Title
Heirs of Bacus vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 127695
Decision Date
Dec 3, 2001
Luis Bacus' heirs refused to honor a lease-to-buy option exercised by Faustino Duray. Courts ruled Duray validly exercised the option, upheld by the Supreme Court, ordering sale execution.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 127695)

Key Dates and Procedural Events

  • June 1, 1984: Lease and option-to-buy executed.
  • October 10, 1989: Death of lessor, Luis Bacus.
  • March 15, 1990: Durays notify Roque Bacus of willingness and readiness to exercise the option and request documentation (e.g., special power of attorney for absent heirs).
  • March 30, 1990: Adverse claim annotated on TCT No. 63269 covering the 2,000 sq. m. portion.
  • April 5, 1990: Durays file complaint for specific performance with the Lupon Tagapamayapa, presenting a bank manager’s certification concerning loan arrangements.
  • April 27, 1990: Complaint for specific performance with damages filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Civil Case No. CEB-8935.
  • October 30, 1990: Durays manifest issuance of a cashier’s check payable to petitioners (amount described variously in the record: P650,000; assigned error states P625,000).
  • August 3, 1991: RTC orders petitioners to execute deed of sale upon payment of P675,675 within 30 days.
  • November 29, 1996: Court of Appeals affirms RTC, finding timely exercise of option.
  • December 3, 2001: Supreme Court decision denying the petition and affirming the Court of Appeals (decision rendered under the 1987 Constitution framework).

Applicable Law and Authorities

  • Constitutional framework: 1987 Philippine Constitution (applicable given the decision date).
  • Relevant statutory and doctrinal authorities cited: Civil Code principles on reciprocal obligations (last paragraph of Art. 1169), case law including Nietes v. Court of Appeals (46 SCRA 654, 1972), Vermen Realty Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals (224 SCRA 549, 1993), Legaspi v. Court of Appeals (142 SCRA 82, 1986), and procedural distinctions on petitions under Rule 45 vs. Rule 65 (Medel v. People, G.R. No. 137143, Dec. 8, 2000).

Issues Presented for Supreme Court Review

  1. Whether the lessee (Durays), in exercising the option to buy, was required to deliver the purchase price or consign it in court prior to the execution of a deed of sale by the lessor’s heirs.
  2. Whether the Durays incurred delay (and thus forfeited their right) by not delivering the purchase price or consigning it on or before the expiration of the lease/option period.

Summary of Facts Relevant to the Issues

The Durays communicated their intention to exercise the option and took preparatory steps (letters, bank arrangements, adverse claim annotation, Lupon proceedings, and filing of suit) before the lease expired on May 31, 1990. Petitioners (heirs) refused to execute a deed of sale unless the purchase price was first delivered. The Durays later procured a banker’s certification regarding loan arrangements and, after the case was submitted for decision but before the trial court judgment, issued a cashier’s check in favor of the petitioners. Petitioners maintained that no valid tender or consignation had been made before the option expired and asserted that failure to deposit or consign the price meant noncompliance.

Court’s Legal Analysis — Reciprocity and Timing of Performance

The Supreme Court analyzed the option-to-buy within the framework of reciprocal obligations. Under Civil Code principles and controlling jurisprudence (Nietes, Vermen Realty), obligations in an option contract are reciprocal and generally require simultaneous performance: the buyer’s obligation to pay and the seller’s obligation to execute and deliver the deed are interdependent. The Court reiterated that notice of intent to exercise an option, together with readiness and preparedness to pay, can suffice as the buyer’s performance of its part at the time of election; actual payment is not required to be made prior to the seller’s execution of the deed where performance is mutually contingent.

Court’s Analysis — Consignation and Tender

The Court observed that consignation is a remedy appropriate when a debt is due and the creditor refuses or is unable to accept payment; consignation presupposes a valid tender. Where an obligation is not yet due because performance is reciprocal and contingent, consignation is not appropriate. The Court therefore rejected petitioners’ contention that failure to consign or actually deliver the purchase price before expiration defeated the Durays’ exercise of the option. The bank manager’s certification alone was not legal tender nor a consignation, but, combined with other acts demonstrating readiness, it was evidence of preparedness to pay.

Court’s Analysis — Evidence of Readiness and Absence of Delay

The Court accepted the factual findings that the Durays had sufficiently manifested readiness to perform prior to the option’s expiration: (a) written notices and correspondence indicating intent; (b) the bank certification regarding loan arrangements prepared before May 31, 1990; (c) annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT; (d) resort to the Lupon Tagapamayapa and filing suit before the expiration of the option. Because petitioners refused to perform their reciprocal obligation (execution of the deed) and conditioned performance on prior payment, the Court held that the Durays could not be deemed in delay. The subsequent issuance of a cashier’s check while the case was already submitted further buttressed the showing of readiness; the trial court appropriately considered the check in assessing preparedness to pay.

Court of Appeals’ Affirmation and Supreme Court’s Conclusion

The Court of Appeals’ factual findings and legal conclusions—that the Dur

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