G.R. No. L-35546 - IN RE: Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-35546)

Historical and Legal Setting

Martial law was declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos invoking his powers under Art. VII, Sec. 10(2) of the 1935 Constitution to quell rebellion and insurgency threatening national security.
Proclamation No. 1081 cited specific factual circumstances: widespread rebellion led by communist and various insurgent groups, active support by foreign powers, lawless violence, and attempts to overthrow the government.
Following the proclamation, General Orders No. 2 and No. 2-A directed arrests and detentions of persons named as participants or supporters of the rebellion, including many petitioners.
Habeas corpus petitions were filed by the petitioners challenging the legality of their arrest and detention.

Jurisdiction and Justiciability of Proclamation No. 1081

A central issue is whether the Supreme Court may review the constitutional validity of Proclamation No. 1081, especially the factual basis for declaration of martial law.
Majority views hold that the proclamation of martial law and its factual foundation constitute a political question and are thus non-justiciable, i.e., outside the scope of judicial review.
The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is constitutionally vested with the exclusive power to declare martial law upon determination of invasion, rebellion, insurrection, or imminent danger threatening public safety.
Historical Philippine cases (Barcelon vs. Baker [1905], Montenegro vs. Castaneda [1952]) established that the President’s decision on the existence of rebellion or insurrection is final and conclusive upon the courts, supported by international precedents (e.g., Martin vs. Mott [1827]).
While the Court has plenary judicial power, it exercises judicial restraint on this political question to respect the separation of powers and the President’s prerogative in matters of national security.

Doctrine on Judicial Inquiry and Scope of Review

The Court draws a distinction between the President’s power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law; the latter involves broader powers affecting the whole government apparatus and society.
Where judicial inquiry is permitted, it is narrowly confined to determining whether the President acted arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing a proclamation, rather than re-examining the substantive merits or policy wisdom of such acts (Lansang vs. Garcia [1971]).
The Court may take judicial notice of commonly known historical facts regarding the ongoing rebellion and subversive activities.
The continuing state of martial law and the President’s decision to maintain it likewise remain political questions for the executive and the sovereign people, not susceptible to effective judicial review.

Validity of Arrests and Detention Under Martial Law

Proclamation No. 1081 expressly ordered the detention of persons involved in rebellion, subversion, and crimes against national security without requiring initial judicial warrants or charges.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is an inherent incident of martial law, permitting preventive detention and restraint of liberty necessary to preserve public order and national survival.
The Court emphasized that in times of grave national emergency, individual liberties may be subordinated temporarily to the greater need of preserving the state and democratic institutions.
Judicial intervention in the legality of such detentions is precluded as long as they are made in good faith and based on the President’s constitutional exercise of authority.
The prohibition to inquire into the legality of arrest during martial law is balanced by the sovereign political responsibility of the President, subject ultimately to the people’s will expressed through elections or referendums, and to constitutional mechanisms (impeachment, political accountability).

Effect of the 1973 Constitution and Transitory Provisions

The new 1973 Constitution, ratified by a referendum in 1973, contains transitory provisions (Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)) which affirm and validate all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts issued by the incumbent President (including Proclamation No. 1081 and related orders), making them part of the law of the land and binding even after its ratification.
This transitory clause forecloses constitutional challenges to the validity and continuing effect of martial law and acts taken under it, unless modified or revoked by the President or expressly repealed by the National Assembly.
The Supreme Court in related cases (e.g., Javellana vs. Executive Secretary) held that the question of the validity and effectivity of the 1973 Constitution is political and not judicially reviewable.

Withdrawals and Mootness

Among the petitioners, several have been released subject to restrictions, some have had their petitions withdrawn with the Court’s consent, and notably petitioner Jose W. Diokno moved to withdraw his petition on the ground of prolonged detention and loss of faith in the Court, which motion was initially denied but later rendered moot upon his release in 1974.
The Court held that a prisoner’s motion to withdraw the petition for habeas corpus is generally a matter of right unless overriding public interest requires otherwise.
The political and public importance of the issues led the majority of Justices to deny the withdrawal initially, insisting on resolving the issues on merits for the sake of public interest and maintenance of rule of law.

Summary of the Supreme Court’s Holding

The proclamation of martial law by President Marcos on September 21, 1972, pursuant to the explicit power vested in him by the 1935 Constitution, was valid and constitutional.
The determination by the President that rebellion, insurrection, and imminent danger to public safety existed was a political question and non-justiciable by the Court; even if justiciable, the finding was not arbitrary.
Martial law automatically carries with it the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as an essential incident to effectively deal with rebellion and guarantee public safety.
The arrests and detention of the petitioners without charges during martial law were legal and constitutional under the President’s exercise of authority; restrictions on those conditionally released were likewise proper.
The 1973 Constitution’s transitory provisions validated all acts done by the incumbent President under martial law, thereby giving continued legal effect and precluding judicial invalidation unless modified or repealed by subsequent proper authorities.
The withdrawal motion of petitioner Jose W. Diokno was ultimately granted as moot following his release.
The petitions of those conditionally releas

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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-35546)

Nature of the Cases and Background

The cases are multiple petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by a number of petitioners, including Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., Jose W. Diokno, and others, challenging their arrest and detention by military authorities.
The arrests and detentions were executed under authority of General Orders Nos. 2 and 2-A, issued pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, placing the entire country under martial law.
The petitioners contend that their detention is illegal, the Proclamation is unconstitutional, and allege lack of charges or warrants.
Many petitioners have been released, some withdrew their petitions with the Court's approval, but some like Aquino and Diokno remained confined; Diokno later sought to withdraw his petition, which was denied by the Court but eventually rendered moot by his release.
The martial law regime was sustained by the President, with repeated assertions it was constitutional and necessary for public safety amid rebellion and subversion threat.

Procedural History and Court's Deliberations

Early hearings occurred soon after the arrests, with memoranda submitted by both petitioners and respondents.
Petitioners challenged the validity of martial law proclamation, the legality of their detention, and raised issues related to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
Separate opinions were filed by individual justices due to lack of consensus on several issues, although the dismissal of petitions was nearly unanimous.
The Court faced procedural complications including the question of whether the Court could act on constitutional questions with diminished membership under the new Constitution's quorum requirements.
A related significant decision on the effectivity and validity of the 1973 Constitution was the Javellana case, which influenced the Court's stance on the martial law issues.

Constitutional Basis and Presidential Authority to Declare Martial Law

The 1935 Constitution, Article VII, Section 10, paragraph 2, explicitly grants the President the exclusive power to place the country under martial law in case of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, whenever public safety requires.
The power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a constitutional prerogative vested solely in the President (or Prime Minister under 1973 Constitution).
Historical jurisprudence (Barcelon vs. Baker, Montenegro vs. Castaneda) supports the principle that the President’s factual determination justifying martial law is final and conclusive upon courts and other branches of government.
Petitioners’ attempts to subject the proclamation of martial law and detention orders to judicial inquiry into their factual bases conflicted with this doctrine.
The constitutional framers and the 1971 Constitutional Convention reaffirmed this system, rejecting proposals to subject martial law declarations to legislative or judicial concurrence or review prior to enactment.

Political Question Doctrine and Justiciability

The Court clarified the distinction between jurisdiction over cases and jurisdiction over issues presented, holding that claims involving martial law declarations raise political questions.
The issue of whether martial law was properly proclaimed is a political question, reserved to the President exclusively; therefore, the Court ordinarily shall not inquire into or interfere with the factual determination justifying it.
Citing international and U.S. jurisprudence, the Court noted the limits of judicial review in national security and emergency matters, including the uniqueness of Philippine constitutional provisions in granting express martial law powers.
The approval and ratification of the 1973 Constitution and public referenda reinforced the political character of martial law declarations and their continuance.

Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and Detentions

Martial law ipso facto carries with it suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons detained for crimes related to rebellion, insurrection, public order, and related offenses.
Historical and Philippine jurisprudence reaffirm the compatibility and necessity of this suspension under conditions of martial law.
Detention without charges or warrants may be constitutional if based on the President’s reasonable belief of involvement in rebellion or support thereof, provided such detention is not arbitrary or abusive.
The Court found no basis to declare the detention or restrictions imposed upon the released petitioners as arbitrary or unlawful under the circumstances, given the prevailing rebellion and security concerns.
Petitioners released conditionally, subject to limitations on travel and communication, were held not entitled to habeas corpus relief but might have other legal remedies.

Effect of the 1973 Constitution and the Transitory Provisions

Article XVII, Section 3(2) of the 1973 Constitution affirms that all proclamations, orders, decrees, and acts issued by the incumbent President, including martial law proclamations, remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after lifting of martial law or ratification of the Constitution, unless revoked or modified by the President or National Assembly.
The Court recognized this explicit transitory provision as an authoritative construction of the martial law clause, validating the existing proclamation and measures under martial law.
The 1973 Constitution codified and confirmed the martial law powers and suspensions of the writ previously exercised under the 1935 Constitution.
The Court found that the Supreme Court itself, as constituted under the 1973 Constitution, unequivocally enforces and respects the new Constitution as legally in force and effect.

The Petitioners’ Contentions and the Court’s Response on Justification and Continuation of Martial Law

Petitioners challenged the existence of sufficient grounds constituting actual rebellion or imminent danger, citing open court functions, ongoing legislative and electoral activity, international conferences, and development projects as proof peace and order existed.
The Court took judicial notice of widespread armed rebellion, subversion, violence, and insurgency in various parts of the country, including Mindanao and other regions.
The Court held that the trial court and the President’s own continuing assessments, although classified, demonstrated a continuing danger and need for martial law.
The July 1973 national referendum, in which a large majority expressed support for the continuation of martial law and President Marcos’ term to finish reforms, was decisive in confirming the President’s assessment.
Even assuming judicial review of the continuation of martial law were proper, the Court found no arbitrariness or capriciousness in the President’s decision to maintain martial law.

Judicial Review, Limits, and Remedies against Abuse

While the Court acknowledged that, in theory, a manifestly arbitrary or unjustified declaration of martial law could be reviewed and held invalid, in practice such judicial inquiry must rely on facts of general public knowledge or judicial notice rather than reception of evidence.
The prerogative to defend the state in times of grave crisis implies broad and discretionary powers to the Executive to determine the need for martial law and its duration.
The Court has the constitutional role to restrain blatant transgressions of executive power, but the present proclamations and acts were found legally grounded and constitutional.
The ultimate remedy against any abuse of the martial law power is political: public referendum, national assembly controls under the parliamentary system, and, ultimately, the people’s sovereign will.
The Court underscored respect for