Order No. 2/2-A were authorized by the proclamation and therefore not unconstitutional as pleaded.
- Petitioners released subject to conditions were held to have no judicially actionable habeas cause because their release papers and conditions were within the scope of the proclamation and necessary in the judgment of the Executive.
- Petitioners against whom formal charges were later filed (e.g., Senator Aquino) have separate remedies to pursue (e.g., the pending prohibition proceeding L-37364 questioning military commission jurisdiction) — habeas corpus dismissed but not precluding constitutional relief on other distinct grounds.
Majority Rationale — Chief Justice Makalintal (Opinion outline and holdings)
- On justiciability:
- The Court was divided on whether judicial inquiry into the initial factual bases for martial law is permissible. Some Justices held the matter political and non-justiciable (e.g., Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, and Aquino), while others found limited judicial inquiry appropriate (Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Muñoz Palma) — the Chief Justice summarized the split.
- Chief Justice Makalintal concluded the controversy was largely academic for purposes of disposition because (a) the Court found, on the record and on facts of judicial notice, that a state of rebellion existed when Proclamation No. 1081 issued, and (b) the 1973 Constitution’s transitory provision (Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)) validated acts of the incumbent President, including Proclamation No. 1081, as part of the law of the land.
- On the subs