G.R. No. L-952 - Haw Pia vs. San Jose

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-952)

Factual Background

In Cadastral Case No. 63, the right of conventional redemption claimed by Aurelia Altea over lot No. 8610 was litigated between her and Haw Pia. The Court of First Instance of Tayabas decided the case, and the matter was later appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in a decision dated August 31, 1940 upheld Altea’s redemption right. The Court of Appeals fixed the redemption price at P490 (as reflected in Exhibits A and B of the petition).

After the redemption price had been declared to be P490, the record showed that Altea consigned that sum with the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas at some time in September 1940, although the petition also reflected that, according to Exhibit B, the consignment had been made before October 31, 1940, and had been authorized by the Court’s order of September 30, 1940. Subsequent proceedings in the case culminated in an order of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas dated January 13, 1941, decreeing, among others, that the Register of Deeds register on the Certificate of Title covering lot No. 8610 the right of redemption, effective until August 2, 1942 (Exhibit C).

On appeal, the order of January 13, 1941 was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the occupation government in a decision promulgated on July 27, 1943. Later, upon Altea’s motion of December 1, 1943 and an amended motion of December 15, 1943, the Court of First Instance issued an order dated January 6, 1944 directing three consequential acts: first, requiring Haw Pia, within ten days from notice, to deliver to the Register of Deeds the owner’s duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 43125 for cancellation insofar as lot No. 8610; second, ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel said certificate and issue a new one in Altea’s favor if Haw Pia failed to deliver the duplicate; and third, ordering the clerk or the Provincial Treasurer to deliver to Haw Pia the P490 consigned for redemption, while reserving to Altea the right, in a separate action, to claim from Haw Pia the fruits of the land from the time Altea would be deemed owner. The January 6, 1944 order thus tied together cancellation of the title and payment of the redemption price upon the consummation of the redemption mechanism.

Court of First Instance Orders and Reconsideration Proceedings

Concerning the issuance and implementation of the January 6, 1944 order, the decision reflected that after counsel for Haw Pia filed a petition for continuance on December 14, 1943, the Court continued consideration until January 6, 1944, and then entered the questioned order.

After the January 6, 1944 order, Haw Pia filed three motions for reconsideration, each denied by the Court of First Instance as shown by Judge Ramon R. San Jose’s order dated August 30, 1946 (Exhibit J). The August 30, 1946 order recounted that on January 18, 1944, Haw Pia filed its first motion for reconsideration. Altea filed a written reply on February 9, 1944. The Court denied Haw Pia’s first motion for reconsideration in an order dated September 26, 1944.

Haw Pia then filed a second motion for reconsideration on October 12, 1944, and while that was pending, it filed another motion on August 9, 1946. The August 30, 1946 order stated that the second motion was a repetition of the first and was denied on that ground. As to the third motion for reconsideration, the Court held that Haw Pia again raised issues regarding the consignment of the P490 and claimed reimbursement of alleged expenses under articles 1509 and 1518 of the Civil Code, but those issues had already been resolved when the Court considered and denied the first motion for reconsideration. The Court further added that as to whether the Register of Deeds properly cancelled the original title and issued a transfer certificate, such question could not be raised in a motion for reconsideration because it was a separate issue not resolvable in the incident. All these denials were anchored on the procedural posture that the motions merely reiterated matters already determined, and on limitations as to what may be addressed through reconsideration.

The Petition and Issue Raised

The petition attacked the January 6, 1944 order. The Court noted that the petitioner’s submissions included the claim that the order had become impossible of execution, because, according to Haw Pia, the redemption amount consigned in September or October 1940 was later “frozen” by the Japanese authorities, and that the present government had not made provision for payment to this day. The Court treated that argument as an auxiliary contention, but emphasized that the jurisdictional or procedural question regarding the proper remedy was decisive.

The petition sought relief by certiorari, and it was therefore necessary to determine whether the January 6, 1944 order, and the subsequent orders denying reconsideration, were appealable, such that certiorari could not substitute for the available appellate remedy.

The Parties’ Contentions on Remedy and Execution

Haw Pia’s attack on the January 6, 1944 order centered on alleged impossibility of execution due to wartime circumstances. The petitioner contended that she could not collect the consigned P490 because of the asserted freezing and the alleged failure of the post-war government to provide for payment. The decision recorded, however, that the Court viewed any loss from this circumstance as attributable to the petitioner if consignation had been validly made and complied with the legal requisites.

On the other hand, the controlling considerations addressed by the Court focused on remedy. The Court held that the petition for certiorari could not prosper because appeal was the proper remedy, given the nature and effects of the order challenged.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court relied on Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Payva (44 Phil., 624). In Payva, the Court dealt with a motion under section 72 of Act No. 496, and confronted the contention that an order issued pursuant to that provision was not appealable. The Court in Payva denied the motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the order appealed from was appealable because it resolved important questions regarding the parties’ rights, raised issues not definitively adjudicated earlier, and required the surrender of the certificate of title for an operation that necessarily entailed the cancellation of the surrendered certificate and the issuance of a new one in favor of a different owner. The Court held that the facts in the instant case were very similar to those in Payva and that the Payva rule was therefore perfectly applicable.

Applying the Payva reasoning, the Court treated the January 6, 1944 order as the kind of order that resolved rights between the parties, required consequential acts affecting the certificate of title, and necessarily resulted in cancellation and issuance of title in favor of the redemption claimant. Accordingly, the challenged order was appealable, and the petitioner’s resort to certiorari could not replace the proper remedy of appeal.

The decision further addressed the petitioner’s argument on impossibility of execution due to wartime freezing. Even assuming impossibility of collection and a failure by the government to provide for payment, the Court held that the loss, if any, had to be borne by Haw Pia. This conclusion was supported by the doctrine that valid consignation extinguishes the obligation and relieves the debtor of liability for risks that later occur to the thing due and consigned, without the debtor’s acts causing the loss. The Court cited Art. 1176 of the Civil Code: if the creditor refuses without reason to accept tender, the debtor may relieve liability through consignation; consignation also produces the same effect when made in the absen

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-952)

The case originated from a cadastral proceeding where lot No. 8610 became the subject of a dispute in cadastral case No. 63 under G.L.R.O. cadastral record No. 1019.
The petitioner, Haw Pia, and the respondent Aurelia Altea litigated over the right of conventional redemption asserted by Altea as the assignee of Valeriano Niala.
The respondents included Ramon R. San Jose, Judge of Court of First Instance of Quezon, the Register of Deeds of Quezon, and Aurelia Altea.
The petition sought relief against an order of January 6, 1944 issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas (now Quezon), later reiterated and effectively confirmed by an order of August 30, 1946.
The Court dismissed the petition, holding that certiorari was not the proper remedy and that, under the governing law and circumstances, the consignation produced its legal effects.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Haw Pia was the petitioner challenging the orders of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas (Quezon) relating to the redemption of lot No. 8610.
Aurelia Altea obtained affirmance of her claimed redemption right in the appellate proceedings that followed the trial court’s decision.
The procedural posture centered on challenges to the Court of First Instance’s January 6, 1944 order, which required delivery of the title owner’s duplicate, cancellation and issuance of a new certificate, and delivery of the redemption price to Haw Pia.
The petitioner filed multiple motions for reconsideration against the January 6, 1944 order, all of which were denied, as reflected in the August 30, 1946 order signed by Judge Ramon R. San Jose.
The Court treated the petition for certiorari as the direct attack on the January 6, 1944 order, despite its effective reiteration and confirmation in the August 30, 1946 order.
The Court ruled that the petition could not prosper because appeal was available and should have been pursued.

Key Factual Allegations

In the cadastral dispute over lot No. 8610, Altea claimed the right of conventional redemption as assignee of Valeriano Niala.
The litigation reached the Court of Appeals, which on August 31, 1940 upheld Altea’s redemption right and fixed the redemption price at P490.
After the Court of Appeals declared the redemption price as P490, Altea consigned the amount with the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas in September 1940, and the record also described authorization and timing that varied by reference to the petition.
On January 13, 1941, the Court of First Instance decreed that the Register of Deeds should register on the relevant Certificate of Title the redemption right lasting until August 2, 1942.
Upon appeal, the order was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the occupation government in a decision promulgated on July 27, 1943.
Altea then moved to secure further implementation of the redemption result, leading to the Court of First Instance’s January 6, 1944 order.
The January 6, 1944 order directed that Haw Pia deliver the owner’s duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 43125 for cancellation as to lot No. 8610; if Haw Pia failed, the Register of Deeds was to cancel and issue a new certificate in favor of Altea.
The same order directed that the clerk of the court or the Provincial Treasurer deliver to Haw Pia the P490 consigned for redemption, while reserving to Altea the right in a separate action to claim the fruits from Haw Pia.
The petitioner contended that execution had become impossible because the consigned P490 was allegedly “frozen” by Japanese authorities and that the present government had not provided for payment.
The Court noted that, regardless of alleged post-war contingencies, any resulting loss would be borne by Haw Pia if the consignation had been valid.

The January 6 1944 Order

The Court of First Instance ordered Haw Pia to deliver, within ten days from notice, the owner’s duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 43125 for cancellation as to lot No. 8610.
The order provided a default mechanism whereby, upon Haw Pia’s failure to comply within the fixed period, the Register of Deeds would cancel the certificate as to the lot and issue another certificate in favor of Aurelia Altea.
The order required delivery of the consigned P490 to Haw Pia by the clerk of the court or the Provincial Treasurer.
The order expressly reserved for Altea the right, in a separate action, to claim the fruits of the land after Altea came