Title
Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 188492
Decision Date
Aug 28, 2018
Conflict over appeal period for Voluntary Arbitrator decisions: 10 days under Labor Code vs. 15 days under Rules of Court. SC ruled 10 days for reconsideration, 15 days for CA review, favoring labor.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 202454)

Core Issue Presented

Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had become final and executory under Article 276 (10-day rule), thereby rendering the CA without jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ petition for review; and, more broadly, whether the 10-day period in Article 276 or the 15-day period in Rule 43 governs the reglementary period for appealing a voluntary arbitrator’s decision.

Relevant Factual Background

Pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728, GNC imposed a 7% tuition fee increase for school year 2006–2007 and allocated a portion of the 70% net incremental proceeds to fund the retirement program. The unions challenged that unilateral disposition as contrary to Section 5(2). The parties submitted the dispute to voluntary arbitration. Voluntary Arbitrator Bacungan rendered a decision on June 16, 2008 in favor of GNC, holding that retirement benefits were “other benefits” chargeable to the 70% net incremental proceeds. The unions received a copy on June 16, 2008, sought and obtained from the CA an extension to file a petition for review, and filed their petition on July 16, 2008. GNC moved to dismiss on grounds that the award became final and executory after ten days per Article 276, making the CA devoid of appellate jurisdiction. The CA denied the Motion to Dismiss and later denied reconsideration; GNC then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Relevant Procedural and Jurisprudential Background

Historically, voluntary arbitrator awards were considered final and immediately executory but were nonetheless subject to limited judicial review (e.g., Oceanic Bic Division v. Romero). Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees recognized appeals from voluntary arbitrators’ awards to the Court of Appeals by petition for review under Rule 43, invoking Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (and similar administrative circulars) to provide a uniform appellate route. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions applied either a 15-day period (Rule 43) or a 10-day period (Article 276) inconsistently. Coca-Cola Bottlers (2005) referenced the 10-day statutory period; other decisions such as Sevilla Trading and Manila Midtown applied the 15-day Rule 43 period. Teng v. Pagahac (2010) clarified that the 10-day period in Article 276 should be understood as the period to file a motion for reconsideration before the voluntary arbitrator (promoting exhaustion of administrative remedies), with the 15-day Rule 43 period applying to the filing of a petition for review to the CA after resolution of the motion for reconsideration.

Supreme Court’s Holding

The Supreme Court dismissed GNC’s petition for certiorari and affirmed the CA resolution. The Court held that the petition for review under Rule 43 must be filed within 15 days pursuant to Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It construed the 10-day period in Article 276 as the period within which an aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration before the voluntary arbitrator (or, in specified contingencies, to seek a writ of execution), not as the exclusive period for seeking appellate review before the CA that would preclude the 15-day Rule 43 period once reconsideration is had and resolved.

Legal Reasoning — Interpretation and Harmonization of Conflicting Periods

  • Statutory and remedial framework: The Court recognized the textual presence of the 10-day finality clause in Article 276 but stressed that jurisprudence and administrative practice had long treated voluntary arbitrator awards as appealable to the CA under Rule 43. The Court sought a harmonized reading that respects both the Labor Code and the Rules of Court.
  • Function of the 10-day period: Following Teng v. Pagahac and construing Article 276 in the context of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court concluded that Congress intended the 10-day period to afford the aggrieved party the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration with the voluntary arbitrator. This approach promotes administrative correction of errors and avoids premature judicial intervention.
  • Application of the 15-day Rule 43 period: After resolution of the motion for reconsideration (or after the opportunity to file such a motion has been afforded), the aggrieved party may file a petition for review under Rule 43 within the 15-day reglementary period from notice pursuant to Section 4, Rule 43. Thus, the 15-day period governs the filing of the petition for review to the CA in line with established appellate practice.
  • On Rule versus statute: Although earlier decisions emphasized that rules of court are subordinate to statute, the Court resolved apparent conflicts by reading Article 276 as establishing a deadline for motions for reconsideration rather than an absolute bar to appellate review within fifteen days; this interpretation avoids a result where an appellant could be deprived of judicial review by a restrictive reading of the 10-day clause.

Disposition on the Motion to Dismiss and Scope of Certiorari

The Court reiterated that certiorari is not the ordinary remedy to review the denial of a motion to dismiss; certiorari corrects grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The C

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