Title
Imbong vs. Ferrer
Case
G.R. No. L-32432
Decision Date
Sep 11, 1970
Petitioners challenged R.A. No. 6132's constitutionality, questioning delegate apportionment, public officer resignation, and political party bans; Court upheld the law, affirming Congress's authority and reasonable restrictions.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-32432)

Factual Background

Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly under Art. XV of the Constitution, adopted Resolution No. 2 calling for a Constitutional Convention composed of two delegates from each representative district to be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970. Thereafter Congress, acting legislatively, enacted R.A. No. 4914 to implement that resolution. Later, Congress as a Constituent Assembly passed Resolution No. 4, which amended its prior resolution by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants" but with a minimum of two delegates per district, and stating that further implementing details may be enacted by legislation. On August 24, 1970, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6132, expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914 and prescribing implementing rules for the election and operation of the Constitutional Convention.

Procedural History

Two related petitions for declaratory relief were filed under Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both lawyers, taxpayers and prospective candidates for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. The petitions challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132 generally and of specific provisions. The Solicitor General answered for respondents. Hearings were held and several senators appeared as amici curiae. The Court consolidated consideration of the challenges and rendered an opinion.

Issues Presented

The petitions raised constitutional questions concerning the validity of portions of R.A. No. 6132. The principal issues were: whether Congress, acting as a legislative body rather than a Constituent Assembly, validly enacted implementing legislation for a Constitutional Convention; whether Sec. 2 (apportionment of delegates) violated constitutional principles of proportional representation; whether Sec. 4 (deemed resignation of public officers upon filing candidacy) and related provisions violated due process or equal protection; whether Sec. 5 (temporary disqualification of elected delegates from holding other public office until final adjournment of the Convention) offended due process or equal protection; and whether paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) (ban on party or organizational intervention or support in the nomination or campaign of delegates) violated due process, equal protection, freedom of expression, assembly and association.

Petitioners' Contentions

Petitioners argued that various provisions of R.A. No. 6132 infringed constitutional rights and principles. Raul M. Gonzales attacked the entire statute and specifically Secs. 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), asserting that Sec. 2 failed to secure proportional representation and that the bans and disqualifications denied due process and equal protection and abridged fundamental freedoms. Manuel B. Imbong challenged par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) on substantially the same grounds as Gonzales, stressing that the prohibition against party and organizational support unduly restricted freedom of association, expression and assembly.

Respondents' and Amici Curiae Positions

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, defended R.A. No. 6132 as a valid exercise of legislative power to implement the convention call and as a lawful exercise of the State's police power to protect the electoral process and to assure equality of chances. Amici curiae, including several senators, urged that Congress had authority to adopt the implementing details and that the restrictions, particularly paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), were necessary to prevent corruption, excessive partisanship and the domination of the Convention by sectional interests. The record submitted to the Court included the formula and computations used by Congress, based on the Bureau of Census and Statistics' preliminary 1970 census, to apportion the 320 delegates.

Ruling of the Court

The Court denied the petitions and ruled that R.A. No. 6132, including Secs. 2, 4, 5 and paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), was constitutional. Justice Makasiar delivered the opinion of the Court. Several members of the Court filed concurring and dissenting opinions on certain questions, most notably on paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a).

Legal Basis and Reasoning — Authority to Enact Implementing Legislation

The Court first sustained Congress' authority, when acting as a legislative body, to enact implementing legislation for a Constitutional Convention even where Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, had adopted resolutions calling the convention. The Court reasoned that Art. XV vested Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly with plenary power to call a convention and that this grant necessarily carried by implication the power to determine implementing details essential to effectuate the call. When such details were not fully provided by the Constituent Assembly resolutions, Congress in its legislative capacity could validly enact implementing statutes, so long as they did not conflict with specific constitutional provisions. The Court regarded the presidential veto power over such legislation as no bar, since Congress could override a veto or reconvene as a Constituent Assembly.

Legal Basis and Reasoning — Apportionment (Sec. 2)

Addressing the challenge to Sec. 2, the Court held that the Constitution does not require that apportionment of convention delegates follow the same exact population-based rule applied to legislative apportionment of representative districts. Congress could constitutionally allocate delegates on other bases, including equal minimums for districts, to avoid an unwieldy convention. The Court accepted that Res. No. 4 directed apportionment "according to the number of their respective inhabitants" but fixed a minimum of two delegates per district. It presumed that Congress relied upon the latest available official population figures and approved the formula adopted by Congress. The Court found the use of the Bureau of Census and Statistics' preliminary 1970 census and the adopted computation to be a reasonable basis for substantial proportionality. The Court rejected the comparison to the apportionment invalidated in Macias, et al. v. Comelec, noting that the present law did not grant disproportionate advantage to lower-population districts beyond the expressly fixed minimum and that absolute mathematical proportionality is not required. The Court relied on the constitutional language that apportionment of congressional districts should be "as nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants," to illustrate that substantial rather than absolute proportionality is constitutionally acceptable.

Legal Basis and Reasoning — Deemed Resignation (Sec. 4) and Prior Rulings

The Court noted that the constitutionality of Sec. 4, which treated public officers and employees as resigned upon filing candidacy, had been recently sustained by this Court in related cases, on the ground that it applied the constitutional prohibition in Sec. 2, Art. XII and did not deny due process or equal protection. The Court likewise upheld paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) in prior rulings.

Legal Basis and Reasoning — Temporary Disqualification (Sec. 5)

The Court upheld Sec. 5, which disqualified an elected delegate from running for any public office or assuming any appointive office until final adjournment of the Convention. The Court reasoned that no citizen has an inherent right to public office and that the State may prescribe qualifications and temporary disqualifications. The disqualification served a compelling objective: to insulate delegates from self-interest and to ensure full devotion to the Convention's high public duty. The Court emphasized the temporary nature of the restriction, limited to the Convention's duration (which could not exceed one year under the enabling instrument), and found analogies in the Constitution's prohibition on appointment of members of Congress to offices created or increased during their term (Sec. 16, Art. VI). The Court concluded that the classification was reasonable, germane to the statute's purpose, and applied uniformly to all delegates.

Legal Basis and Reasoning — Ban on Party and Organizational Support (Sec. 8(a), par. 1)

The Court sustained paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), which prohibited candidates for delegate from representing themselves as candidates of any political party or organization and barred parties or organized groups from intervening in nominations or giving aid or support to candidates. The Court applied the precedent in Gonzales v. Comelec, which recognized that constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, free expression, assembly and association are not absolute and may yield to valid exercises of the police power. The Court applied the "clear and present danger" framework discussed in that precedent and found two principal and sufficient State interests: (1) to prevent the debasement of the electoral process, a substantive evil of excessive partisanship, corruption and violence; and (2) to secure equality of chances among candidates so that elections for convention delegates would depend upon individual merit rather than organizational resources. The Court held that the ban was narrowly tailored in several respects: it did not prevent individual party members from supporting a candidate in their personal capacity; it permitted family helpers and a limited campaign staff; and it pr

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