Title
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Bigo
Case
G.R. No. 10202
Decision Date
Sep 29, 1914
Dispute between Cardona and Binangonan over territorial jurisdiction of barrios; preliminary injunction denied; quo warranto deemed improper remedy.
complaint
jurisdiction
barrios
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 10202)

The Complaint and the Alleged Boundary Controversy

The plaintiffs alleged that Cardona was a municipal corporation whose territorial jurisdiction included the listed barrios. They further alleged that Binangonan was then exercising, or was pretending to exercise, jurisdiction over those same barrios without them being politically within Binangonan’s limits, thereby allegedly usurping the powers of Cardona’s municipal council over barrios located within Cardona’s confines.

They also alleged that L. R. Brown was about to destroy and remove the ancient monuments marking the limits of Binangonan and Cardona and to construct new monuments in their place, but allegedly in a manner that would exclude those barrios from Cardona and include them within Binangonan. The plaintiffs contended that the power to organize municipalities and fix their territorial limits rested exclusively in the Legislature as placed in the Philippine Bill framework, and that no law had authorized the separation of the barrios from Cardona and their incorporation into Binangonan.

According to the plaintiffs, the sole authority asserted for the proposed boundary change was Executive Order No. 66, series of 1914, issued by the Governor-General. They further asserted that the Philippine Bill did not authorize delegation of the power to change municipal territorial limits and that Act No. 1748, which they said was the basis for the executive order, was unconstitutional for attempting such delegation. They also argued that the executive order was void because it allegedly did not comply with Act No. 1748’s requirement under section 1 that the order affirmatively set forth that it was made for the public benefit.

The Relief Sought and the Authority to Sue

The plaintiffs prayed for judgment declaring Binangonan an illegal usurper of the powers, faculties, and duties of Cardona with respect to the specified barrios. They also sought a preliminary injunction ordering L. R. Brown to abstain from destroying the monuments and constructing new ones that would effect the boundary change.

The complaint was signed by Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Ymzon, described as attorneys for the municipality of Cardona. To show authority to appear for the Government of the Philippine Islands, the plaintiffs alleged that on August 19, 1914, the attorneys, acting for Cardona, had directed a communication to the Honorable Attorney-General asking him to begin the present action of quo warranto, but that the Attorney-General had refused and continued to refuse.

The Issue Limited to Preliminary Injunction

The Court stated that the only point it would decide at that moment was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction based on the facts stated in the complaint. The Court therefore confined its attention to the statutory requirements governing preliminary injunctive relief under the Code of Civil Procedure.

Statutory Requirements for a Preliminary Injunction

The Court cited section 166 of the Code of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that one of the conditions precedent for issuing a preliminary injunction was that the complaint must show facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded, the complaint must be verified by the oath of the plaintiff or an authorized person who could testify to the truth of the facts, and the plaintiff must file a written obligation with sufficient sureties to pay damages sustained by the party enjoined if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction.

The Court also cited section 164 of the Code, which allowed a preliminary injunction only when, to the judge’s satisfaction, it was established: first, that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief demanded and that such relief consisted in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually; second, that the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; and third, that the defendant was doing, threatening, or about to do some act likely in violation of the plaintiff’s rights, relating to the subject of the action, and tending to render the final judgment ineffectual.

Failure to Show Entitlement to the Relief Demanded

The Court held that a simple reading of the complaint and the record showed that the plaintiffs had not met the requirements of the cited provisions. It reasoned that, when preliminary injunctive relief was prayed for, the Court could not issue it unless the facts in the complaint showed that the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief and unless all other statutory requirements were complied with.

The Court also explained that while it would not examine the sufficiency of the complaint for purposes other than preliminary relief where no preliminary relief was prayed for, it was specifically required under the Code to consider the sufficiency of the complaint with respect to the remedy prayed for when asked to issue a preliminary injunction.

Misfit of Quo Warranto and the Nature of the Alleged Wrong

A central aspect of the Court’s determination was that the action was not properly one of quo warranto, and the court allegedly lacked authority—based on the facts stated—to declare the municipality of Binangonan an illegal usurper of the powers, faculties, and duties of Cardona regarding the contested barrios.

The Court held that the allegations did not bring the case within section 197 and following sections of the Code governing quo warranto. It described quo warranto as the remedy for situations involving usurpation, intrusion, or unlawful holding or exercise of a public office or franchise within the Philippine Islands, or an office in a corporation created by government authority, or where a public civil official commits or suffers an act that results in forfeiture of office, or where bodies of persons act as a corporation without legal incorporation or lawful authority to act.

The Court further clarified that quo warranto did not extend to cases where persons who held a legal title to an office merely exercised functions beyond their proper limits or exceeded the jurisdiction conferred. In the Court’s view, the complaint did not allege usurpation supported by the facts pleaded.

Application to Municipal Corporations and the Alleged Boundary Excess

Although the Court acknowledged that quo warranto could also be begun against corporations under terms analogous to those applicable to persons, it stressed that such an action presupposed that the person or corporation had no title to the office, functions, or franchise sought to be exercised. The Court observed that while the defendant municipality might not have legal authority to exercise jurisdiction over the named barrios on the basis claimed by the plaintiffs, it was nevertheless admitted that Binangonan was a municipal corporation with authority to exercise municipal prerogatives.

Thus, the Court reasoned that the mere fact that Binangonan might have attempted to exercise jurisdictio

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