Title
Hirakawa vs. Lopzcom Realty Corp.
Case
G.R. No. 213230
Decision Date
Dec 5, 2019
A Japanese assignee sued for unpaid checks after a realty deal; SC ruled it a collection suit, not breach of contract, remanding for merits.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 213230)

Factual Background

On December 28, 1995, a Deed of Sale purportedly conveyed the ninety-two hectare Windfields Subdivision in Consolacion, Cebu City, from certain corporations and their stockholders to LOPZCOM REALTY CORPORATION, represented by ATTY. GARI M. TIONGCO, for P100,000,000.00. As part of the purchase price, Tiongco delivered nine Westmont Bank postdated personal checks payable to Takezo Sakai. On September 30, 1996, Sakai assigned to Hirakawa four of those nine postdated checks aggregating P65,000,000.00. Respondents were informed of that assignment and allegedly agreed to be bound by it.

Assignments and Subsequent Issuance of Checks

After Hirakawa collected the first assigned Westmont check, he requested that the remaining three be reissued in his name. Respondents acceded and replaced them with PDCP Development Bank postdated checks drawn on Tiongco’s personal PDCP account: Check Nos. 0050992, 0050993 and 0050994. When PDCP Check No. 0050992 became due on October 30, 1997, Tiongco requested that Hirakawa not deposit it and offered to pay eighteen percent interest for the delay, which Hirakawa accepted. The subsequent two PDCP checks were dishonored on their maturity dates for the reason of “ACCOUNT CLOSED.”

Attempts at Settlement and Further Instrumentation

On February 9, 1999, respondents proposed to satisfy the outstanding P40,000,000.00 balance by assigning to Hirakawa shares in a golf course project to be developed through a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation, and executed a Deed of Assignment in his favor. Three years later Hirakawa discovered the golf course had not been developed and no certificates of stock had been issued in his name. Thereafter, Tiongco issued two PNB postdated checks for P20,000,000.00 each dated October 30, 2004 and October 30, 2005, both of which remained unfunded when they matured.

Filing of Complaint and Preliminary Attachment

After years of unsuccessful collection efforts and a final Notice of Demand dated March 22, 2010, Hirakawa filed suit on June 22, 2010 against respondents for breach of contract and for attachment, claiming P114,027,812.22 inclusive of interest. The trial court granted an ex parte writ of preliminary attachment on October 1, 2010, subject to bond, and later discharged the writ on October 21, 2010 upon respondents’ posting of a counter-bond.

Trial Court Proceedings and Denial of Motion to Dismiss

Respondents moved to dismiss on grounds that Hirakawa lacked legal capacity and cause of action because he was not a party to the Deed of Sale. The trial court, by Order dated May 15, 2012, denied the motion. The court reasoned that the complaint alleged causes of action beyond breach of contract, including fraud, issuance of worthless checks and other deceits, and that Hirakawa, as a natural person, possessed juridical capacity to sue. Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on August 28, 2012.

Court of Appeals Decision

Respondents sought relief by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court in the Court of Appeals. By Decision dated November 19, 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action on the ground that Hirakawa was not a party to the underlying Deed of Sale. The CA instructed that the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action in the proper court. The Court of Appeals denied motions for reconsideration by Resolution dated July 8, 2014.

Present Petition and Issue Presented

Petitioner sought review in the Supreme Court, contending that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the complaint for lack or excess of jurisdiction. He argued that jurisdiction is determined from the allegations in the complaint, and that the true nature of his claim should be gleaned from the averments in the body of the pleading rather than from its title. Respondents maintained that Hirakawa could not sue on the Deed of Sale to which he was not a party.

Supreme Court Ruling

The Supreme Court agreed that Hirakawa was not a party to the Deed of Sale and that under the principle of the relativity of contracts contracts bind only the contracting parties, their assigns and heirs under Art. 1311. The Court nonetheless held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint outright. The Supreme Court found that the body of the complaint, not its title, determined the nature of the action and that the pleading, although denominated “Breach of Contract,” in substance sought collection of a sum of money and damages for dishonored checks and failure to deliver assigned stock. Applying the settled rule that courts should look beyond form to substance, the Court treated the action as a collection suit and remanded the case to the trial court for resolution on the merits.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court relied on the canonical proposition that the nature of a pleading is determined by its averments and relief sought, not by its caption, citing authority such as Fong v. Duenas, Bank Of Commerce v. Hon. Estela Perlas-Bernabe, Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Benedicto F. Suganob, and Sps. Pajares v. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning. The Court emphasized that procedural rules must serve substantive justice and may be relaxed to prevent injustice where noncompliance is not grave. The Court observed uncontested fac

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