Title
Heirs of Lopez, Sr. vs. Enriquez
Case
G.R. No. 146262
Decision Date
Jan 21, 2005
A land registration case involving disputed decrees and titles, with petitioners denied a lis pendens due to lack of standing.
heirs of lopez sr
enriquez
carpio

Case Summary (G.R. No. 146262)

Factual Background

In 1966 Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. filed an application for registration of title in the land registration court, docketed as LRC No. N-18887, and the court granted the application on 31 May 1966. That judgment became final and executory, with a certificate of finality issued on 8 March 1991. The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration, now the Land Registration Authority, prepared Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 purportedly dated 20 October 1977 in the names of the applicants, and the corresponding Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 were entered in the registration book and issued by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City on 18 August 1998.

Proceedings in the Land Registration Court

Petitioners, asserting succession to a purchaser, filed a motion on 16 July 1997 in LRC No. N-18887 to have the court consider a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta in favor of the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr., and prayed that the decree of registration issue in their names as successors-in-interest under Section 22, PD 1529. The land registration court gave due course to that motion and conducted hearings. Petitioners later filed, on 25 November 1998, a separate motion to declare Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 void.

Issuance of Decrees, Certificates, and the Date Irregularities

The decrees and OCTs bore inconsistent dates: the decrees were stamped with an issuance date of 20 October 1977 yet were signed and released only after the incumbent Administrator, Alfredo R. Enriquez, assumed office on 8 July 1998. In a letter dated 1 December 1998 the Administrator explained that the decrees had been prepared pursuant to the 1966 decision and an order for issuance dated 24 August 1993, but were actually forwarded to the Office of the Administrator on 8 August 1998 and signed and released between 8 and 13 August 1998; the October 1977 date on the decrees reflected an oversight. The Administrator declined to recall the decrees because the certificates of title had already been transcribed and released by the Register of Deeds.

Petitioners’ Application to Annotate a Notice of Lis Pendens and the Register of Deeds’ Denial

On 25 November 1998 petitioners applied to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City to annotate a notice of lis pendens on the backs of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604, attaching a copy of their 25 November 1998 motion. The Register of Deeds denied the application by letter dated 15 December 1998 on the ground that the application lacked the original petition or complaint upon which the office would base its action, and informed petitioners of their right to elevate the denial in consulta to the Office of the Administrator within five days.

Consulta to the LRA and the LRA’s Ruling

Petitioners elevated the denial to the Land Registration Authority on 14 January 1999 as Consulta No. 2879. In a resolution dated 21 May 1999 the LRA framed the sole question as whether a notice of lis pendens based on a motion to declare void decrees and titles is registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as interpreted in practice, the LRA held that only a party to a case has the legal personality to record a notice of lis pendens and that petitioners were mere movants whose personality the court had not admitted. The LRA concluded that because the land registration proceeding was in rem and an order of general default bound the whole world, petitioners should have moved to lift the order of general default; absent such admission of personality they could not file a registrable notice of lis pendens. The LRA therefore denied registration of the notice.

Court of Appeals Ruling

Petitioners sought relief from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993, arguing manifest error and grave abuse of discretion in the LRA’s ruling. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit on 29 November 2000, reaffirming the LRA’s view that only a party to an action may file a notice of lis pendens, and that petitioners lacked legal personality in LRC No. N-18887 because they had not first filed a motion to lift the order of general default.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Petitioners presented two issues for the Supreme Court’s resolution: whether petitioners’ motion to declare void the decrees issued by the Land Registration Authority constituted a proper basis for filing the notice of lis pendens, and whether petitioners could file the motion to declare the decrees issued by the land registration court null and void despite the fact that the court had not lifted the general order of default.

Supreme Court’s Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court found that petitioners had not complied with the statutory and doctrinal requisites for registration of a notice of lis pendens because they were not parties to LRC No. N-18887 as required by Section 76, PD 1529, and the relevant provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court held that the Register of Deeds correctly denied annotation of the notice of lis pendens.

Legal Basis: Doctrine and Requirements of Lis Pendens

The Court reviewed the doctrine of lis pendens and its purposes: to protect the rights of the party causing registration of the notice and to warn third persons that acquisition of the property is subject to the outcome of the pending litigation. The Court explained the twofold practical effect of a notice of lis pendens — to keep the subject matter within the court’s power until final judgment and to bind subsequent purchasers to the court’s decree — but emphasized that the filing of the notice does not create new rights or liens. The Court cited Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 76, PD 1529, which require that a notice state the institution of the action, the court where it is pending, the date of institution, a reference to the certificate of title, an adequate description of the land, and the registered owner. The Court concluded that these statutory requisites had not been met by petitioners because petitioners were not parties within the meaning of the law and therefore did not present the requisite pleading for the Register of Deeds to act upon.

Reconveyance as the Proper Remedy

The Court identified the appropriate remedy for the factual situation alleged by petitioners. It held that petitioners’ procedural course was materially defective because the proper remedy against registration procured by fraud is an action for reconveyance, grounded on Section 55 of Act No. 496 as amended by Act No. 3322. Reconveyance is an action in personam brought in the ordinary courts against the parties to the alleged fraud and not an action before the land registration court. The Court explained that reconveyance remains available so long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value, and that a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the certificate of title upon the institution of such an in personam action to protect the real owner’s claim.

Necessity and

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