Title
Heirs of Atega vs. Garilao
Case
G.R. No. 133806
Decision Date
Apr 20, 2001
Heirs contested CARP land acquisition, claiming non-agricultural classification; Supreme Court ruled certiorari valid but upheld denial of exemption due to insufficient evidence.
certiorari
denial
application for exemption

Case Summary (G.R. No. 133806)

Factual Background

Petitioners’ land was placed within the reach of compulsory acquisition and distribution under RA 6657. In December 1992, petitioners received notice from the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) that the property was subject to compulsory acquisition and distribution under the CARP. Petitioners protested before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), asserting that their land was classified as non-agricultural. The MARO allegedly ignored the protest, and on 9 September 1994, the PARO sent petitioners a Notice of Land Acquisition and Valuation.

In April 1996, petitioners filed with DAR-Region XIII an Application for Exemption from the coverage of CARP. The application was denied on 27 November 1996 by respondent Regional Director Isidro Dublado. The denial rested on the ground that the zoning authority invoked by petitioners, specifically SP Ordinance/Resolution No. 33-79, had not been submitted for approval to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), as allegedly required by DAR Administrative Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90.

Administrative Review and Dismissal by the Court of Appeals

After the denial, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the Resolution of the Regional Director. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground of prematurity. It ruled that petitioners should first have exhausted available administrative remedies, namely, by filing a motion for reconsideration of the Regional Director’s Resolution or by appealing the same to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform before resorting to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court further held that the Regional Director did not commit an abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, emphasizing that DAR Adm. Order No. 9-94 empowered Regional Directors to resolve protests involving coverage under RA 6657, and that the Regional Director’s finding on the absence of HLURB approval fell within that authority.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied, prompting the present petition.

Issues Raised by Petitioners

Petitioners asserted that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that their petition for certiorari was premature because they did not first file a motion for reconsideration before the Regional Director or appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. They further insisted that the Regional Director’s Resolution was a patent nullity for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Central to their second contention was their claim that SP Resolution No. 33-79 had in fact been submitted to and approved by the HLURB, and they supported that claim with a certification from the HLURB attached to their motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.

The Parties’ Positions on Judicial Review and Exhaustion of Remedies

The Supreme Court recognized that, under DAR Administrative Orders Nos. 9-94, 10-94, and 12-94, the remedy for a party aggrieved by the Regional Director’s decision was to file a motion for reconsideration; if denied, the party could appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Nevertheless, the Court held that, under the circumstances of the case, a motion for reconsideration before the Regional Director would have been futile.

The Court explained that after the Regional Director issued the denial on 27 November 1996, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform allegedly proceeded to cancel petitioners’ title and to transfer the property to designated beneficiaries. The cancellation and transfer were effected through the issuance of a collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00059320, dated as far back as 26 November 1994. Petitioners learned of that issuance only upon receipt of the assailed Resolution denying their exemption application. Given that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had already canceled the title and caused distribution to beneficiaries before the incidents involving the Regional Director’s resolution could be resolved, the Court reasoned that it was indeed unreasonable to expect the Regional Director to reverse course in reconsideration or to contradict the earlier posture of the Secretary.

Petitioners also argued that certiorari lay because the Regional Director’s ruling involved jurisdictional error. The Court, however, scrutinized the underlying claim of HLURB approval for the cited zoning measure.

Futility of Administrative Remedies and When Certiorari Lies

In addressing the propriety of judicial intervention, the Court reiterated that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It emphasized that the assessment of adequacy is not rigid; it rests on judicial discretion and depends on the case’s particular circumstances.

Here, the Court held that an appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform would appear to be a useless exercise. It reasoned that the Secretary had already canceled petitioners’ title, meaning that the Secretary had effectively concurred in the denial stance and, therefore, an appeal could no longer be considered an adequate remedy. Thus, although the Court found that the Court of Appeals’ reasoning on prematurity was not wholly correct, it sustained the ultimate finding on the absence of grave abuse in the denial of the exemption application.

The Court’s Evaluation of the Claim of HLURB Approval

On the merits, petitioners maintained that the Regional Director gravely abused his discretion when he ruled that SP Resolution No. 33-79 was not submitted to the HLURB for approval. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ reliance on the HLURB certification presented with the motion for reconsideration in the appellate court.

The Court explained that a meticulous review of the record revealed that the HLURB certification did not even mention, and could not reasonably be inferred to refer to, SP Resolution No. 33-79. It noted that SP Resolution No. 33-79, denominated as the Resolution Amending the General Policy on Zonification and Land Use Plan of the City of Butuan, was not the only local zoning measure involved. The City of Butuan also had SP Ordinance No. 102-78, described as the Revised Zoning Ordinance and providing for its administration and enforcement. Given that the certification referred to approval of a different zoning ordinance, the Court concluded that petitioners’ interpretation was misleading.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Regional Director’s conclusion that SP Resolution No. 33-79 was not submitted to, much less approved by, the HLURB. The Court observed that the Regional Director’s conclusion appeared to be based on another HLURB certification stating categorically that it was SP Ordinance No. 102-78 that had been submitted and approved.

Requirements for CARP Exemption and the Effect of the Cited Zoning Measures

The Court then applied the requirements for exemption as reflected in DAR Adm. Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90, which required that an Application for Exemption filed before the Regional Director be accompanied by an HLURB certification showing that the pertinent zoning ordinance had been approved by the HLURB prior to 15 June 1988, the date when the CARL took effect. In this case, the Court held that petitioners did not file the required accompanying HLURB certification. The Court treated this as fatal to the exemption application.

Even assuming arguendo that SP Ordinance No. 102-78 had accompanied the application, the Court held that such fact would not overturn its position. It reasoned that SP Ordinance No. 102-78 was a general zoning plan and lacked any categorical statement that the disputed property was classified as non-agricultural. The Court further noted that a later ordinance reclassified the disputed property from agricultural to non-agricultural. Specifically, on 8 April 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod adopted SP Resolution No. 246-94 reclassifying the use of the property owned by the Heirs of Pedro Atega.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Grave Abuse

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.

About Privacy Terms