Title
Heirs of Soliva vs. Soliva
Case
G.R. No. 159611
Decision Date
Apr 22, 2015
A family dispute over a 14,609-sqm land in Calbayog City, involving inheritance, contested sales, and partition claims, resolved by the Supreme Court affirming Cenon's partial ownership and validating the 1970 sale as a true transaction.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 159611)

Procedural Posture

Original action: Complaint for Partition with Accounting filed by Antero (later amended to include Victoriano, Sergio, Romeo) against several Soliva heirs, Roleda and SEI. RTC (Calbayog City, Branch 32) rendered a January 25, 1997 decision allocating specific lots and excluding Severino and Cenon’s heirs from certain shares. The Court of Appeals (CA) issued a May 23, 2003 decision modifying the RTC result and an August 20, 2003 resolution denying reconsideration. Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) to the Supreme Court challenged the CA rulings; the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA with modification as to Antero’s share distribution among his heirs.

Core factual background relevant to title and partition

The Soliva spouses (Ceferino/Rufino and Juana Endeza) owned three parcels. Parcel 2’s area was adjusted by court-appointed relocation surveys: initially alleged at 9,447 sq. m. in the complaint, later found to be 10,906 sq. m. by the first commissioner, and finally fixed at 14,609 sq. m. by geodetic commissioners and the Plan of Land used in partition. Key historical transfers: in 1949 Brigida Mancol conveyed to Cenon a portion of Parcel 2 (described in the Escritura de Compra-Venta Absoluta); in 1970 Juana executed a Deed of Conditional Sale with Pacto de Retro in favor of Cenon; in 1986 Cenon sold a portion to Roleda, who in 1991 sold to SEI.

Plan of Land subdivision and specific contested lots

The relocation Plan assigned Parcel 2 into discrete lots: Lot 1 (828 sq. m.), Lot 2-A (3,305 sq. m.), Lot 2-B (877 sq. m.), Lot 3 (2,741 sq. m.), Lot 4 (3,142 sq. m. / includes National Highway), Lot 5 (3,716 sq. m.), and Lot 2-C (952 sq. m., located west and not part of Parcel 2). Disputes centered on ownership and entitlement over the whole of Parcel 2 and specifically the 4,092.8 sq. m. portion sold by Cenon to Roleda, later conveyed to SEI.

Relief sought by petitioner

Petitioners sought: (1) judicial declaration that the 1970 Pacto de Retro was an equitable mortgage; (2) partition of Parcels 1 and 2; (3) accounting by Cenon’s heirs for proceeds of the portion sold to Roleda with legal interest from 1986; and (4) ejectment and rental recovery from SEI.

RTC findings and disposition

The RTC (January 25, 1997) determined: Lot 2-A, 2-B and Lot 2-C belonged exclusively to SEI (Lot 2-C later held to be outside Parcel 2 but SEI’s claim undisputed); Lots 1, 3 and 5 were co-owned by Antero, Victoriano and Dorotea’s heirs; Lot 4 formed part of Parcel 2 (national highway); Severino was excluded from partition because he had previously received his inheritance share (the riceland sold in 1959); Cenon was excluded in part because he had previously acquired a 1,600 sq. m. portion via the 1949 Escritura which limited his residual participation and because his sale to Roleda exceeded that portion and effectively conveyed part of the co-heirs’ pro indiviso share.

Court of Appeals modification and allocations

The CA (May 23, 2003) modified the RTC: it declared Antero, Victoriano, Romeo and Sergio (as Dorotea’s heirs), plus the Cenon heirs, and SEI as co-owners of Parcel 2. It accepted the 1949 notarized Escritura as proof that Mancol had sold a 1,600 sq. m. portion to Cenon; it treated the 1970 Pacto de Retro as a valid sale (not an equitable mortgage) limited to the alienable interest of Juana; it found Cenon had acquired 10,706.3 sq. m. and validly sold 4,092.8 sq. m. to Roleda; it allocated specific square meters to each heir and to SEI as purchaser of Roleda’s portion.

Issues presented to the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the controlling issues as: (1) validity and extent of the 1949 Escritura de Compra-Venta Absoluta in favor of Cenon; (2) whether the CA correctly applied accretion (Article 1015) in distributing Severino’s presumed share; (3) whether the 1970 Pacto de Retro constituted an equitable mortgage under Article 1602; (4) if the 1970 instrument were a true sale, whether it covered only Juana’s 6/10 share and whether the 30-day repurchase under Article 1606 remained available; and (5) whether Roleda and SEI purchased in bad faith.

Standard of review and treatment of factual findings

The Court emphasized Rule 45 limits: appellate review in a petition for certiorari is confined to errors of law; factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded deference. The petition largely repeated factual challenges already resolved by the RTC and CA; absent exceptional circumstances warranting reexamination of facts, the Supreme Court will not substitute its factual findings for those below.

Ruling on the 1949 Escritura de Compra-Venta Absoluta

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s acceptance of the notarized 1949 Escritura as a public document carrying a presumption of regularity and, absent convincing contradictory evidence, as clear and convincing proof that Mancol sold a 1,600 sq. m. portion to Cenon. The Court found no credible evidence impeaching the document’s execution or the notarization and noted supporting testimony (e.g., Severino’s) that corroborated the transaction. As such, the 1,600 sq. m. deduction from Parcel 2 was proper in computing distributable shares.

Ruling on accretion (Article 1015) and computation of shares

The Court rejected petitioner’s contention that the CA misapplied Article 1015. The CA did not invoke accretion as the statutory mechanism; rather it recognized Severino had already received a separate inheritance parcel in 1959 and therefore was excluded from participating in partition of Parcel 2. The CA then redistributed the distributable portion among the remaining heirs. The Supreme Court illustrated two computational scenarios (with and without Severino) to show the CA’s arithmetic and legal effect was to exclude Severino’s share and proportionately increase each remaining heir’s allotment (from 1,084 to 1,300.9 sq. m. per heir of Ceferino’s distributable share), consistent with succession principles and the factual record.

Ruling on the nature of the 1970 Pacto de Retro (Article 1602)

The Supreme Court agreed with the CA that the 1970 Deed of Conditional Sale with Pacto de Retro was a true sale and not an equitable mortgage. It reiterated the two requisites for Article 1602 presumption and found that petitioners failed to prove that the transaction in fact secured a debt. The Court relied on objective indicia: prompt declaration of the property in Cenon’s name for taxation, continuous payment of taxes from the property’s income, enjoyment and disposition of fruits by Cenon and his heirs, absence of evidence that Juana or her heirs treated the instrument as a mortgage, and absence of any executed extension of the repurchase period. The permissive clause that the parties “may” execute another document to extend the repurchase period did not convert the instrument to an equitable mortgage, particularly where no such extension was executed and no convincing evidence established an intent to secure debt.

Ruling on the scope of the 1970 Pacto de Retro and right of redemption (Article 1606)

The Court held that, even as a true sale, the Pacto de Retro could only affect Juana’s alienable interest (her 6/10 conjugal/share component) and not the entire Parcel 2. The CA had correctly computed Juana’s 6/10 share as 7,805.4 sq. m., which was the share affected by the 1970 transaction. The Court further concluded petitioners had lost any right to redeem: the 10-year repurchase term had expired long before the 1991 filing and paragraph 3 of Article 1606 (providing a 30-day repurchase following a judicial declaration where the vendor in good faith believed the contract was an equitable mortgage) did not apply because there was no bona fide belief that the instrument was an equitable mortgage. The Court cited precedent requiring good faith and objective circumstances for the 30-day remedy; absent such bona fide belief and evidence, allowing the remedy would improperly enable vendors to resurrect expired rights.

Ruling on acquisitive prescription and possession arguments

The Supreme Court noted petitioners’ claims that acquisitive prescription could not run against them because they were in actual possession we

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