Title
Heirs of Zoleta vs. Land Bank of the Philippines
Case
G.R. No. 205128
Decision Date
Aug 9, 2017
Eliza Zoleta’s heirs contested DARAB’s improper issuance of a certiorari resolution, leading the Supreme Court to annul it, citing DARAB’s lack of judicial authority and violation of separation of powers.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 205128)

Applicable Law and Procedural Rules

1987 Philippine Constitution (Article VIII — judicial power); Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), Section 16(d) and Section 50; Executive Orders Nos. 229 and 129‑A (delegation and administrative framework for DAR/DARAB); DARAB rules of procedure (1989, 1994, 2003, 2009); Rule 65 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) on certiorari; Rule 45 (1997 Rules) as procedural vehicle for review.

Factual Background — Land Offer, Valuation and Adjudication

Eliza Zoleta voluntarily offered for sale to the government a parcel (approx. 136 hectares) covered by TCT No. T‑87673. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Landbank valued 125.4704 hectares as CARP‑covered at P3,986,639.57 and deposited that amount in Eliza’s name. Eliza rejected the valuation and the matter proceeded to DAR summary administrative proceedings under RA 6657 §16(d). On October 3, 2000, RARAD Conchita C. MiAas fixed just compensation at P8,938,757.72.

Procedural History — Competing Remedies and Enforcement Steps

Dissatisfied, Landbank filed a petition for just compensation in the Regional Trial Court (Special Agrarian Court) on November 7, 2000. Eliza moved for execution on November 9, 2000; RARAD granted the motion on January 16, 2001 and issued a writ of execution; an alias writ was issued on February 15, 2001 and enforcement steps (garnishment/levy) followed. Landbank sought quashal and interim restraining relief from the Special Agrarian Court but the court denied relief because DARAB was not impleaded. Landbank then filed, on April 2, 2001, a pleading styled as a “petition for certiorari” before DARAB pursuant to the DARAB New Rules of Procedure (1994).

DARAB Action and Subsequent Appeals

By Resolution dated May 12, 2006, DARAB granted Landbank’s petition for certiorari and annulled RARAD’s January 16, 2001 order and the February 15, 2001 alias writ of execution. Petitioners (the heirs) filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals; the Court of Appeals, by its July 23, 2012 Decision and January 9, 2013 Resolution denying reconsideration, sustained DARAB’s exercise of authority based on its supervisory and appellate powers over RARAD/PARAD. The heirs then sought review by petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) to the Supreme Court.

Issue Presented

Whether DARAB acted properly in issuing the May 12, 2006 Resolution granting Landbank’s petition for certiorari and annulling the RARAD order and alias writ of execution.

Holding

DARAB’s grant of Landbank’s petition for certiorari was improper. DARAB, as an administrative agency exercising quasi‑judicial functions but not vested with consummate judicial power, may not issue writs of certiorari; its purported exercise of certiorari power via its procedural rules was an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial power and a grave abuse of discretion. The Court granted the petition for review, reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals’ decisions, and ordered DARAB to dismiss Landbank’s petition for certiorari (DSCA 0219).

Jurisprudential and Constitutional Rationale — Nature of Certiorari

The Court reiterated established doctrine that the writ of certiorari is an incident of judicial review and historically a prerogative writ issued by superior courts (King’s Bench origin). Under Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is vested exclusively in the Judiciary; the power to determine whether a public officer or tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction (or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction) is a judicial function. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court prescribes certiorari’s requisites: (1) directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial/quasi‑judicial functions; (2) action without/excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion; and (3) absence of appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

Nature of Administrative Quasi‑Judicial Power and Its Limits

Administrative agencies (including DAR and DARAB) belong to the Executive and, although vested with quasi‑legislative and quasi‑judicial functions by statute, exercise only limited adjudicatory powers as defined by their enabling laws. Quasi‑judicial power allows determination of facts and application of legislative policy within statutory bounds, but it does not include the plenary judicial power to issue prerogative writs of judicial review such as certiorari. A grant of original jurisdiction to issue special civil actions must be conferred expressly by the Constitution or by law; rules of procedure cannot create substantive jurisdiction.

Analysis of DARAB’s Authority and Its Rules

DARAB’s earlier rules (1989 and 1994) provided mechanisms for Board review of RARAD/PARAD decisions and in the 1994 Rules referenced review “upon a verified petition for certiorari.” DARAB relied on its supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over regional/provincial adjudicators to justify issuing certiorari relief. The Court held that supervisory authority over subordinate adjudicators does not equate to judicial power to issue certiorari; exercise of such supervisory authority must remain within administrative control and cannot transmute an administrative body into a court empowered to decide jurisdictional controversies. DARAB’s attempt to con

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