G.R. No. L-14628 - Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-14628)

Factual Background

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, born July 1917, and petitioner became intimate beginning in 1950 while she was a teacher and he was younger by approximately ten years. In 1953, after an evening at the movies, they had sexual intercourse in petitioner’s cabin aboard the M/V “Escano,” where he served as apprentice pilot. In February 1954 complainant advised petitioner that she was pregnant, whereupon petitioner promised to marry her. The child, Chris Hermosisima, was born June 17, 1954. Petitioner married Romanita Perez on July 24, 1954. Complainant commenced suit on or about October 4, 1954 for acknowledgment of the child as petitioner’s natural child, for support, and for moral damages for breach of promise to marry.

Trial Court Proceedings

Upon complainant’s motion the Court of First Instance ordered alimony pendente lite on October 27, 1954 in the amount of P50.00 monthly, later reduced on February 16, 1955 to P30.00 monthly. After trial the court rendered judgment declaring the child the natural daughter of petitioner, confirmed the pendente lite order, ordered monthly payments of P30.00 for the child’s support, and awarded P4,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages, P5,000.00 as moral damages, and P500.00 as attorney’s fees, with costs against defendant. The trial court found that complainant “surrendered herself” to petitioner, overwhelmed by love, and sought to bind him by bearing a fruit of their engagement.

Court of Appeals Ruling

On appeal by petitioner the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance except that it increased the award for actual and compensatory damages and the award for moral damages. The Court of Appeals added P1,114.25 to the actual and compensatory damages for hospitalization, medical attendance, and expenses for the child, raising that item to P5,614.25, and increased moral damages to P7,000.00. The Court of Appeals justified the award of moral damages by holding that petitioner was liable for seduction and that moral damages were recoverable under Article 2219, paragraph 3 of the new Civil Code.

Issue Presented

The principal issue presented to this Court was whether moral damages are recoverable under Philippine law for breach of promise to marry, and whether the award of moral damages could be sustained on the separate ground of seduction under Art. 2219, paragraph 3 of the new Civil Code.

Parties’ Contentions in the Record

The record reflects that complainant sought recognition, support, and damages premised upon a promise to marry and the consequences of the parties’ intimacy. The Court of Appeals treated the case as fitting within the compensatory and moral damage provisions of the new Civil Code and characterized petitioner’s conduct as seduction for purposes of awarding moral damages. Petitioner protested the judgment and appealed, contesting the awards, particularly the moral damages, which led to review by this Court.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

This Court examined the historical and statutory background. It observed that Arts. 43 and 44 of the Civil Code of Spain did not create an actionable right to enforce a promise of marriage and that this Court in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866) had held that an action for breach of promise to marry had no standing in the civil law except insofar as money or property advanced on the faith of the promise could be recovered. The Court noted that the Code Commission had proposed Articles 56 to 65 in the Proposed Civil Code to authorize an action for breach of promise to marry and to permit recovery of moral damages and liability for causing a betrothal to be broken. The Court then recounted that Congress eliminated those proposed articles and relied upon the report of the Senate Committee which explained that breach of promise suits had been largely abolished in many American jurisdictions because of abuse, and that the elimination manifested a deliberate legislative choice not to create such a cause of action. Given that legislative history and the settled precedent in De Jesus vs. Syquia, the Court held that an award of moral damages for breach of promise to marry was not sustainable under Philippine law as it then stood. The Court further considered the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Art. 2219, paragraph 3 for seduction. It observed that the tenor of Art. 2219 and surrounding paragraphs indicated that the “seduction” contemplated corresponded to the crime defined in Arts. 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which were not present in this case. The Court also noted factual findings that complainant, a mature woman of about thirty-six years and formerly a teacher, had consented and had “surrendered herself” because she was “overwhelmed by her love,” which precluded treating petitioner as morally guilty of seduction under the penal and civil concept relied upon by the Court of Appeals.

Ruling and Disposition

The Court concluded that the awa

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-14628)

Parties and Posture

Francisco Hermosisima was the petitioner who sought relief by appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals which had modified the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
Soledad Cagigas was the complainant who filed the original suit for acknowledgment of her child, for support, and for moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry.
The Court of First Instance ordered alimony pendente lite, later rendered judgment declaring the child natural, ordered monthly child support, and awarded actual damages, moral damages, and attorney's fees against the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in all respects except that it increased the awards for actual and moral damages.
The principal question presented to the Court was whether moral damages are recoverable under Philippine law for breach of promise to marry.

Key Facts

Soledad Cagigas was born in July 1917 and was approximately ten years older than Francisco Hermosisima at the time of the events.
The parties had social intimacy beginning in 1950 and were regarded as engaged although there was no formal promise to marry before their intimacy.
The parties had sexual intercourse in the evening in 1953 aboard M/V "Escano", where petitioner served as an apprentice pilot.
In February 1954, upon learning that complainant was pregnant, petitioner promised to marry her, and the child Chris Hermosisima was born on June 17, 1954.
Petitioner subsequently married one Romanita Perez on July 24, 1954, and complainant filed suit on or about October 4, 1954.
The trial court found that complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because she was "overwhelmed by her love" and sought to "bind" him by producing the fruit of their engagement.

Statutory Framework

ART. 43 of the Civil Code of Spain provided that a mutual promise of marriage did not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage and that courts should not entertain suits to enforce such promises.
ART. 44 of the Civil Code of Spain permitted reimbursement of expenses incurred in reliance on a promise to marry where the promise had been made in a public or private instrument or where banns had been published.
The Court cited De Jesus vs . Syquia (58 Phil., 866) for the proposition that an action for breach of promise to marry had no standing in Philippine civil law apart from recovery of money or property advanced on the faith of such promise.
The Code Commission had proposed provisions in the Proposed Civil Code, including ART. 63 allowing recovery of moral damages for breach of promise and ART. 64 creating liability for causing an engagement to be broken, but these provisions were eliminated by Congress.
The Senate Committee report rejecting the