Title
Heirs of Velasquez vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 126996
Decision Date
Feb 15, 2000
Dispute over conjugal properties of deceased spouses; plaintiffs claimed unlawful possession, defendants asserted valid conveyance. SC ruled res judicata applied, deeds valid, no co-ownership; complaint dismissed.
partition of conjugal properties
lack of evidence
dispute
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 122451)

Factual Background

During their marriage, spouses Aquino acquired several parcels of real property in Mangaldan, Pangasinan, described in the complaint as six parcels, later treated by the trial court as conjugal properties. The parcels included: (a) a residential land in Guiguilonen, (b) a large parcel described as sugar cane and coconut land in Poblacion, (c) a parcel in Malabago, (d) a sugarcane parcel in Embarcadero (covered by Tax Decl. No. 231), (e) a residential land in Bari (covered by Tax Decl. No. 453), and (f) unirrigated riceland in Malabago (covered by Tax Decl. No. 1156).

In 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman filed a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, held a conference with Santiago Meneses and Anatalia de Guzman, with Tranquilina de Guzman (the defendants’ grandmother), and with Cesario Velasquez. The plaintiffs claimed Leoncia told them that certain donation and partition documents executed by Leoncia and Cornelio Aquino earlier were not genuinely signed by them and that Leoncia’s intention was not to give away all their properties to Cesario Velasquez, because Anatalia had several children to support. Plaintiffs asserted that Cesario Velasquez and his mother promised to divide the properties equally and to give plaintiffs one-half of all the properties as Anatalia was Leoncia’s full-blood sister.

After Leoncia’s death, plaintiffs alleged that defendants forcibly took possession of all the properties and refused to partition despite demands. Plaintiffs prayed for the nullity of the questioned documents, the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares, and an accounting of produce from the time of alleged forcible taking.

Defendants, in their amended answer with counterclaim, invoked a contrary history. They alleged that spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman had already disposed of the properties to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez, through several deeds. They asserted, among others, that: the third and sixth parcels were conveyed by Escritura de Donation Propter Nuptias dated February 15, 1919 to future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman; the second parcel was conveyed by a deed dated July 14, 1939; the first parcel was conveyed by a deed of conveyance dated April 10, 1939; and that the fourth and fifth parcels were owned and possessed by third parties. Defendants also denied that the alleged 1944 conference took place, denied any promise to execute a deed of partition, and alleged that their possession was peaceful, open, continuous, and adverse.

Trial Court Proceedings

The trial court issued a pre-trial order on May 18, 1990 defining three issues: whether the properties formed part of the estate of Anatalia de Guzman and the spouses Aquino; whether plaintiffs’ action was barred by statutes of limitation and res judicata; and whether the properties could be the subject of an action for partition.

After trial, the court rendered its decision on April 8, 1992. It ruled that plaintiffs were siblings, children of Estanislao Meneses and Anatalia de Guzman, while defendants were the children of plaintiffs’ cousin Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. The trial court found that the defendants’ grandmother Tranquilina de Guzman and plaintiffs’ mother Anatalia de Guzman and Leoncia de Guzman were full-blooded sisters. It treated the six parcels as conjugal properties held in the Aquino spouses’ possession until their deaths.

The trial court then treated as decisive an affidavit and later testimony. It stated that after Anatalia’s death on September 14, 1978, Santiago Meneses allegedly discovered an affidavit stating Cesario Velasquez was an adopted son of the Aquino spouses, but the court found no support by court order. It then narrated that, sometime in 1944, Leoncia had called a conference and allegedly told the parties that their conjugal properties would be divided equally between Anatalia and Tranquilina and that Leoncia did not sign documents regarding the conveyances. Based on this narrative, the trial court concluded that Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman, though childless, had Anatalia and Tranquilina as legal heirs, and that each succeeded the other over the six parcels in equal shares.

The trial court disregarded defendants’ documentary evidence of conveyances in favor of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest and third parties. It declared as null and void the Donation Intervivos over the first parcel, the Deed of Sale over the second parcel, the Deeds of Donation over the third and sixth parcels, and the sales to third parties over the fourth and fifth parcels insofar as one-half of those parcels belonged to plaintiffs. It ordered reconveyance of the one-half shares or, failing reconveyance, reconveyance of the sugar cane and coconut land parcel, and awarded damages, attorneys’ fees, and litigation expenses. It further held that prescription did not bar partition.

Appellate Court Proceedings

Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in a December 29, 1995 decision and denied reconsideration in a November 6, 1996 resolution.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals rejected the defense of res judicata, reasoning that it had not been pleaded or raised earlier and thus was deemed waived. It also dismissed the claim of prescription, holding that an action for partition was imprescriptible. On the merits regarding prior transfers, it affirmed the trial court’s findings that the transfers to defendants had been repudiated before Leoncia’s death.

Issues Raised on Review

Petitioners faulted the appellate court for purported reversible errors. The Supreme Court framed the principal issues as follows: whether the case was barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations; whether the properties mentioned in the complaint formed part of the estate of the spouses Aquino; whether petitioners acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the properties; whether private respondents were legal heirs of the spouses Aquino; and whether partition was the proper action.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling on Res Judata and Waiver

The Supreme Court granted the petition. It first addressed the appellate court’s conclusion that res judicata had not been raised at the trial level.

The Court held that the appellate court committed clear error. The records showed that defendants had raised res judicata in their Amended Answer before the trial court, particularly under paragraph 18(b), invoking three earlier cases involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action, and asserting that the last dismissal was for failure to prosecute and had the effect of adjudication on the merits as with prejudice. The trial court admitted the amended answer through an order dated March 2, 1990, and the pre-trial order dated May 18, 1990 identified issues for resolution that included the defense. Accordingly, the Court held that res judicata was not waived.

Res Judicata Found to Exist

The Supreme Court then determined that the requisites of res judicata were present. It relied on the documentary record establishing that three earlier complaints had been filed by Anatalia’s heirs against the heirs of Cesario and that those cases involved the same subject matter and causes of action as the present suit. The first complaint, Civil Case No. 11378, was dismissed on August 18, 1950. A second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. D-7584, was dismissed on May 28, 1986 for failure to prosecute, without prejudice. A third complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. P-8811, was filed on October 23, 1987 and dismissed on October 21, 1988 for failure to prosecute, with the order stating only that for failure to prosecute, the case was dismissed without costs.

The Court held that the third dismissal, absent any qualifying condition, was deemed to have the effect of an adjudication on the merits as with prejudice. It further concluded that the earlier orders were final, rendered by a court with jurisdiction, and involved identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. Thus, res judicata barred the present complaint.

Nevertheless, the Court noted that because the case had already reached it via a petition for review on certiorari, it would be more consistent with substantial justice to resolve the controversy on the merits rather than on a procedural technicality, in view of the rules requiring liberal construction to achieve just, speedy, and inexpensive determination.

Trial on the Merits: Failure to Prove Nullity of Conveyances

The Supreme Court then addressed petitioners’ contention that the lower courts erred in nullifying the conveyances based only on Santiago Meneses’s testimony. The Court recalled the general rule that factual findings of lower courts are final, but held that it could reverse when those findings did not conform to the evidence on record.

The Court explained that in an action for partition, a court must first determine ownership and the existence of co-ownership. Without a definite resolution of ownership, partition would be premature. It referred to Rule 69, requiring the complaint to state the “nature and the extent of his title,” and held that until the issue of ownership was resolved, partition could not properly proceed. It further stated that partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the property.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court found no preponderance of evidence supporting the lower courts’ conclusions that the disputed conveyances had been repudiated before Leoncia’s death. It held that the trial court relied essentially on Santiago Meneses’s claim that in 1944 Leoncia held a conference stating that she did not sign the documents and that the properties were to be divided equally. It h

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