G.R. No. L-67766 - Hildawa vs. Enrile

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-67766)

Factual Background

Petitioners challenged the formation and fielding of secret marshals or so-called crimebusters who were alleged to have absolute authority to kill suspected thieves, holduppers, robbers, pickpockets and slashers, asserting that such operations deprived persons of life, liberty and property without due process and denied equal protection under the Constitution; petitioners also relied on constitutional guarantees concerning presumption of innocence, rights in criminal prosecutions, prohibition against self-incrimination, and protection against cruel or unusual punishment. Respondents denied the existence of any executive or administrative order authorizing a license to kill, maintained that the special operation teams were impelled by the proliferation of robberies and holdups and that members were subject to the same laws and immunities as other law enforcement officers, and asserted that special squads were a legitimate means to combat resurgent crime.

Procedural History

Petitioners filed special civil actions seeking declaratory relief, injunctions and writs of certiorari or prohibition to restrain respondents from fielding and authorizing the secret marshals; respondents filed comments denying authorization to kill and attaching operational rationales; the Court required the Solicitor General to submit data and reports on killings allegedly resulting from crimebuster operations, and the matter was heard en banc with supplemental compliance and evidence submitted to the Court.

The Parties' Contentions

Petitioners asserted that the secret marshals operated with extrajudicial power to kill without due process in violation of the Constitution and sought a preliminary injunction and a permanent declaration nullifying any order creating such marshals. Respondents contended that no written executive or administrative order authorizing extra-judicial killings existed, that the special teams were lawful police formations to combat public-transportation crime, and that alleged abuses, if any, were contrary to orders and subject to investigation and prosecution under existing law.

Compliance and Reported Incidents

The Solicitor General, in compliance with the Court’s June 11, 1985 resolution, reported that from May 4, 1985 to May 9, 1985 fifteen alleged holduppers were killed by policemen and that cases against the policemen were filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office while those policemen had been ordered released; earlier reports show that secret marshals activated August 8, 1982 and thereafter killed 106 alleged holduppers and arrested 128 up to May 31, 1984, and that a reactivation in June 1984 resulted in a concentrated number of suspect fatalities.

The Court’s Holding

The Court held that the formation and deployment of special operation teams or crimebusters is lawful, but that a license to kill is unconstitutional and intolerable; the Court directed respondents to exercise strict supervision and control over such teams, ordered members not to use unnecessary force and to comply strictly with the law and to accord suspects all constitutional rights, and enjoined respondents to report immediately deaths or injuries resulting from apprehensions to superior officers and the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for investigation and appropriate action.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court grounded its decision in the Constitution’s guarantees against deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process and in the accused’s rights to be presumed innocent and to due process in criminal prosecutions, citing specific provisions as set forth in the petitions; the Court emphasized that due process requires hearing in a court of competent jurisdiction and orderly procedure before punishment may be imposed, and reiterated the rule that when a person is killed by another the assailant bears the burden of proving justification for self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, namely that the assailant was not the unlawful aggressor, that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and that he employed reasonable means to repel the aggression, citing authority including Ong Chang Wing v. U.S., 40 Phil. 1049 and related doctrine.

Supervisory and Investigative Directives

The Court ordered that NAPOLCOM should investigate alleged killings by special operation teams without waiting for formal complaints by relatives, and that once the identity of the killer(s) is established and admission of authorship is secured the investigating officer should file appropriate cases in the proper court or tribunal to determine whether the killing was justified as self-defense, defense of relatives or strangers, or in fulfillment of duty; the Court reiterated the prohibition against unnecessary force in arrests as expressed in Rule 113, Section 2, par. 2, Rules of Court.

Concurring Opinions

Several justices, including Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, De la Fuente, Cuevas, and Alampay, concurred with the Court’s ruling; Chief Justice Makasiar concurred but would have limited the remedy to reminders to respect constitutional rights because the record did not establish official authorization to kill; Justice Gutierrez, Jr. filed a separate concurring opinion emphasizing that there was no evidence special teams were ordered to liquidate suspects, that the police command counseled respect for rights, that specific incidents were being investigated, and that investigations by officers other than the police were more appropriate while commending the majority of police who faithfully perform their duties.

Separate Opinion of Teehankee, J.

Justice Teehankee concurred with the Court’s remedial measures but would have gone further and granted the petition to disband and outlaw secret marshals or crimebusters, reasoning that urban policing should not employ troops trained in ranger tactics and jungle warfare, that the casualty record — including episodes of apparent wanton shootings and the June 1984 spike in fatalities — evidenced a g

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-67766)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Isidro T. Hildawa filed a Special Civil Action for declaration of nullity of an alleged executive/administrative order creating secret marshals with prayer for a restraining order.
Ricardo C. Valmonte filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order against the Integrated National Police and Brig. Gen. Narciso Cabrera.
Petitioners sought a preliminary injunction directing respondents to recall the “crimebusters” and restrain them from fielding teams with authority or license to kill.
Respondents denied the existence of any executive or administrative order authorizing secret marshals to shoot and disable suspected criminals and asserted that special teams are subject to the same law as other peace officers.
The Solicitor General filed a compliance report showing that fifteen alleged holduppers were killed by policemen from May 4 to May 9, 1985, and that cases had been submitted to the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) while the policemen involved were ordered released.
The cases were heard en banc and the Court issued directions and injunctions rather than nullifying any specific executive order.

Key Factual Allegations

Petitioners alleged that secret marshals or “crimebusters” were formed and fielded with absolute authority to kill thieves, holduppers, robbers, pickpockets, and slashers.
Petitioners failed to produce any copy of an executive or administrative order and admitted that they had never seen one.
The record reflected that the secret marshals had been organized previously and reactivated, with reports of substantial suspected-killer counts including 106 alleged holduppers killed up to May 31, 1984, and further killings in June 1984 and May 1985.
Respondents reported the deployment of about 760 secret marshals in Metro Manila, with 160 INP field force members assigned to principal bus routes trained in “ranger tactics and jungle warfare.”
Media, local officials, and religious bodies publicly criticized the marshals, and municipal administrative changes placed administrative control under the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and operational supervision under city and town mayors.

Issues Presented

Whether the formation and fielding of secret marshals or “crimebusters” with alleged authority to kill violated constitutional guarantees of life, liberty, due process, and equal protection.
Whether petitioners established an executive or administrative order authorizing extrajudicial killings.
Whether the Court should enjoin, restrain, or nullify the formation or deployment of such special police teams.
What investigatory and supervisory duties devolve upon the police hierarchy, NAPOLCOM, and other authorities when killings occur in the course of such operations.
Whether certiorari, prohibition, or a declaration of nullity provided the appropriate remedy under the circumstances.

Contentions of the Parties

Petitioners contended that the special teams’ alleged license to kill violated provisions of the New Constitution including Article IV, Section 1, Section 17, Section 19, Section 20, Section 21, and the Court’s appellate powers under Section 5.
Respondents contended that no official order authorized a license to kill, that special teams were legitimately formed to counter rising robberies and holdups, and that members enjoyed no greater immunity than other law enforcement officers.
Respondents further asserted that the creation and deployment of special operation teams was within police competence and that public support existed for vigorous crime suppression.
The Solicitor General reported factual data of killings and administrative ste