Title
Ignacio M. Coingco vs. Roberta Flores
Case
G.R. No. L-2147-48
Decision Date
Dec 9, 1948
Appeal dismissed; extrajudicial partition deemed invalid, presumption of conjugal property rebutted; issues on building construction not ruled upon.
conjugal property
civil code
appeal

Case Summary (A.C. No. 1608)

Procedural History and Nature of the Motion

The petitioner sought reconsideration of a minute resolution that had dismissed his appeal by certiorari on the ground that the questions involved were questions of fact, and that the supposed questions of law were either unsubstantial or were beyond the Court’s review in that procedural posture. The reconsideration was directed against the dismissal rather than a direct review of the merits, and it addressed three specific legal questions raised in the motion, which the Court treated as either not properly reviewable on certiorari or, if reviewable, as matters already determined through factual findings supported by evidence.

Factual Background on the Properties and the Lower Courts’ Findings

The record, as described in the resolution, showed that both parties had executed an extrajudicial partition agreement enumerating the lots as conjugal property, and the petitioner later challenged the validity of that agreement on the premise that it had been made before the marriage bond had been dissolved and regarding property allegedly not truly conjugal. The Court of Appeals, however, found that the respondent’s signing of the agreement was not voluntary in the sense asserted by the petitioner and that the partition agreement was never enforced. In addition, the lower courts treated the properties as having acquired the character of conjugal property under the statutory presumption applicable to acquisitions during coverture, and the resolution discussed whether that presumption was sufficiently rebutted.

The Three Legal Questions Raised in the Reconsideration

First, the petitioner raised the validity of the extrajudicial partition agreement executed by both parties, emphasizing that it listed the lots as conjugal property despite the alleged lack of dissolved marriage at the time of execution. After the petitioner’s counsel initially raised this point, counsel immediately shifted in the reconsideration to argue that even if the agreement were invalid, its statements could not be treated as admissions regarding ownership.

Second, the petitioner questioned whether the presumption that the properties were conjugal because they were acquired during coverture could be rebutted, and he suggested three facts as possible rebuttal: (1) that titles were in the wife’s name alone; (2) that the husband gave marital consent to the mortgage of the properties by the wife; and (3) that the wife was financially able to buy the properties. The resolution acknowledged that each fact, taken separately, might not suffice to overcome the presumption under Art. 1407 of the Civil Code, but it held that, taken together with other evidence, they could be considered sufficient by the lower courts.

Third, the petitioner posited that even if the lots were paraphernal, the construction of buildings thereon during the marriage automatically made the lots conjugal from the time of construction, notwithstanding that the buildings had later been destroyed during the war and before liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Court’s Treatment of the Petitioner’s Arguments on Reviewability

On the first question, the Court refused to disturb the Court of Appeals’ factual findings, particularly the appellate court’s inclination to credit the respondent’s explanation that she signed to escape her husband’s continued maltreatment and that the partition was never enforced. The Court treated this as a matter of fact, which it would not revise on reconsideration.

On the second question, the Court reiterated that it could not correct the lower courts’ findings that the relevant factual circumstances had been established. The resolution explained that while the three enumerated facts might not independently defeat the statutory presumption, the lower courts had also relied on additional circumstances shown by the evidence—such as the fact that other lots acquired during coverture (specifically those referenced as items three and five) were titled in the names of the spouses as conjugal property. The Court thus concluded that the presumption could be rebutted based on the totality of circumstances, as the lower courts had evaluated them.

On the third question, the Court stated that it would not properly pass upon it because it was not put in issue in the pleadings and determined by the Court of First Instance, not assigned as erroneous on appeal to the Court of Appeals, and not raised even in the petition for certiorari filed with the Court. Accordingly, the question was procedurally treated as outside the Court’s proper review on reconsideration.

Majority Resolution: Denial of Reconsideration

The Court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The denial rested on the Court’s view that the issues, as framed by the petitioner, either required revision of factual findings already made by the Court of Appeals or involved matters not properly in issue for appellate review. The minute resolution’s dismissal of the certiorari appeal was therefore left undisturbed.

Legal Discussion Included in the Resolution (Art. 1404 and Destruction of Buildings)

Although the Court declared it unnecessary to resolve the third question for procedural reasons, the writer of the resolution expressed the view that it must be answered in the negative. The writer reasoned from the operation of Art. 1404, second paragraph as an exception to the general accession rules in the Civil Code and explained that the conjugal partnership’s interest arising from constructions on one spouse’s land did not automatically and permanently convert the land into conjugal property regardless of subsequent events.

The writer analogized the legal framework to accession and to the principle that the owner of the land would otherwise become owner of improvements, subject to statutory exceptions. The writer emphasized the purpose of Art. 1404 to encourage construction during coverture on vacant land belonging to one spouse, by allowing the conjugal partnership, in effect, to acquire the land subject to payment of the value. Yet, the writer argued that where the building constructed during the marriage is destroyed or disappears before the owner exercises an appropriate right to appropriate the building (or before liquidation occurs in a manner that would credit the value to the paraphernal capital), no accession should take place because the legal situation would no longer result in the formation of a single object belonging to different owners.

The writer further relied on the liquidation structure under Art. 1424, stressing that, after deductions and settlement of the conjugal partnership’s debts, obligations, and the payment of the spouses’ relevant capitals and paraphernal elements, only the remainder forms conjugal partnership assets. Thus, the writer concluded that construction of a building on one spouse’s land during marriage does not ipso facto make the land conjugal in all circumstances; the outcome depends on the liquidation result.

The writer supported the above with a comparative reference to Spanish jurisprudence cited within the resolution. The writer stated that, in that Spanish line, the determination of whether the building ends up conjugal requires liquidation, because only at that stage can one decide what remains to be divided after settling debts and obligations.

Separate Opinion of Perfecto, J.

Justice Perfecto dissented and opined that the dismissal should be set aside and the petition given due course. He reasoned that the petition raised questions of law, including the specific inquiry whether, under Art. 1404, the lots automatically became conjugal from the moment buildings were constructed thereon, even if the buildings were later destroyed before liquidation.

Justice Perfecto advanced a doctrinal position grounded on the nature of conjugal partnership rights. He framed the conjugal partnership as the usufructuary of paraphernal and exclusive properties but treated Art. 1404, second paragraph as an exception to the general accession rules. Under his view, the building constructed by the conjugal pa

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