G.R. No. 129824 - De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Case Summary (G.R. No. 129824)

Factual Background

The administrative case traced its origin to a simple ejectment case initiated by the complainants against Metro Manila Builders, Inc. (Manila Builders). The parties’ relationship stemmed from a lease contract executed on November 30, 1976, under which the complainants’ predecessors-in-interest leased a parcel of land exceeding one (1) hectare along Taft Avenue, Pasay City to Manila Builders for twenty-five (25) years at a rental rate ranging from P15,000.00 to P30,000.00 per month. Under the lease, Manila Builders undertook to cover present and future improvements by insurance against specified risks and to maintain the premises in good, sanitary, and tenantable condition at all times. The lease was allegedly breached, prompting the complainants to exercise a contractual right of unilateral rescission by sending notice terminating the lease and demanding vacation and surrender, which Manila Builders ignored.

On February 3, 1997, the complainants filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Pasay City, Branch 45 a complaint for unlawful detainer based on breach of the lease contract. The trial court ruled in favor of the complainants on May 9, 1997, ordering the eviction of Manila Builders. On May 16, 1997, the complainants moved for execution of the eviction judgment. Manila Builders appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, Branch 113, but the appeal was dismissed for failure to file an appeal memorandum on time. Subsequently, on November 5, 1997, Manila Builders elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

On November 26, 1997, the MTC granted the motion for execution, with the corresponding order issued on December 1, 1997. On December 8, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued an order restraining execution of the ejectment judgment. On February 7, 1998, the Court of Appeals allowed Manila Builders to withdraw its appeal. At the same time, Manila Builders filed with the RTC, Pasay City, Branch 231, an action for annulment of the ejectment judgment, alleging lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and seeking a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to halt execution. The RTC did not issue an injunction. Manila Builders then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1998, challenging the RTC’s sub-silencio denial of its application for injunctive relief. On the same date, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution restraining enforcement of the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 113-97 of the MTC, Pasay City, Branch 45.

Only two members of the division signed this restraining resolution: Justices Demetria and Barcelona, with Justice Omar U. Amin not signing. The restraining resolution was then followed by a dismissal by the RTC on April 14, 1998 of the action for annulment of judgment, holding that the proper remedy was appeal in due time, and that withdrawal of the appeal amounted to abandonment.

Procedural Developments in the Court of Appeals and Execution Pending Appeal

The controversy then returned to the Court of Appeals, which on August 21, 1998 promulgated a decision that set aside the MTC decision and the RTC orders. The dispositive portion ordered restoration of the subject property to Manila Builders’ possession and permanently enjoined further acts disturbing physical possession by Manila Builders until the lease’s expiration.

Despite the pending review by the Supreme Court filed later by the complainants, on the same date (August 21, 1998) Manila Builders filed a very urgent ex parte motion for execution pending appeal. On September 14, 1998, the complainants filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari questioning the Court of Appeals decision. The complainants filed a consolidated comment with the Court of Appeals on September 17, 1998, seeking deferment due to the pending Supreme Court petition. Nevertheless, on September 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting execution pending appeal. This September 18, 1998 resolution issued a writ of execution pending appeal of the Court of Appeals decision dated August 21, 1998, directed the Division Clerk to furnish copies to the MTC and RTC, adjudged private respondents and counsel guilty of indirect contempt, imposed a fine of P30,000.00, and ordered a complete restoration of the subject property.

On September 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals (Second Division) issued a resolution directing the chief of the mailing section to appoint a special sheriff to execute the August 21, 1998 decision. On that same date, Mr. Rivamonte was appointed special sheriff to enforce the writ, after which the Second Division Clerk issued the writ of execution commanded to enforce the resolution dated September 18, 1998 and the decision dated August 21, 1998, directing restoration of possession to Manila Builders and return of the writ to the Court within five (5) days. That writ was immediately enforced: on September 21, 1998, Rivamonte evicted the complainants from the premises and restored possession to Manila Builders.

Claims and Administrative Charges

On September 15, 2000, the complainants filed the administrative complaint in the Supreme Court against the Court of Appeals justices and personnel, alleging that irregularities in proceedings in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 47158 and 47720 deprived them of possession due to the malicious, deliberate, and unlawful issuance of a restraining resolution dated March 23, 1998. They further alleged that the justices perpetrated injustice by promulgating the August 21, 1998 decision and by issuing an execution pending appeal writ dated September 21, 1998, despite a petition then pending in the Supreme Court. The complaint particularly targeted Justice Demetria, as ponente, for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct, and it also implicated Atty. Marigomen and Rivamonte due to their respective roles in the issuance, release, and execution of the questioned orders.

Proceedings Before the Supreme Court and the Parties’ Submissions

The Court required the respondents to file their comments on May 4, 2001, with the deadline set within ten (10) days from receipt. By May 31, 2001, Justices Barcelona and Barrios and Division Clerk Marigomen filed a joint comment asserting innocence. By June 21, 2001, Justice Demetria filed his comment, asserting good faith and adopting the defenses of his co-respondents. Rivamonte filed his comment on October 4, 2001, stating that he merely complied with orders of superiors.

With respect to the March 23, 1998 restraining resolution, Barcelona alleged that his concurrence was done in good faith and based on deference to the ponente, Demetria, who allegedly knew the merits and the factual basis. Marigomen noted that she saw only two signatures and maintained it was permissible for a single justice to issue restraining orders, citing Rule 58, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 3, Section 9 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, as amended.

The Supreme Court addressed these defenses by first focusing on the irregular procedure for the March 23, 1998 restraining resolution. It underscored that the issue was not the Court of Appeals’ general authority to issue provisional relief pending petitions within its jurisdiction. What was questioned was the method by which the resolution was arrived at and served. The Court observed that only two members signed the March 23, 1998 resolution, while Justice Amin did not sign. It concluded that, in such circumstance, the resolution could not properly be received for filing and could not validly be served upon the parties. The Court characterized the apparent intent of the division members as one in which three justices were meant to act, and it held that the failure to secure the requisite collegiate action was procedurally fatal.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning on the March 23, 1998 Resolution

The Court recognized that a Court of Appeals member may issue a temporary restraining order, but it emphasized that such authority must be used sparingly and only in extreme necessity where compelling reasons exist to avoid grave injury. It further required submission for ratification at the very next session of the Court. The Court held that Demetria, as ponente, disregarded the operative procedural rules. It treated this disregard as inexcusable because the respondent was expected to know and observe those rules. The Court also invoked the controlling principle that when elementary legal requirements are violated, failure to know or observe the law constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

As to Marigomen, the Court rejected her explanation as deferential rather than rule-based. It held that, as division clerk of court, she was bound to maintain orderly division records and to monitor case progress. It further found her duty required that she immediately report noncompliance by the parties and that she should have alerted the ponente when incomplete signatures appeared on the restraining resolution, which was manifestly intended as a collegiate act. The Court held that she should not have released the resolution for service on the parties.

For Justice Barcelona, the Court absolved him from administrative complicity regarding the issuance of the restraining order. It reasoned that he had no knowledge of the lack of the third signature before promulgation. It also acknowledged that after affixing his signature, the resolution was not submitted to the chairman for promulgation and release by the division clerk. Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to evaluate the subsequent actions taken to enforce and implement the Court of Appeals decision pending appeal.

Execution Pending Appeal and the Court of Appeals’ Lack of Authority

The Court described as “grossly appalling” the immediate enforcement of the Court of Appeals decision pending appeal. It found that the Court of Appeals, in ordering the appointment of a special sheriff through its mailing

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 129824)

Parties and Procedural Posture

The complainants were the heirs of the late Justice Jose B. L. Reyes, represented by Adoracion Reyes, and the heirs of Dr. Edmundo A. Reyes, namely Ma. Teresa P. Reyes and Carlos P. Reyes.
The respondents were Justices Demetrio G. Demetria, Ramon A. Barcelona, and Roberto A. Barrios, and court personnel including Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen, Division Clerk of Court of the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, and Mr. Efren R. Rivamonte, Special Sheriff of the Court of Appeals mailing section.
The case proceeded as an administrative complaint before the Supreme Court.
The complaint sought discipline for alleged violations of Section 11, Rule 59 and Section 8, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, Sections 3.01 and 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
The Court required respondents to file comments within ten (10) days from notice.
Respondents filed joint and separate comments denying the charges, with Justice Demetria asserting good faith and Rivamonte claiming he merely complied with superiors’ orders.

Key Factual Allegations

The controversy originated from a simple ejectment case filed by the complainants against Metro Manila Builders, Inc. (Manila Builders).
The complainants’ predecessors-in-interest leased property to Manila Builders for twenty five (25) years under a contract executed on November 30, 1976.
The lease involved an area of more than one (1) hectare along Taft Avenue, Pasay City, with monthly rental ranging from P15,000.00 to P30,000.00.
The lease agreement required Manila Builders to cover improvements with insurance, and to maintain the premises in good, sanitary, and tenantable condition.
The complainants alleged breach of the lease terms, triggering the lessors’ right of unilateral rescission and demand to vacate.
On February 3, 1997, complainants filed an unlawful detainer case in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 45, and the court ruled for complainants on May 9, 1997, ordering eviction.
Complainants filed a motion for execution on May 16, 1997.
Manila Builders attempted appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 113, but the appeal was dismissed for failure to file an appeal memorandum on time.
Manila Builders elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on November 5, 1997.
The trial court granted execution on November 26, 1997, and the order was issued on December 1, 1997.
On December 8, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued an order restraining execution of the ejectment judgment.
On February 7, 1998, the Court of Appeals allowed withdrawal of Manila Builders’ appeal.
Manila Builders then filed in the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 231 an action for annulment of the ejectment judgment, and it sought a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.
The regional trial court dismissed the annulment action on April 14, 1998, holding that the remedy was appeal in due time, and that withdrawing the appeal amounted to abandonment.
On August 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision setting aside the trial court’s May 9, 1997 decision and ordering restoration of possession to Manila Builders, while permanently enjoining further disturbance until lease expiration.
Complainants later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court on September 14, 1998.
Despite the pendency of that petition, on September 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting execution pending appeal, and it included a finding of indirect contempt for private respondents and counsel, and directed them to restore possession.
On September 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution directing the mailing section to appoint a special sheriff to execute the August 21, 1998 decision.
On the same date, Efren R. Rivamonte was appointed special sheriff and proceeded to enforce the writ.
Respondents executed the writ, resulting in eviction of complainants and restoration of possession to Manila Builders.
Complainants alleged that they lost possession due to the malicious and unlawful issuance of the March 23, 1998 restraining order by Justices Demetria and Barcelona and the later execution pending appeal.

Administrative Charges

The complaint alleged violation of Section 11, Rule 59 and Section 8, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, and Sections 3.01 and 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The complaint invoked Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
The complaint focused particularly on Justices Demetria and Barcelona for the alleged irregularities surrounding the March 23, 1998 restraining order.
The complaint also accused the Court of Appeals respondents of perpetrating injustice by ordering execution pending appeal despite the Supreme Court petition being pending.
The Court’s disposition ultimately found liability only for Justice Demetria, while it dismissed the complaint against the other respondents with admonition or warning.

Contested Issues

The first issue concerned whether the Court of Appeals’ March 23, 1998 restraining resolution was validly issued and served when only two division members signed it.
The second issue concerned whether the Court of Appeals had authority to order execution pending appeal of its own decision and to cause execution despite the case being elevated to the Supreme Court.
The third issue concerned whether the issuance and execution actions showed bad faith, ill motive, or gross ignorance of the law warranting administrative sanctions.
The fourth issue concerned the extent of administrative responsibility of Atty. Marigomen as division clerk of court and Rivamonte as special sheriff acting under a belief of ministerial compliance.

Parties’ Positions

Justice Demetria asserted that the March 23, 1998 temporary restraining order had sound basis in law and jurisprudence and that he conducted thorough study before issuance.
Justice Barcelona claimed his concurrence in the restraining order was in good faith and based on deference to the ponente’s discretion and knowledge of the factual and legal merits.
Justice Barcelona’s posture treated the restraining act as compliant with the rules on a single justice’s authority to act on restraining matters.
Atty. Marigomen explained that seeing only two signatures was legally permissible under Rule 58, Section 2 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) and under Rule 3, Section 9 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, as amended.
Rivamonte argued that he only complied with orders of his superiors and claimed no malice or bad faith.
Respondents further argued that the Court of Appeals proceeded based on good reasons presented by Manila Builders, including alleged dep