G.R. No. L-14559 - Madrinan vs. Sinco

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-14559)

Factual Background and Execution Sale

The RTC’s final judgment in Civil Case No. 0809 directed petitioner to pay P 64,870.00 plus interest at 18% per annum from August 3, 1990 until full payment. After the judgment attained finality, the court issued a writ of execution. Medina levied on thirty (30) parcels of land owned by petitioner and set the properties for public auction on May 27, 1993, serving petitioner with the Notice of Levy and Auction Sale. At the auction, the properties were sold to respondent for P 308,701.00, and Medina executed a Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale in respondent’s favor.

Petitioner received the certificate of sale on August 20, 1993. Petitioner asserted that she had been willing to pay amounts she considered due under the judgment and that she offered P 112,574.00 to both respondent and the deputy sheriff, but they refused the offers. Petitioner claimed the deputy sheriff insisted that she remit P 308,701.00, the auction purchase price.

Civil Case No. 2096 and the Dismissal of the Complaint

On September 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35, captioned for redemption of foreclosed properties, consignation of payment and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 2096. Petitioner alleged, among others, that her account under the judgment in Civil Case No. 0809 amounted to P 112,574.00, that she had attempted to pay that amount but was rejected, and that she was depositing P 112,574.00 with the court.

Respondent denied any cause of action and raised forum shopping. After petitioner failed to redeem, Medina executed a Deed of Final Sale on August 16, 1995 in favor of respondent, and the Register of Deeds subsequently issued titles on August 31, 1995. On November 8, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 2096. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 56850), but the CA dismissed the appeal on August 10, 1998 due to petitioner’s failure to file her appellants brief. The CA denied reconsideration on December 13, 1998, and entry of judgment was made on February 10, 1999.

Petition for Annulment Filed in the Court of Appeals

On August 29, 2000, petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition captioned for annulment of the writ of execution against respondent and Deputy Sheriff Medina, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60427. Petitioner alleged that Medina violated Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by levying on and selling at public auction all thirty (30) parcels instead of selling only such part as was amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs. She also invoked Section 21, Rule 39, asserting that where the sale involves real property consisting of several lots, the lots must be sold separately and not all sold together for a lump sum. Petitioner maintained that Medina’s act of selling all thirty parcels together for a single lump sum purchase price of P 308,701.00 exceeded the amount due under the RTC judgment, which she characterized as P 64,870.00 plus interest or a total of P 112,574.00 based on her interpretation of the decision.

Petitioner anchored her position on Buan v. Court of Appeals. She prayed that the assailed writ of execution be declared null and void, that the sheriff’s final deed of sale be annulled, and that ownership revert to her.

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals

On September 25, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner’s remedy was to appeal from the RTC decision, not to file a petition for annulment. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that her petition was truly one for annulment of the implementation of the writ of execution due to excessive levy and sale, which she claimed could be pursued under Rule 47.

On February 5, 2001, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration. It held that petitioner’s failure to pursue available remedies in the RTC was due to her own fault. It reasoned that the proper remedy was to appeal from the trial court’s decision. It noted that petitioner had appealed but that her failure to file her appellants brief led to dismissal. The CA therefore refused to treat the petition as an appropriate Rule 47 remedy.

Issues Raised Before the Supreme Court

In the petition before the Supreme Court, petitioner presented two principal assignments of error. First, she contended that the CA erred in treating her petition as not cognizable under Rule 47, asserting that Rule 47 allows annulment not only of decisions but also of final orders. She further maintained that the writ of execution constituted the final order envisioned by Rule 47, and she urged reliance on Buan v. Court of Appeals.

Second, petitioner asserted that the CA erred by refusing to grant annulment because Medina’s levy and sale allegedly violated Sections 15 and 21 of Rule 39.

Nature of the Petition: Caption Not Controlling; Material Allegations Prevail

The Court rejected petitioner’s theory that her CA petition was properly anchored on Rule 47. The Court held that the caption of a petition was not controlling. It reiterated that the nature of an action or petition depended on the material allegations therein, regardless of whether the petitioner would be entitled to the relief prayed for.

The Court examined the CA petition and concluded that it was directed at invalidating the deputy sheriff’s levy of petitioner’s properties, the public auction sale, and the resulting Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale and Final Deed of Sale. The Court observed that petitioner did not assail the RTC’s decision or its order for the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, petitioner’s prayer that the writ of execution be nullified did not control the character of the petition; the petition’s substance focused on the alleged irregularities of the sheriff’s acts and the execution sale itself.

The Court emphasized that Rule 47 applied only to petitions to annul a judgment or final order and resolution in civil actions, grounded on extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or lack of due process. It explained that a final order or resolution was one that disposed of the subject matter in its entirety or terminated a particular proceeding, leaving nothing to be done except to enforce by execution what had been determined. It further held that Rule 47 did not apply to an action seeking annulment of the levy and sale and the sheriff’s certificate of sale. It likewise held that the writ of execution was not a final order or resolution. The writ of execution was issued to carry out the court’s mandate in enforcing a final judgment. It was a judicial process that implemented enforcement, not a terminal act constituting a final order amenable to Rule 47 annulment.

Proper Remedy: Motion Before the Trial Court, Then Certiorari

On the second aspect of petitioner’s argument, the Court held that the remedy to challenge the alleged irregularities attendant to the levy and sale was not a petition for annulment in the Court of Appeals. The Court stated that irregularities in the sheriff’s execution acts were properly raised through a motion before the trial court that issued the writ. It grounded this in Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato, where the Court held that once a court acquired jurisdiction it retained it until termination, and that irregularities in the issuance and execution of writs should be referred to the same tribunal that rendered the decision, since it had inherent power to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. If the trial court rendered an adverse resolution, the remedy from such resolution was certiorari under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Applying these principles, the Court noted that petitioner did not file a motion to annul the levy and sale after the sheriff sold the properties on May 27, 1993, and after Medina executed the final deed of sale. Instead, petitioner filed another complaint in the RTC under Civil Case No. 2096 seeking redemption and consignation. The Court treated the institution of Civil Case No. 2096 as an admission by petitioner that the levy and sale were in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Afterthought Character of the CA Petition

The Court further found that petitioner’s petition in the Court of Appeals appeared to be an afterthought. It reasoned that petitioner filed the Rule 47-type petition only after her appeal from Civil Case No. 2096 had been dismissed due

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-14559)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Aurora Guiang filed a petition assailing the Court of Appeals dismissal of her case captioned CA-G.R. SP No. 60427 for annulment of a writ of execution.
Eva T. Co, doing business under the business name etc Lending Investor, opposed the petition and relied on the finality of the judgment and the impropriety of the pleaded remedy.
The controversy began with a Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21 decision in Civil Case No. 0809, which later became final and executory.
After the execution sale, Guiang initiated Civil Case No. 2096 in RTC Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35 for redemption and consignation, and the complaint was dismissed.
Guiang appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals, but the CA dismissed the appeal due to her failure to file an appellants brief, and the dismissal became final.
Guiang then filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the writ of execution, which the CA dismissed and denied reconsideration.

Key Factual Allegations

The RTC Branch 21 rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 0809 ordering Guiang to pay P 64,870.00 as principal plus 18% interest per annum from August 3, 1990 until fully paid.
After the judgment became final, the trial court issued a writ of execution upon the respondent’s motion.
Deputy Sheriff David R. Medina levied thirty (30) parcels of land owned by Guiang, scheduled the properties for public auction, and served a Notice of Levy and Auction Sale.
The properties were sold on May 27, 1993 at public auction to Eva T. Co for P 308,701.00, after which Medina issued a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale in the respondent’s favor.
Guiang received a copy of the certificate of sale on August 20, 1993.
Guiang asserted that she attempted to pay the account she claimed was due, and she alleged she deposited with the court P 112,574.00.
According to Guiang, the deputy sheriff acted wrongfully by levying and selling all thirty (30) parcels for a lump sum, rather than selling only so much as was sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt and costs.
Guiang further alleged that the execution sale violated Section 21, Rule 39 because the lots were separate home lots and should have been sold separately, not collectively and lump-sum.

Legal Issues Raised

The first issue centered on whether Rule 47 of the Rules of Court authorized annulment of the writ of execution and the processes taken thereunder through a petition filed directly in the Court of Appeals.
The second issue concerned whether the deputy sheriff’s levy and sale allegedly violating Sections 15 and 21 of Rule 39 rendered the writ of execution and related execution processes null and void.
A related procedural issue was whether Guiang should have challenged the levy and sale through a motion before the trial court rather than through a Rule 47 petition after her appeal dismissal.

Statutory and Rule Framework

Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was invoked by Guiang as a vehicle to annul a judgment or final order and resolution in civil actions on specified jurisdictional or due process grounds.
The Court emphasized that Rule 47 coverage is limited to petitions to annul a judgment or final order and resolution, not to actions targeting the sheriff’s ministerial acts in execution.
The Court treated a final order or resolution as one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding, leaving only execution.
The Court stressed that a writ of execution is issued to enforce a final order or judgment and is therefore not itself a final order or resolution contemplated by Rule 47.
Section 15, Rule 39 was cited by Guiang to support the alleged impropriety of levying and selling more property than necessary to satisfy the judgment debt and costs.
Section 21, Rule 39 was cited to support the alleged requirement that real property consisting of several home lots must be sold separately.
The Court also referenced that, for adverse rulings from the trial court, the proper remedy could be certiorari under Rule 65 upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The decision relied on Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato to explain that irregularities in execution should first be brought to the court that issued the writ.

Contentions of the Parties

Guiang argued that the caption of her petition should not control, but that her allegations showed a proper Rule 47 petition because the writ of execution had become the final order envisaged by the rule.
Guiang asserted that the trial court’s approval of the sheriff’s Sheriffs Certificate of Sale and Final Deed of Sale sanctioned the alleged wrongful implementation.
Guiang relied on Buan v. Court of Appeals to support the proposition that annulment under Rule 47 may extend beyond only decisions and include final orders.
Guiang contended that the alleged vio