Title
Grageda vs. Gomez
Case
G.R. No. 169536
Decision Date
Sep 21, 2007
Heirs of Juan Navia Grageda disputed partition of co-owned land; SC upheld final MCTC ruling, affirming Haudiny Grageda's share without waiver.
partition of land
dismissal of appeal
baseless arguments

Case Summary (G.R. No. 169536)

Factual Background

The owner of Lot No. 6386, with the residential house thereon, was Juan Navia Grageda, who died single and without issue on 27 July 1982. He left surviving relatives who became heirs, including petitioner Remigia Grageda, the daughters of Lauro Grageda (Dorotea Grageda Naga and Lina Grageda-Solano), and the six children of another late brother (Amado Grageda)—including Haudiny Grageda—as well as the two children of a third late brother (Moises Grageda), namely Mosadlino Grageda and Clarita Grageda-Imperial. A further brother, Rufo Grageda, also died single and without issue.

In July 1998, Dorotea Grageda-Naga and Lina Grageda-Solano filed with the MCTC a Complaint for partition of Lot No. 6386 and its improvements, docketed as Civil Case No. C-655. They impleaded as defendants the other heirs of Juan Navia Grageda. Of the defendants, only petitioner Remigia Grageda, Mosadlino Grageda, and Juan Morona Grageda tendered an Answer. In that Answer, they alleged, among others, that they did not know anyone named Lina Solano-Naga and that they had no interest in the property because it allegedly belonged to a third person not impleaded. They further claimed that the property had already been the subject of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Exchange among Juan Navia Grageda’s siblings and certain nephews and nieces executed soon after his death, and that the house on the lot was allegedly constructed at Remigia’s expense and, similarly, had become the property of a third person.

On 31 March 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. C-655, ordering partition of Lot No. 6386, including the house built thereon. The MCTC ruled that the defendants had not presented credible proof of any valid extrajudicial division that included the subject lot. It also found baseless the claim of third-person ownership, emphasizing the complete lack of proof, and noted the defendants’ admissions that they were staying in the house on the lot, which the MCTC viewed as inconsistent with the claim of third-person ownership. Applying intestate succession principles under the Civil Code, the MCTC held that the plaintiffs were co-heirs and co-owners, and that as co-owners they could demand partition under Article 494. It further held that the house should be included as an accessory to the land under Article 445.

The dispositive portion ordered partition of the lot into four (4) equal shares among Remegia Grageda, Heirs of Amado Grageda, Heirs of Moises Grageda, and Heirs of Lauro Grageda (with the latter represented by Dorotea and Lina). It required the parties to contribute equally for the expenses necessary to effect partition and directed payment of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and costs of suit against the defendants.

Orders for Partition and the Execution Dispute

On 16 January 2001, the MCTC issued an order commissioning Geodetic Engineer Ramon Magdaong to conduct a survey to implement the partition ordered in the March 31, 2000 Decision. The order instructed the commissioner to consider the value of the house as he partitioned the lot. It required the commissioner to appear, take his oath, convene the parties within ten days after his oath, permit objections during the survey, and submit a written report within fifteen days after completion.

However, on 22 October 2001, Dorotea Grageda-Naga and Lina Grageda-Solano manifested that the property had already been partitioned in accordance with the MCTC’s order. The record indicated that only the one-fourth share pertaining to the plaintiffs was segregated, leaving other portions of the lot still undivided.

In 9 May 2002, Haudiny Grageda and his brother Hipolito Grageda filed a separate complaint for partition among themselves and certain siblings of the one-fourth share in the lot pertaining to their late father, Amado Grageda, docketed as Civil Case No. C-691. In response, on 4 June 2002, some defendants moved to dismiss, raising, among others, the argument that since Haudiny and Hipolito had not filed their separate Answer in Civil Case No. C-655, they were deemed to have adopted the Answer filed by other answering defendants, which included claims that the property belonged to a third person.

On 9 September 2003, the MCTC dismissed Civil Case No. C-691 without prejudice, holding that the action was premature because the remaining shares had not yet been segregated. The MCTC explained that partition proceedings in the context of Rule 69, Section 2 occur in stages: first, the determination that a co-ownership exists and that partition is proper; and second, the actual partition by court-assisted means when the parties do not agree. It concluded that while the first stage had ended in Civil Case No. C-655, the second stage required completion for the remaining portions because the heirs’ respective shares beyond the plaintiffs’ one-fourth had yet to be segregated. It therefore found no cause of action for partition of the remaining undivided portion attributable to Amado’s heirs at that time.

Haudiny and Hipolito moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Acting alone, Haudiny Grageda then filed on 15 December 2003 a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution in Civil Case No. C-655, seeking to execute the partition of the remaining undivided portion.

On 22 September 2004, the MCTC ordered the parties to submit a project of partition. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but on 13 January 2005, the MCTC denied it in effect and directed the geodetic engineer to partition the remaining three-fourths undivided part of Lot No. 6386. The MCTC reasoned that it could not add or declare matters not contained in the Decision; it was simply mandated to carry out the terms of the final judgment.

RTC and Court of Appeals Proceedings

Petitioners elevated the dispute through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC of Legazpi City, docketed as SCA Case No. 10440. The RTC dismissed the petition as patently without merit and as manifestly intended for delay. It also characterized the issues raised as too insubstantial to warrant consideration.

Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal by denying due course. The Court of Appeals thus affirmed the RTC dismissal without special pronouncement as to costs.

The Sole Issue and the Parties’ Contentions

In the Supreme Court, petitioners framed the sole issue as whether the Court of Appeals correctly found that Haudiny Grageda’s claim in his motion for execution was not a compulsory cross-claim that could be enforced at any time.

Petitioners argued that Haudiny’s supposed claim should have been raised as a compulsory cross-claim in Civil Case No. C-655, which they insisted required Haudiny to file a separate Answer. They based this on the allegation that the answering defendants in Civil Case No. C-655 disclaimed interest because they claimed ownership was with a third person not impleaded. Petitioners further contended that Haudiny’s failure to file a separate Answer resulted in his being deemed to have adopted the Answer filed by the other answering defendants, including their admissions that negated Haudiny’s right to partition of the subject property. Petitioners insisted that the issue in Civil Case No. C-655 was limited to whether the plaintiffs had a right to a share, and that the defendants, including Haudiny, could not properly demand partition among themselves unless timely raised in the original action.

Haudiny, in turn, relied on the finality and executory nature of the MCTC Decision in Civil Case No. C-655, and the correctness of the MCTC’s implementation of that Decision through execution and partition measures covering the remaining undivided portion of the lot.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that petitioners’ arguments did not defeat the execution of the final and executory judgment.

The Court ruled that petitioners’ cross-claim theory attacked the correctness of the judgment and therefore should have been ventilated through an appeal of the 31 March 2000 MCTC Decision rather than through a petition for certiorari against a later execution motion. The Court stressed that petitioners could not relitigate matters that had already become final and executory in the context of execution.

The Court further held that petitioners’ position was contradicted by the dispositive portion of the MCTC Decision in Civil Case No. C-655, which ordered partition of Lot No. 6386 into four equal shares, awarding one of those shares to the Heirs of Amado Grageda, which included Haudiny. It also observed that the subsequent 16 January 2001 Order commissioning a geodetic engineer to implement the partition confirmed the intention to carry out a four-share partition of the entire lot, not merely to segregate the plaintiffs’ one-fourth share.

Applying the principle that when the fallo conflicts with the body of a decision, the fallo prevails, the Court ruled that an order for execution is based on the disposition, not on the discussion in the body. It recognized an exception where the inevitable conclusion from the body shows a mistake in the dispositive portion, but it held the case did not fall under that exception.

Finally, the Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ theory that Haudiny’s failure to file a separate Answer in Civil Case No. C-655 amounted to a waiver of his rights or an adoption of the answering defendants’ admissions in a manner that would deprive him of partition. It explained that petitioners invoked Rule 9, Section 3(c) on the effect of partial default, but that provision did not justify a presumption of waiver of a substantive right. The Court held that waiver must be express and may not be lightly presumed under the doctrine of renuntiatio non prsumitur. Since Haudiny’s supposed waiver could not be lightly presumed from procedural inaction, the favorable outcom

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