Title
Heirs of Sandejas vs. Lina
Case
G.R. No. 141634
Decision Date
Feb 5, 2001
Estate administrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. entered a conditional sale with Alex Lina for estate land, requiring court approval. Upon approval, Sandejas' share (11/20) was binding; other heirs' consent was absent. Probate court upheld jurisdiction, affirming partial enforceability.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 154739)

Key Dates

  • Death of Remedios R. Sandejas: April 17, 1955.
  • Contract (Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy): June 7, 1982.
  • Letters of Administration initially issued to Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr.: July 1, 1981.
  • Intervention and subsequent appointment and substitution of administrators, reconstitution of lost records, filing of motions for approval of sale, RTC order (January 13, 1995) approving the Receipt, and appellate proceedings culminating in modification by the Court of Appeals and later Supreme Court resolution.

Applicable Law (basis)

  • 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable because the decision under review is post-1990).
  • Rules of Court, particularly Rule 89 (Sections 1, 2, 4 and 8) and related probate provisions (Rules 74; 86–91).
  • Civil Code principles on contracts and conditions (Article 1458 cited).
  • Family Code provisions on conjugal and hereditary shares (Article 129(7) cited).
  • Precedent and treatises referenced in the decision (e.g., Acebedo v. Abesamis; Cheng v. Genato; Gil v. Cancio).

Factual Summary

  • The seller (Eliodoro Sr.), in his individual capacity and expressly binding “his heirs, administrators and assigns,” executed the Receipt with Lina, acknowledging earnest money and stating a P1,000,000 purchase price with terms and a suspensive condition: court approval authorizing the administrator to sell the parcels then under administration in the intestate proceedings of Remedios.
  • The instrument included a clause that, in the event the sale failed to proceed, the seller would return earnest money with 14% interest and that the terms would be binding on heirs and administrators.
  • Procedural complications followed (including loss and reconstitution of records, death of the initially appointed administrator, substitution of administrators, consolidation of proceedings) and ultimately a motion by Lina for court approval of the conditional sale.

Trial Court Ruling

  • The RTC (intestate/settlement court) granted Lina’s motion for approval of the Receipt and ordered Lina to pay the balance of the purchase price and ordered the administrator to execute the necessary deeds of conveyance (order dated January 13, 1995).

Court of Appeals Ruling

  • The Court of Appeals held the instrument to be a contract to sell (not a perfected sale) and treated the court approval requirement as a positive suspensive condition. The CA concluded that, because other heirs had not consented and received no written notice, the sale could only bind the share of the seller-heir (Eliodoro Sr.). The CA therefore modified the RTC order to approve conveyance only as to the three-fifths (3/5) share it attributed to Eliodoro Sr., and directed payment and conveyance as to that share.

Issues on Review

  • Whether the seller (Eliodoro Sr.) was legally obligated to convey title despite a suspensive condition (court approval) that had not been fulfilled at the time of contracting.
  • Whether the seller acted in bad faith.
  • Proper computation of the seller-heir’s undivided share (whether 3/5 or 11/20).
  • Whether the probate/settlement court had jurisdiction to approve the sale and compel execution of deeds, and whether an intervenor like Lina had standing to seek such approval under Rule 89, Sec. 8.

Supreme Court’s Characterization of the Agreement

  • The Supreme Court concluded that the instrument was a conditional sale (a sale subject to a suspensive condition) rather than a mere contract to sell. Key reasoning: the instrument contained an express obligation to deed the properties upon fulfillment of the condition (court approval), and there was no reservation of ownership clause suggesting retention of title pending full payment. Thus, once the probate court granted approval, the conditional sale became perfected and reciprocally demandable.

Effect of Probate Court Approval and the Nature of the Suspensive Condition

  • The court treated the judicial approval requirement as a genuine suspensive condition whose fulfillment (granting of authority by the settlement court) effects the perfection of the conditional sale. Approval by the intestate court therefore converted the conditional sale into an enforceable obligation to convey.
  • The Supreme Court emphasized that a stipulation requiring judicial approval does not impair an heir-seller’s right to dispose of his pro indiviso share; it limits removal of property from custodia legis but does not invalidate a sale binding on the selling heir once approval is obtained.

Jurisdiction of the Probate/Settlement Court

  • The Court reaffirmed the broad probate jurisdiction: settlement courts have authority over matters incidental to estate settlement, including selling, mortgaging, or encumbering realty under administration. Rule 89 permits the court to authorize conveyances contemplated by contracts entered into by the decedent or by contracts affecting property under administration.
  • The Court rejected petitioners’ contention that a separate civil action was required to enforce the sale, noting that requiring a separate suit would needlessly prolong estate settlement. Approval of the conditional sale as part of the settlement proceedings was consistent with the Rules’ purpose to expedite administration and allow heirs to enjoy benefits of settlement.

Standing to Seek Approval under Rule 89, Section 8

  • Section 8 of Rule 89 differs from Sections 2 and 4 in that it does not expressly limit the application for approval to the executor or administrator. The Supreme Court interpreted Section 8 to allow an application by any person who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Consequently, Lina, as purchaser and one directly affected, had standing to seek the court’s authorization to convey pursuant to the preexisting contract.

Bad Faith Allegation

  • The petitioners argued that Eliodoro Sr. acted in bad faith by purporting to bind heirs without their consent. The Supreme Court found no evidence of bad faith: Eliodoro Sr. had informed Lina of the need for court approval and did not misrepresent ownership in fee simple. The Court held that the CA’s imputation of bad faith was unnecessary because judicial approval and binding effect as to the seller-heir’s own shares followed from the conditional sale and subsequent court action.

Computation of Seller‑Heir’s Share (3/5 vs. 11/20)

  • The Court corrected the CA’s arithmetic. The proper method: first assign the conjugal share (one-half) to the surviving spouse; the remaining half (the decedent’s estate for distribution) is then divided among heirs. Eliodoro Sr., as surviving spouse, had a conjugal half and also a hereditary share as one of the ten legal heirs of the decedent. The hereditary share is

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