Case Summary (A.C. No. 7024)
Key Dates and Procedural Posture
Decision rendered by the Supreme Court En Banc on August 14, 1985. Petitioners filed special civil actions seeking (a) declaration of nullity of any executive/administrative order creating secret marshals and (b) certiorari/prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction restraining respondents from fielding such teams or authorizing lethal force; respondents filed comments denying any order authorizing a “license to kill.”
Applicable Constitutional and Legal Provisions Alleged Violated
Petitioners relied on constitutional protections against deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process and equal protection; rights to due process in criminal proceedings; presumption of innocence; rights against self-incrimination and to counsel; prohibition of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment; and the Supreme Court’s appellate powers over criminal cases (as quoted in the pleadings and decision). The Court also referred to Rule 113, Section 2(2) of the Rules of Court concerning use of force in arrests.
Relief Sought by Petitioners
Preliminary injunction prohibiting respondents from fielding “crimebusters” or secret marshals with authority or license to kill; permanent declaration nullifying any executive or administrative order creating such units; and orders directing respondents to recall deployed teams.
Respondents’ Position and Factual Assertions
Respondents denied the existence of any written executive or administrative order authorizing marshals to shoot or otherwise enjoy special immunity. They asserted that the special teams were ordinary police special operation squads formed to counter the proliferation of robberies and similar crimes, and that their members are subject to the same laws and liabilities as other peace officers. Respondents emphasized that the deployment was motivated by a public-safety imperative.
Court’s Principal Holding on Legality of Special Teams
The Court held that the creation and deployment of special operation teams (by whatever name) to combat urban crime is lawful and legitimate as a police function. However, the Court decisively ruled that any “license to kill” is unconstitutional and intolerable, because it violates fundamental law and universal human rights, including due process protections that require opportunity to be heard before deprivation of life, liberty or property.
Due Process and Use of Force Standards Explained by the Court
The Court reiterated that due process requires that a person be proceeded against under orderly processes of law and punished only after inquiry, notice and opportunity to be heard by a competent tribunal. In the context of police killings, the burden of proving justification such as self-defense rests on the assailant; the assailant must establish (1) he was not the unlawful aggressor, (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel aggression. The Court emphasized that no unnecessary force should be used in making arrests and cited Rule 113, Section 2(2) that the arrested person shall not be subject to greater restraint than necessary for detention.
Investigatory and Supervisory Directives Issued
The Court directed respondents to exercise strict supervision and control over special operation teams and ordered that members, when making arrests, must not use unnecessary force, must comply strictly with law, and must accord suspects their constitutional rights. The Court enjoined respondents to immediately report any death or injury resulting from apprehension to superior officers and to the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for investigation and appropriate action.
Investigative and Prosecution Procedure Ordered
The Court stated that NAPOLCOM should investigate killings involving secret marshals/crimebusters without waiting for formal complaints by relatives; media reports of alleged killings should prompt investigation. Once the identity of the killer(s) is established and admission or sufficient evidence exists, the investigating officer should file cases in the proper court or tribunal to determine whether the killing was justified (e.g., self-defense, defense of others, or fulfillment of duty).
Factual Findings and Compliance Report Noted by the Court
In compliance with a Court resolution, the Solicitor General reported that from May 4 to May 9, 1985, fifteen alleged holduppers were killed by policemen; cases against the policemen were filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) and the involved policemen had been ordered released pending investigation. The Court used this information to underscore the need for prompt investigation and appropriate administrative and criminal action where warranted.
Concurring and Separate Opinions — Main Emphases
Justice Gutierrez, Jr. concurred fully with the Court’s decision, stressing that there was no evidence respondents expressly authorized liquidation of suspects and emphasizing that police who commit lawless acts act contrary to orders and must be prosecuted; he commended the majority of police officers and urged investigation by bodies other than the police themselves. Chief Justice Makasiar concurring: since authorization to kill was not established, respondents should be reminded — rather than strictly directed — to respect constitutional rights. Justice Teehankee concurred in the remedial measures but wrote a separate opinion advocating the disbandment of the secret marshals, on grounds that (a) they were reactivated by mere verbal orders, (b) many members were trained in military/ranger tactics unsuitable for urban policing, and (c) the record reflected a high number of killings and apparent excesses. He emphasized that the “cure is worse than the ailment” and urged permanent dismantling. Other concurrences underscored the need to respect human rights and to avoid t
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