Case Summary (G.R. No. 138703)
Factual Antecedents
Media disclosures revealed multiple irregularities:
• Smartmatic supplied incorrect ultraviolet ink, rendering PCOS security marks unreadable and prompting Comelec to disable UV detectors and purchase lamps at P30 million.
• An overpriced, non-bidded P690 million contract for secrecy folders was canceled after Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. exposed the scheme.
• A lone-bid indelible ink from Texas Resources Corporation failed testing yet was used pending disputed re-bidding.
• PCOS machines in Hong Kong malfunctioned, allegedly due to climate; contingency procedures for broken machines were acknowledged.
• Comelec awarded Smartmatic a P500 million no-bid contract for ballot tracking as emergency procurement.
• En banc Comelec instructions permitted PCOS machines to transmit results without digital signatures, risking the use of non-precinct ballots and pre-loaded data.
• 76,000 compact flash cards were recalled days before the election after widespread test failures.
• Proposals for parallel manual counts were rejected.
Reliefs Sought
Petitioners sought an order compelling Comelec to disclose:
- Status of negotiations and contracts (including non-bidded procurements).
- Nature, security, and anti-tampering measures for machines, memory cards, software, and facilities.
- Content of the source code review under RA 9369 and public access modalities.
- Schedule, venue, and specifications of the random manual audit required by law.
- Protocols for activating manual voting if machine failure occurs and safeguards against result manipulation.
- Certification by the Technical Evaluation Committee that the Automated Election System (AES) is fully functional and that a continuity plan is in place.
- Department of Science and Technology certification that all 240,000 Board of Election Inspectors are trained in the AES.
- Status of investigations and prosecutions related to procurement irregularities.
Comelec’s Defenses
Comelec contended petitioners lacked standing and cause of action, citing no formal prior request for records. It relied on Roque v. Comelec, which found machine failure a remote possibility and upheld AES security measures, and prayed for dismissal.
Jurisdiction and Standing
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, any citizen may invoke mandamus to obtain information on matters of public concern. Petitioners, as members of the general public, satisfy standing without showing special injury.
Constitutional and Jurisprudential Basis
• 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 7: Recognizes the right to information and access to official records on matters of public concern.
• Article II, Section 28: Mandates full public disclosure of government transactions.
• Valmonte v. Belmonte, Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, and Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino: Establish that transparency is essential to democracy and that mandamus may enforce the disclosure duty.
Statutory Mandates for Disclosure
• Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) Section 52(j): Requires Comelec to educate and inform the electorate.
• Code of Conduct (RA 6713) Section 5(e): Public documents must be accessible during reasonable hours.
• Government Procurement Reform Act (RA 9184) Section 3: Governs transparency, competitiveness, accountability, and public monitoring in procurement.
• RA 9369 (amending RA 8436): Declares policy of transparent, credible automated elections (Section 1); mandates continuity plans (Section 11); requires open source code review (Section 12); and prescribes random manual audits (Section 24).
• RA 9525 Section 2: Conditions supplemental election funding on transparency and accuracy measures.
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 138703)
Facts of the Case
- Petitioners filed a special civil action for mandamus on 23 April 2010, seeking to compel the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to disclose full details of its preparations for the 10 May 2010 polls.
- They invoked their constitutional rights to suffrage and to information, citing alarming events and procurement controversies surrounding the Automated Election System (AES).
- A series of media disclosures alleged wrong ultraviolet ink, malfunctioning PCOS machines, overpriced ballot secrecy folders, failed indelible ink bids, overseas machine failures, emergency procurement without bidding, and relaxed security protocols for digital signatures.
- These incidents raised public concern over the credibility, security, and integrity of the upcoming automated elections.
Antecedents and Procurement Scandals
- Smartmatic–Total Information Management supplied incorrect ultraviolet ink, forcing Comelec to disable detection and spend P30 million on new lamps.
- Allegations of overpriced purchase of nearly two million ballot secrecy folders at P380 each, leading to a canceled P690 million contract award.
- Dr. Arwin Serrano, citizens’ arm representative, reported that Texas Resources Corporation’s indelible ink failed quality tests but was used nonetheless; Comelec initially planned to re-bid but later retracted.
- PCOS machines in Hong Kong failed under cold and humid conditions; Smartmatic acknowledged possible hardware and operational failures and contingency procedures.
- Comelec awarded Smartmatic a P500 million contract for ballot tracking and delivery as an emergency procurement without public bidding.
- En banc resolution allowed any PCOS machine—including 10,000 reserves—to transmit results without digital signatures, raising risks of pre-loaded or non-precinct-specific ballots.
- Days before the election, Comelec recalled 76,000 compact flash cards after widespread machine test failures, halting testing for reconfiguration.
- Proposal for a parallel manual count was unanimously discarded despite IT experts’ recommendations.
Petitioners’ Prayer for Relief
- Detailed status of Comelec’s negotiations and contracts for election supplies, including those without bidding.
- Nature, security, and anti-hacking/tampering measures of all election machines, memory cards, software, and facilities.
- Content of the source code review under RA 9369 and public access modes.
- Schedule, venue, and specifications of the random manual audit mandated by RA 9369.
- Terms and protocols for implementing manual voting if elections fail.
- Readiness and safeguards for a manual fallback to prevent result manipulation.
- Certification from the Technical Evaluation Committee on full functionality of the AES and existence of a continuity plan (RA 9369, Sec. 11).
- Certification protocol and actual DOST certification that 240,000 BEIs are trained on AES use (RA 9369, Sec. 3).
- Status of investigations and prosecutions of those responsible for procurement irregularities.
Respondent’s (Comelec) Arguments
- Petitioners lack legal standin