Title
Guinto vs. Sto. Nino Long-Zeny Consignee
Case
G.R. No. 250987
Decision Date
Mar 29, 2022
A worker claimed illegal dismissal after being told not to return to work; SC ruled in his favor, awarding backwages, leave pay, and attorney’s fees, but denied separation pay and 13th month pay.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 250987)

Factual Background

Petitioner alleged that he had been employed by respondents since August 1997. He initially worked as a warehouseman and was later appointed as a “sizer,” which he described as selecting, sorting, and arranging aquatic animals according to size. He also averred that respondents directed him, from time to time, to clean trays used for their business, the office, and the warehouse.

Petitioner claimed that on November 27, 2015, Zenaida told him at her house: “Wag ka [nang] papasok at lumayas ka.” He added that the following morning he received a text message from “Nam-Nam,” a representative of Zenaida, stating: “Pare, wag ka [nang] papasok pati ang anak mo sabi ni Ate.” Petitioner stated that mediation failed, prompting him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal.

To establish that he was a regular employee, petitioner relied on: Angelo’s Certification stating that he was employed as a warehouseman “from August 1997 up to present”; a work schedule posted at respondents’ premises; an affidavit of Rizalito G. Alfonso, a dispatcher of JC Garcia Consignee (an establishment similar and adjacent to the Consignee) attesting to petitioner’s employment; petitioner’s payslips; and affidavits and a katunayan executed by porters at the Orani Fishport indicating that petitioner was an employee of respondents and not a member of any porters’ association there. Petitioner also emphasized that his name did not appear in the list of associated porters because he was allegedly a regular employee of respondents.

Respondents denied that there was an employer-employee relationship. They asserted that petitioner was a porter at the Orani Fishport and that, although porters and sizers normally grouped together and were associated with consignations of their choice, they were never considered employees of a consignation.

To support their position, respondents submitted affidavits of porters who attested that petitioner rendered services to other fishpond owners and was not their employee; affidavits from petitioner’s relatives suggesting that he was merely a nephew of Zenaida and worked as a porters/sizers without employer status with fishpond owners; and mayor’s permit applications for several years showing only two “regular employees” of the Consignee.

On dismissal, petitioner insisted that he was terminated without just cause and due process. On benefits, petitioner claimed entitlement to service incentive leave pay and thirteenth month pay as a regular employee, and he sought exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Respondents, in turn, contended that the certification was only an “accommodation document,” that petitioner’s supporting documents failed to establish employment, and that handwritten notes were “cuenta” or bills earned by porters as a group and divided among themselves.

Labor Arbiter Proceedings

In the LA’s October 18, 2017 Decision, the LA found that petitioner was indeed respondents’ employee. The LA relied largely on Angelo’s certification and rejected respondents’ explanation that the certification was merely an accommodation document. The LA reasoned that respondents could not vary the wording of the certification without violating evidentiary rules.

On the illegal dismissal issue, the LA held that respondents had interposed no defense other than denial. It thus concluded that petitioner was illegally dismissed and awarded service incentive leave pay and thirteenth month pay, in addition to backwages, separation pay, and attorney’s fees, while dismissing other claims for lack of merit.

NLRC Appellate Ruling

Respondents appealed to the NLRC. In the NLRC’s May 2, 2018 Decision, the NLRC agreed with the LA that petitioner was a regular employee. It considered the certification, affidavits, work schedule, attendance records, and payslips, and it found that respondents exercised control by directing petitioner’s work within its premises and providing instruction.

However, the NLRC reversed on illegal dismissal. It ruled that aside from petitioner’s bare assertions, he failed to adduce corroborating evidence that he was actually dismissed by respondents. For remedy, it ordered reinstatement without backwages and denied separation pay. It also deleted thirteenth month pay on the ground that petitioner was paid on a commission basis. It awarded service incentive leave pay and attorney’s fees, concluding that petitioner was compelled to litigate to protect his rights.

The NLRC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on June 20, 2018.

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, arguing that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

In its May 24, 2019 Decision, the CA dismissed the petition and sustained the NLRC’s outcomes in full. The CA held that the evidence supported petitioner’s regular employment status and that the NLRC’s findings were supported. It also affirmed that petitioner did not establish the fact of dismissal. The CA observed that filing a complaint for illegal dismissal did not ipso facto prove that petitioner was terminated.

On monetary awards, the CA upheld the award of service incentive leave pay, affirmed the denial of thirteenth month pay based on the commission basis finding, and sustained reinstatement without separation pay, citing the doctrine that where there is neither dismissal by the employer nor abandonment by the employee, reinstatement is proper but without backwages, with Pu-od v. Ablaze Builders, Inc. and Borja v. Minoza as referenced authorities.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a December 12, 2019 Resolution.

Issues Raised in the Supreme Court

In the Supreme Court, petitioner argued that the findings of regular employment by the LA and NLRC had become final because respondents did not assail the CA rulings on that point. He also contended that he was illegally dismissed. He argued that respondents’ failure to specifically deny the allegations on the circumstances of his termination should be deemed an admission under Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, as applied through the NLRC’s procedural rules. He further argued for entitlement to full backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to strained relations, and he insisted on entitlement to service incentive leave pay, thirteenth month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. He also sought solidary liability of Angelo and Zenaida with the Consignee.

Respondents countered, among others, that the petition should be limited to questions of law, and that the NLRC properly found that petitioner failed to prove the fact of dismissal by substantial evidence.

Legal Basis for Review and the Court’s Approach

The Supreme Court held that under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. As a general rule, it is not a trier of facts. The Court explained, however, that labor cases present recognized exceptions when the NLRC’s factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence or when grave abuse of discretion is shown.

It reiterated that grave abuse of discretion exists when findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence—defined as the relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The Court also emphasized that in Rule 45 review of labor cases, it looks through the CA’s decision to determine whether the CA correctly found the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC’s ruling.

The Court then found a basis to review the conflicting factual findings of the LA and NLRC because it concluded that the NLRC’s conclusion that petitioner failed to prove dismissal lacked substantial evidentiary support.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling on Illegal Dismissal

The Supreme Court held that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it reversed the LA and dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint for lack of merit.

The Court relied on the procedural rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to establish the validity of dismissal, while the fact of dismissal, if disputed, must be proven by the complainant. It then applied the procedural mechanism that, through the NLRC Rules, the Rules of Court may apply suppletorily. It cited Section 3, Rule 1 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure on the suppletory application of the Rules of Court, and Section 11, Rule 8 that material averments not specifically denied are deemed admitted.

The Court reasoned that respondents did not specifically deny petitioner’s allegations regarding the circumstances of his dismissal: that on November 27, 2015, Zenaida told him to leave and not to report, and that the following morning he received a text message from Zenaida’s representative telling him not to come to work. The respondents’ defense focused on employer-employee relationship and the nature of petitioner’s role, but it did not directly rebut petitioner’s material allegations about the dismissive act itself. Hence, the Court deemed admitted petitioner’s allegations as to the fact of dismissal.

The Supreme Court also treated petitioner’s regular employment status as settled with finality. It noted that there was no showing that respondents assailed the regular employment finding with the CA via their own petition for certiorari, and thus the issue could no longer be relitigated before the Court.

Given these circumstances, the Court held that petitioner, a regular employee, had been illegally dismissed. It grounded the illegal dismissal finding on the deemed admission of dismissal and the absence of proof of a just or valid cause for termination.

Relief: Reinstatement, Backwages, and Separation Pay

Having found illegal dismissal, the Court addressed relief. It held that petitioner was entitled to full backwages under Article 294 of the Labor Code.

On petitione

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