Title
Himagan vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 113811
Decision Date
Oct 7, 1994
A PNP officer charged with murder challenged his indefinite preventive suspension under R.A. 6975, arguing for a 90-day limit. The Supreme Court ruled that suspension lasts until case termination, upholding the law's intent and rejecting equal protection claims.
suspension
trial
constitutional right
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 113811)

Factual Background

Petitioner was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. Informations charging him with murder and attempted murder under the Revised Penal Code were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City. Upon filing of those informations, the trial court issued an order suspending petitioner from office pursuant to Section 47, R.A. 6975, which prescribes preventive suspension of members of the PNP charged with grave felonies punishable by imprisonment of six years and one day or more.

Trial Court Proceedings

After suspension, petitioner moved to lift the order on October 11, 1993. He relied on Sec. 42, P.D. 807, arguing that preventive suspension in his case should be limited to ninety days, and he invoked this Court's decisions in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan and Layno v. Sandiganbayan. The trial judge denied the motion by order dated December 14, 1993 and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then sought relief by petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Supreme Court.

Issue Presented

The dispositive issue was whether Section 47, R.A. 6975 limits the duration of preventive suspension of a PNP member charged with a grave felony to ninety days by reason of its provision that the case "shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment," or whether the suspension continues "until the case is terminated."

Petitioner's Contentions

Petitioner contended that as a member of the PNP he remained subject to the Civil Service Law under Sec. 91, R.A. 6975, and that Sec. 42, P.D. 807 therefore limited any preventive suspension to ninety days. He argued that the two sentences of Sec. 47, R.A. 6975 must be read together so that the statutory mandate that the trial be terminated within ninety days also operated as a limit on the duration of his suspension. He further alleged that an indefinite suspension exceeding ninety days violated his constitutional right to equal protection.

Respondent Judge and Government Position

The trial court construed Section 47, R.A. 6975 to mandate immediate suspension "until the case is terminated" for a PNP member charged with grave felonies. The court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that the first sentence of Section 47 clearly required suspension until termination and that the succeeding sentence, which urged continuous trial and termination within ninety days, established a time frame for the trial but did not qualify the period of suspension.

Supreme Court Ruling — Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court affirmed that Section 47, R.A. 6975 applies to members of the PNP charged with grave felonies and that its mandate that the accused "shall be suspended from office until the case is terminated" is clear and unambiguous. The Court held that the provision requiring that the case "shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment" concerns the duration of the trial and does not operate to shorten or limit the period of preventive suspension.

Supreme Court Reasoning — Statutory Construction and Remedies

The Court reasoned that the first sentence of Section 47, R.A. 6975 and the second sentence prescribing a ninety-day target for trial are independent provisions. The Court explained that nothing in R.A. 6975 suggests that failure to terminate the trial within ninety days automatically lifts the preventive suspension. The Court noted that judges who fail to decide cases within the prescribed period without justifiable reason may face administrative, criminal, or civil liability under applicable laws, and that an accused prejudiced by inordinate delay retains remedies including a motion to dismiss, certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, or habeas corpus where appropriate.

Supreme Court Reasoning — Applicability of the Civil Service Decree

The Court held that Sec. 42, P.D. 807 governs lifting of preventive suspension in the context of administrative investigations, not criminal prosecutions. The Court emphasized that Sec. 91, R.A. 6975 makes the Civil Service Law applicable only insofar as its provisions are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975. Because Section 47, R.A. 6975 prescribes a different rule—suspension until termination—Sec. 42, P.D. 807 could not be invoked to limit the suspension of a PNP member charged with a grave felony.

Supreme Court Reasoning — Distinguishing Precedents

The Court distinguished Layno v. Sandiganbayan and Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, noting that those cases arose under Sec. 13, R.A. 3019, which is silent as to the duration of preventive suspension. In Layno and Deloso this Court found that an indefinite preventive suspension under a statute that did not specify duration raised due process and equal protection concerns. By contrast, Section 47, R.A. 6975 expressly provides that suspension continues until the case is terminated; therefore the rationale of Layno and Deloso did not apply.

Legislative History and Equal Protection Analysis

The Court reviewed the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations on the bill that became R.A. 6975. Those legislative discussions manifested a clear intent to subject PNP members charged with grave felonies to preventive suspension until termination of the case and to require continuous hearings with a ninety-day target for trial. T

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