Case Summary (G.R. No. 135087)
Key Dates and Procedural Posture
Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 396, S-1994 adopted October 13, 1994; mayor’s letter offering purchase dated January 20, 1995; City filed complaint for expropriation March 13, 1995 (RTC Pasig docketed SCA No. 875); trial court denied owner’s motion to dismiss October 24, 1995; trial court allowed immediate possession upon deposit of 15% of fair market value November 14, 1995; writ of possession issued December 14, 1995, with possession assumed December 15, 1995; trial court issued order of condemnation July 28, 1998; petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed in the Supreme Court, which granted the petition and reversed the trial court’s July 28, 1998 decision.
Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis
Constitutional provisions applied: 1987 Constitution — Article III, Section 9 (private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation) and Article III, Section 1 (due process and equal protection). Statutory provision central to the decision: Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), which authorizes a local government unit to exercise eminent domain “through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,” subject to conditions including prior offer and payment of just compensation. Relevant procedural rule: Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court (expropriation proceedings). Also implicated: Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, specifically Article 36, Rule VI (which refers to a resolution) and Article 32, Rule VI (which refers to an ordinance).
Central Legal Issue
Whether the City of Mandaluyong validly initiated and prosecuted expropriation proceedings based on a Sangguniang Panlungsod resolution (Resolution No. 396, S-1994), or whether the Local Government Code requires an ordinance authorizing the chief executive to exercise eminent domain prior to filing the complaint and thereby initiating the expropriation process.
Parties’ Contentions
Petitioners’ position: The City may exercise its delegated power of eminent domain only by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of RA 7160; a mere resolution is insufficient. Respondent’s position: Article 36 of the IRR (Rule VI) permits a resolution to serve as antecedent authority to file expropriation proceedings; an ordinance is only necessary later to appropriate funds after the court determines just compensation. The trial court adopted respondent’s view and issued an order of condemnation.
Trial Court Ruling and Relief Sought
The trial court denied the owner’s motion to dismiss and, following the proceedings, issued an order of condemnation declaring the City had a lawful right to take the subject parcel for public use upon payment of just compensation; the court directed submission of appraisers to ascertain just compensation. The petitioners sought reversal of the trial court’s denial and the order of condemnation on the ground that the exercise of eminent domain was not in compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code.
Supreme Court’s Analysis on the Nature and Safeguards of Eminent Domain
The Court reiterated that eminent domain is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty but is in derogation of private rights and therefore must be strictly construed and exercised in accordance with law. Constitutional protections (just compensation, due process, equal protection) act as safeguards against arbitrary exercise. Delegation of eminent domain to local government units is permissible but the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower and must strictly comply with the terms of the delegating statute.
Requirement of an Ordinance under Section 19, RA 7160
The Court held that Section 19 of the Local Government Code unambiguously requires that the local chief executive exercise eminent domain “acting pursuant to an ordinance.” The Court emphasized that the ordinance is a legislative act distinct from a resolution: an ordinance is a law of general and permanent character enacted by a different procedure (including a third reading), whereas a resolution is generally temporary and declaratory. Because filing an expropriation complaint is itself an exercise of the power of eminent domain (it triggers the two-stage Rule 67 process and grants the plaintiff the right to seek possession upon deposit), the authorizing ordinance must exist prior to filing the complaint, not only after judicial determination of just compensation.
Rule 67 Expropriation Stages and Timing of Ordinance Requirement
Invoking Rule 67, the Court described the two stages of expropriation: (1) determination of plaintiff’s authority to exercise eminent domain and propriety of exercise, culminating in an order of condemnation declaring the plaintiff’s lawful right to take the property upon payment of just compensation; and (2) determination of the just compensation amount with the assistance of commissioners. Because the filing of the complaint initiates the first stage—during which the court decides whether the plaintiff has authority to expropriate—the ordinance authorizing the chief executive must preexist the filing.
Inconsistency Between the Code and the IRR
The Cou
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 135087)
Case Caption, Court, and Decision
- Full caption as provided: Heirs of Alberto Suguitan, Petitioner, vs. City of Mandaluyong, Respondent.
- Reported at 384 Phil. 676, Third Division; G.R. No. 135087.
- Date of decision: March 14, 2000.
- Authoring justice: Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
- Concurring justices: Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ.
- Nature of petition: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Dispositive Order of the Trial Court (Subject of Review)
- The trial court (Branch 155, Regional Trial Court of Pasig) issued an Order dated July 28, 1998 in SCA No. 875 entitled "City of Mandaluyong v. Alberto S. Suguitan."
- The dispositive portion of that order declared:
- The Motion to Dismiss was denied.
- An order of condemnation was issued declaring that the plaintiff, City of Mandaluyong, had a lawful right to take the subject parcel of land together with existing improvements thereon (Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264, Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District II) for the public use or purpose as stated in the Complaint, upon payment of just compensation.
- The parties were directed to submit within fifteen (15) days a list of independent appraisers from which the court would select three commissioners pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67, Rules of Court.
Procedural History (Key Dates and Acts)
- October 13, 1994: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994 authorizing Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property covered by TCT No. 56264.
- January 20, 1995: Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos wrote to Alberto Suguitan offering to buy the property; Suguitan refused to sell.
- March 13, 1995: City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, docketed as SCA No. 875.
- October 24, 1995: Trial court denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss the complaint.
- November 14, 1995: Trial court issued order allowing the City to take immediate possession upon deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of fair market value based on the current tax declaration.
- December 14–15, 1995: Writ of possession issued December 14; City assumed possession December 15, 1995.
- July 28, 1998: Trial court issued the order of condemnation that is the subject of the present petition.
- October 2, 1998: Alberto Suguitan passed away.
- November 25, 1998: The Supreme Court allowed the heirs of Alberto Suguitan to substitute as petitioners in the present case.
- March 14, 2000: Supreme Court decision reversing and setting aside the trial court's July 28, 1998 decision.
Facts: Property and Purpose
- Subject property:
- Located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets, Mandaluyong City.
- Area: 414 square meters.
- More particularly described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II.
- Includes existing improvements (a two-storey building adjacent to Mandaluyong Medical Center as described in the resolution).
- Purpose of expropriation:
- Expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center to accommodate increased daily influx of patients and to continue delivering free health and medical services to less fortunate residents.
- Resolution recites that owner was not desirous of selling even under reasonable terms, justifying exercise of eminent domain for public health and welfare.
Grounds of Motion to Dismiss Raised by Petitioner (Suguitan)
- The motion to dismiss asserted the complaint should be dismissed because:
- The power of eminent domain was not being exercised in accordance with law.
- There was no public necessity to warrant expropriation of the subject property.
- The City of Mandaluyong sought to expropriate the said property without payment of just compensation.
- The City of Mandaluyong had no budget and appropriation for the payment of the property being expropriated.
- The expropriation was a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire the property for his personal use.
- The trial court denied this motion on October 24, 1995.
Central Legal Issue Presented
- Whether the City of Mandaluyong validly exercised the delegated power of eminent domain by way of a Sangguniang Panlungsod resolution (Resolution No. 396, S-1994) rather than by means of an ordinance, in light of Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) and related implementing rules.
Positions of Parties
- Petitioners (Heirs of Alberto Suguitan):
- Asserted that Section 19 of RA 7160 requires that the local legislative council enact an ordinance authorizing the chief executive to exercise eminent domain; a mere resolution is insufficient.
- Argued that the resolution in question (Article 36 of the IRR aside) does not dispense with the necessity of an ordinance for the exercise of eminent domain under Section 19 of the Code.
- Respondent (City of Mandaluyong):
- Contended it validly exercised eminent domain.
- Relied on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7160 to argue that a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for filing expropriation proceedings.
- Trial court accepted respondent’s position, reasoning that a resolution empowers the mayor to initiate proceedings and an ordinance follows later to appr